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## Can Conservatives Be Saved?

IN OUR AGE, M. Raymond Aron observes in his *Opium of the Intellectuals*, the materialistic and anti-personal forces of what are called Left and Right are growing more and more like each other. The only real opposition to these grim forces, he continues, comes from "conservatism, after the fashion of Burke, limited to a narrow circle of intellectuals, at pains to counteract, not economic progress, but the decomposition of eternal moral values."

It is the hope of the editors of MODERN AGE that the narrow circle of conservatives may broaden, and that the totalism of Left and Right may be compelled, after all, to respect the traditions of our civilization. It is this conservatism of consecration, indeed, which MODERN AGE takes for its principal function. Yet the question remains whether there are in this world, and in these United States, enough conservatives of reflection—as contrasted with the mere conservatives of the flesh, of timidity, and of what Bagehot called "the ignorant democratic conservatism of the masses"—to hold the pass against the powers of leaden materialism and dreary uniformity.

More than a year before the first number of MODERN AGE came from the printer, the present editor enjoyed a conversation with a prudential liberal. By prudential liberal, I mean neither an old-fashioned nineteenth-century Utilitarian liberal, nor

one of those gentlemen who say "liberal" when they mean "socialist." The sort of person I have in mind has abjured the errors—or some of them—of twentieth-century "ritualistic liberalism"; he has mellowed somewhat, and seems a little tired, and goes only on *little* crusades. He does not admire the Soviets; he is not so hostile toward religious doctrine and dogma as once he was; and though he still believes in a further extension of the powers of the state, he has begun to worry over certain threats from state power to civil liberties and variety in life. Still, he is no conservative.

Well, my prudential-liberal acquaintance had learned that I was among the prospective founders of a conservative review. He understood the sort of magazine we had in mind, and was reasonably sympathetic. "Modern liberalism needs some corrective," he remarked. He would not agree with our opinions; but he would concede that an intelligent body of conservative opinion is rather a valuable element in a great nation. He was tired, too, of the sterile repetition of ideas and slogans into which most of the radical and liberal journals of opinion had fallen.

"If ever you really got underway," he said, "you could change this country, and the world. If ever you should get your magazine read by the graduate students, and the young instructors, and the young lawyers, and ministers and priests who are new to the business, and some literate businessmen, you could change the whole tide of public opinion within a few years. After all, there is a vague conservative drift in this country, and that drift might become coherent, if ever the drifters got ideas into their heads." He smiled a trifle ironically.

"But no," he went on, "you won't get anywhere. You'll never get off the ground. Mill was right when he said that conservatives are the stupid party. I don't mean you people: I don't agree with you, but I know you think. I mean the conservatively-inclined people who ought to help

you, but who won't. I mean the men with money, and the big foundations, and the people who can afford to subscribe to quarterlies, and the people who could write articles and stories for you. They'll fail you, all of them. The men with money will be too busy making money to pay any attention to you, and the big foundations will tell you they already have spent their budget for nose-counting surveys and hospitals, and the people who subscribe to magazines will keep on taking the *Nation* because they don't know any better, and the writers will all want to be approved by the liberal reviewers, and so won't touch conservative pitch, lest they be defiled. I know how it will go. I wish you well: but you haven't a chance. If I had any money, I'd give you some myself, because no one else will. You can't save conservatives from themselves."

No, the prudential liberal went on, the conservative element never will realize they have to think, until the hour when there is nothing left to conserve. By that time, taxation or war will have taken away the last of their money, so it will be too late to offer any resistance to the new regime. The prudential liberal shrugged. He might not like that new regime himself, he implied; but then, anyway, very possibly he would be dead by that time. *Après moi, le deluge*. He had few enthusiasms left, though he was quite a pleasant gentleman.

The editors of MODERN AGE are happy to report, however, that the predictions of the commiserating prudential liberal have not wholly come to pass. In the first place, within a mere nine months, we have found subscribers: Four thousand-five hundred of them, nearly, and at least twice that many readers. Our prudential liberal friend had declared that we could not possibly find more than a thousand subscribers, without spending a fortune in advertising; for long-established liberal quarterlies, he remarked, usually have only three thousand or four thousand subscribers, at best.

In the second place, we have found writers, both American and foreign. Though we have been able to pay only modest honoraria, we have attracted thoughtful and well-written articles, good verse, and even some decent short stories. Indeed, we have an overflowing bank of contributions yet to publish.

In the third place, we are beginning to exercise some serious influence. Newspaper editors quote us in their columns; young instructors write us long letters; undergraduates hold group discussions of our numbers; there have been some sermons preached on the basis of our articles. In nine months, we have made some mark. Given another year or two of existence, we should be able to find the ten thousand subscribers—after all, we are nearly halfway there now—whose support would defray our direct costs of publication.

But in one matter, affairs have gone as the prudential liberal predicted: in the matter of our finances. We have no bounteous angels; and though we are very grateful for the sizeable contributions which have been made by two small foundations and by several private persons (none of them millionaires), still we stagger precariously from issue to issue. We commenced on a shoestring, and now that shoestring is badly worn. Our hope springs eternal, all the same. We are not yet altogether convinced that conservatives really are the stupid party.

MODERN AGE can continue publication for a year longer, at least, if only it obtains funds for the two purposes—and in the amounts—below:

(1) About six thousand dollars to pay honoraria to contributors for one year. Even though our contributors do a labor of love, most of them cannot afford to give their time for nothing.

(2) About four thousand, five hundred dollars to make possible the donation of trial subscriptions for one year to teachers' colleges, junior colleges, and select public libraries—that at once increasing our public and our

finances.

Any help toward these goals will be most welcome. Our whole undertaking costs less than forty thousand dollars a year. If all the conservatives in this country cannot afford that sum for the discussion of great questions, then indeed conservatism is wholly confined—and perhaps fatally confined—to the narrow circle of which Aron writes.

In a debate between Mr. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and your servant, Professor Schlesinger civilly remarked that "Mr. Kirk is trying to save conservatism from the conservatives." There is a

grain of truth in Mr. Schlesinger's witticism; but that is not precisely what MODERN AGE is trying to accomplish. Our endeavor rather, is to save conservatives from the imputation of stupidity; from the ruin which always descends upon stupidity when that stupidity thinks itself entrenched in power and possessions; and from their own congenital apathy. In doing this, we may do our part toward the defense of our civilization of those dark forces, Left and Right, that would treat society as no more than a machine, and man as no better than a producing-and-consuming animal.

R.K.



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## A SYMPOSIUM

### AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

THE UNITED STATES occupies today the position that was Britain's in the age of the French Revolution. We Americans, whether we like it or not, have become the most powerful defenders of Western or Christian civilization against the menace of totalist ideology and armed doctrine. But greatness was thrust upon us suddenly; and certain confusions in our diplomacy, no matter what party is in power, are evident to everyone. In no field is healthy controversy, frankly undertaken, more likely to be beneficial.

Professor Bouscaren, in the first of the four essays of this symposium, argues that diplomacy may be conducted with success and honesty by a great democracy: in opposition to Mr. Walter Lippmann and certain other recent writers. Mr. Curtis Cate says that our diplomats have been endeavoring to apply the techniques of Dale Carnegie to the conduct of statecraft, with scant success; his article will rouse argument, we trust, and perhaps attract a reply from some quarter. Dr. Barnes, in a forthright review-article, examines the secret diplomacy that immediately preceded our entry into World War II. Dr. Draskovich calls for a much closer look at the case of Milovan Djilas and *The New Class*, and consequently at American policy towards "national Communism."

The editors and editorial advisors of MODERN AGE differ among themselves on the merits of these several theses; and we expect our readers, or many of them, to differ with one or another article. Without controversy, there can be no right reason.

### *Democracy and American Foreign Policy*

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

IN A WELL-KNOWN passage, Alexis de Tocqueville criticized the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy: "Foreign politics," he said, "demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient . . . . A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the de-

tails of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are the qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and they are precisely the qualities by which a nation, like an in-

dividual, attains a dominant position."<sup>1</sup>

*The Economist* recently indicted our foreign policy in these words: "Perhaps the greatest single obstacle to the emergence in America of a sustained and positive foreign policy is the nature of its political system. The division of power between President and Congress, the possibility of different parties controlling the one and the other, and lack of a cabinet responsible to the legislature, the working of the party system, are all weighted against the present pursuit of long-term national or international objectives . . . . The only way in which an administration in these circumstances can make its voice heard above the clamorous shouts of minorities, lobbyists . . . is by dramatizing the issue at stake to ten times life size and compelling Congress by a species of shock treatments to pass the necessary appropriation."<sup>2</sup>

Other experienced observers have criticized our system more bluntly. President Dickey of Dartmouth once said: "Our procedures for the democratic review and execution of international engagements are . . . in an unholy mess." A former careerist, writing in 1944, had this to say about the Department of State: "The Department is an unbelievably inefficient organization. It does not run. It just jerks along. Foreign policy is in the hands of whoever of two dozen higher officers is able at any moment and by any means to seize the ball. But in the Department there are queer rules: when a player seizes the ball and makes for the goal line, all the members of his team are entitled to tackle him. And as often as not the ball is seized and not carried over any goal line but hidden under the back steps."<sup>3</sup> The famous French foreign service officer Jules Cambon once wrote: "While democracies would always have diplomacy, it was a question whether they would ever have diplomatists."<sup>4</sup> James L. McCamy, in his book *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, complains: "The United States has not attained the competence it

needs, wants, can have and must have if it is to possess administration commensurate with its power."<sup>5</sup>

Among the other weaknesses attributed to democracies in the foreign affairs field are their inherently defensive natures, their alleged inability to act quickly in a nuclear age, their susceptibility to subversion, and the adverse effect of democratic ideology and public opinion on foreign policy.

Perhaps the most serious indictment of foreign policy in a democracy is that it tends to be pacifist, mostly because of public opinion, and that this pacifism plays into the hands of the aggressor. In 1936 Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin of Great Britain declared: "I have stated that a democracy is always two years behind the dictator . . . From 1933 I and my friends were all very worried about what was happening in Europe . . . at that time there was probably a stronger pacifist feeling running through this country than at any time since the War . . . My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance was there—within the next year or two of that feeling being so changed that the country would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think this pacifist democracy would have rallied to that cry?"<sup>6</sup>

The experience of the past twenty years shows how erroneous it is to base foreign policy on pacifism and an unwillingness to take risks. Recent letters to the *New York Times* by such distinguished persons as Salvador de Madariaga, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr take the United States to task on precisely these two counts, with respect to its behavior during the Hungarian uprising. Stefan Possony and Robert Strausz-Hupé put it this way in their textbook *International Relations*: ". . . to make foreign policy is to take risks . . . The United States cannot escape the terrible dilemma by avoid-

ing all risks—lest it accept defeat before the issue is joined.”<sup>7</sup>

But is it true that the foreign policy of the United States had been or need be enervated of our constitutional structure and the nature of democracy? Let us proceed to a consideration of public opinion, and presidential-congressional relationships, as we test various criticism of foreign policy in a democracy.

Machiavelli gives this advice on public opinion: “In politics the words shall never be in agreement with the acts. The prince must be sufficiently skillful to disguise his true plans under contrary designs. He must always give the impression that he cedes to the pressure of public opinion when in fact he carries out what he has prepared by his own hands.” Even in a democracy, the willful policy-maker seeks to lead or mold public opinion, and to make concessions only on minor details where these concessions are forced upon him by political circumstance. Only the most unprincipled will change policy day by day and week by week according to the whims and fancies of public opinion. An eminent historian states that Franklin D. Roosevelt, “when confronted by an apathetic public and a critical foreign menace, felt compelled to deceive the people into an awareness of their peril.”<sup>8</sup>

Lindsay Rogers admits: “Even the experts could reach no agreement on what the public is, and on what opinion is.”<sup>9</sup> Yet there is such a thing as public opinion, however seldom it crystallizes and however difficult if not impossible it is to measure and identify. American public opinion must be the composite of the views of large numbers of people, some well-informed, some with vague ideas, and some almost totally ignorant. If all this wisdom and ignorance are to be embodied in a single amalgam, every variation in the proportion of knowledge to naivete will bring divergent opinions, and variations in the estimates of that proportion will cause different people to reach different conclusions about the character and the validity of

public opinion. Henry Wriston defines “the American attitude” as being “that part of public opinion which, on a given issue, becomes articulate, and which is held with enough conviction and tenacity to affect public policy. It is not determined by counting noses, or by taking polls. It is not always, therefore, the ‘will of the majority,’ numerically determined; it may be the will of a relatively small but vocal and influential minority. On successive issues this effectively dominant group will vary enormously in its size and its make-up.”<sup>10</sup>

Public opinion has influenced world events long before Mr. Gallup sought to gauge it methodically. The Papacy relied on it when it banned offenders from the Church and called upon Christendom to battle the infidel. For long years it was Napoleon’s greatest single element of power. In 1914 the German government would certainly have hesitated to plunge into war if it had encountered strong opposition among the German people. In the 1930’s British public opinion seemed paralyzed by the pacifism previously alluded to, while a growing minority clamored for sanctions against Fascism. During the Korean War there seemed to be a schizophrenic attitude of either win the war to a victory or pull out of Korea.

Only a small segment of the American public offers opinions on foreign policy, and probably the most representative element of this opinion is unorganized. Congressman Robert J. Corbett complained in 1946 that “. . . many of the pictures of public opinion on given issues which I had believed to be true were found to be very false . . . . Like many others, I tended to believe . . . that those who wrote, wired, or telephoned reflected typical public opinion. They simply did not do so. Rather they generally represented vocal minorities.”<sup>11</sup> Gabriel Almond suggest that “the function of the public in a democratic-making process is to set certain policy criteria in the form of widely-held values and expectations, leaving to those

who have a positive and informed interest the actual formation of policy."<sup>12</sup> The chief function of the voter is to elect the makers of policy, but not to make policy itself. The protagonists of foreign policy come to power and stay in power only by virtue of their domestic influence, and generally speaking their policies must be in line with the desires of the citizens over whom they rule. Public opinion may exert great influence when it is overwhelmingly strong, but such a crystallization occurs only rarely. Public opinion is a difficult problem but it need not, and should not, be an obstacle to an effective and rational foreign policy. Mr. Acheson once said that the American government refused to help Chiang Kai-shek "so long as the Chinese people felt that we were supporting a government that they did not believe to be serving their interest."<sup>13</sup> Yet who could know what the Chinese themselves felt? Did the United States stop to ascertain the feelings of the U.S.S.R. before saving Stalin in 1941? The familiar excuse that public opinion would not 'go along' with a necessary policy is likely to be a cloak for unwillingness to act and irresolution.

Walter Lippmann is today foremost in a school of thought which deprecates Congress and public opinion, and urges unimpeded policy formulation and execution by the President and an executive elite. This view asserts that public opinion has been "disastrously wrong" in moments of great decision. It is claimed, for example, that public opinion demanded we "bring the boys back home" in 1945, thus damaging beyond repair America's global position.

"Our God and soldier we alike adore  
When at the brink of ruin, not before;  
After delivrance, both alike requited,  
Our God forgotten, and our soldiers  
slighted."

Thus wrote Francis Quarles in 1635 of the public's vacillating attitude toward the military.

Yet is public opinion primarily to blame for errors of 1945? In November of 1944

President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill: "I will bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems permit." The public, to be sure, delighted in this announcement, but general approval was to some extent, at least, a secondary result of wartime security measures, which kept the people from knowing the deficiencies in the wartime alliance and the menace of Soviet expansionism. Censorship withheld, for war purposes, most of the evidence that tensions were so great within the alliance that one of our partners was likely to become a new, and bitter enemy. Uneasy stirrings of doubt lest that be the case were quieted when President Roosevelt declared on March 8, 1944: "I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they aren't trying to gobble up all the rest of Europe . . . They haven't got any ideas of conquest . . . these fears that have been expressed by a lot of people here—that the Russians are going to try to dominate Europe, I personally don't think there's anything in it."<sup>14</sup>

It is clear that American public opinion was misled. The President had available to him explicit reports about wartime difficulties, which, however, he publicly denied existed. We cannot fairly blame public opinion for failures to face up to issues unless the basic facts are available to all the people. This instance is a powerful piece of evidence against Lippmann and similar critics who claim that democracy goes astray in foreign policy because of the separation of powers and the need to appease Congress and the public. In this instance the President was virtually unchecked. There was no deference to Congress or the electorate in this deliberate presidential action, taken despite numerous written and verbal reports, and his own first-hand contacts with Stalin at Teheran. The plain fact is that two successive presidents, despite repeated warnings from the professional advisers, allowed the Soviets to attain a dominant position in eastern Europe. The Chief Executive, unchecked by Congress or pub-



lic opinion, made the fatal decisions. These decisions, moreover, were taken at a time when military resources and diplomatic action could have made a different policy effective. During the war in Korea the public was again denied certain information about the treatment of American prisoners of war, the effect of diplomatic restrictions on military operations, and the intransigence of the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom.

The lesson to be drawn runs counter to the thesis that public opinion has been at fault and that strengthening the executive is the key to better policy formation; the true conclusion is that the public should be given the facts to the greatest extent possible, and with the greatest possible dispatch, to the benefit of foreign policy.

Foreign policy in our constitutional system has, of course, many shortcomings. Let us admit that many of our attitudes and actions have been shortsighted and mistaken. But was our nation ever involved in anything so wicked as Stalin's pact with Hitler, or Khrushchev's ruin of Hungary? Do we stand in need of emulating a strong man unimpeded by legislative bodies or public opinion? So-called "strong leadership," which is unchecked, often substitutes the irrational, even quixotic, impulses of a Duce, a Führer, a Stalin. Who would seriously propose that the checks and balances which did not exist for the modern dictatorial aggressors should be dropped from our structure of government? Experience has shown that neither constitutional liberties at home nor abroad are promoted by subjecting ourselves to the unlimited powers of personal decision.

Felix Morley has said that "our foreign policy is not democratic, was not intended to be, and cannot be."<sup>15</sup> One of the most difficult problems of political science is the reconciliation of the necessarily arbitrary conduct of foreign policy with the equally essential maintenance of popular government. But if democracy, or more exactly, our particular form of constitutional

government, is not compatible with responsibility and leadership, then it neither will, nor deserves to, endure. Alexander Hamilton, who was more concerned with constitutionalism than with democratic rhetoric, which he left to his opponents, resolves the dilemma for us thus: "There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current . . . as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which governments are instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests."<sup>16</sup> One does not have to concur with Hamilton's view of the broad masses to recognize that there is some midway point between policy by public opinion poll, and policy by a dictator. Even Hamilton agreed that Congress should check and balance the control of foreign policy by the President and Secretary of State, in this passage from the *Federalist*: "There is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature. . . . The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human nature which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States."<sup>17</sup>

Even the most democratic of governments must desire to succeed. There is no reason why democracy should turn upon



itself and deprive its agents of its essential means of defense. Indeed the primary objective of any foreign policy, democratic or not, is security. "Democracy," writes John Kieffer, "is a doctrine for the virile and the determined; it is not a protective cloak for the weak, or a haven for the pacifist or coward. Unless we are prepared to fight for that freedom we lose it. The most insidious anti-democratic doctrine ever advanced was 'peace in our times—at any price.' One can be secure in democracy, but only if one is prepared to fight for the freedom and security that democracy offers."<sup>18</sup>

When Secretary of State Dulles returned from the Far East in April, 1955, he suggested that our choice might soon have to be between peace and liberty: "The Communist rulers think that if pacifism becomes a prevalent mood among the free peoples, the Communists can easily conquer the world. Then they can confront the free peoples with successive choices between peace and surrender; and if peace is the absolute goal, then surrender becomes inevitable."<sup>19</sup> Several months later President Eisenhower declared: "Eagerness to avoid war—if we think no deeper than this single desire—can produce outright or implicit agreement that injustices and wrongs of the present shall be perpetuated in the future. We must not participate in any such false agreement. Thereby we would outrage our own conscience. In the eyes of those who suffer injustice, we would become partners with their oppressors. In the judgement of history, we would have sold out the freedom of men for the pottage of a false peace."<sup>20</sup>

The Pope, in his Christmas message of 1956, declared: "In the present circumstances, there can be verified in a nation the situation wherein every effort to avoid war being expended in vain, war—for effective self-defense and with the hope of a favorable outcome—could not be considered unlawful."<sup>21</sup>

Our constitutional structure grants to the President such a degree of dominance

in foreign policy that Chief Justice Marshall once said: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." As Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President has at his disposal the prestige of his office, his position as party leader, his control over patronage, and the ability to appeal over the heads of Congress directly to the people. He has the power to recognize or to withhold recognition from foreign states, to enter into binding secret agreements with them, or to commit American military forces to undeclared wars; he shares the treaty-making power and the power of appointments with the Senate. But, says Edward S. Corwin, ". . . whatever emphasis be given the President's role as 'sole organ of foreign relations', and the initiative thereby conferred upon him in this field, the fact remains that no presidentially devised diplomatic policy can long survive without the support of Congress, the body to which belongs the power to lay and collect taxes for the common defense, to regulate foreign commerce, to create armies and maintain navies, to pledge the credit of the United States, to declare war, to define offenses against the law of nations, and to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution not only its own powers, but all the powers of the government of the United States and of any department or officer thereof."<sup>22</sup> Corwin also points out that the Constitution "invites a struggle for power between Congress and the President," and throughout the history of this republic both sides have had their champions.

Thomas Bailey, a strong supporter of the Presidency, urges that the President deceive the people, for their good: ". . . because the masses are notoriously shortsighted, and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their long-run interests. This is clearly what Franklin D. Roosevelt had

to do, and who shall say that posterity will not thank him for it? Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary, unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand . . . in the days of the atomic bomb we may have to move more rapidly than a lumbering public opinion will permit . . . the yielding of some of our democratic control of foreign affairs is the price that we may have to pay for greater physical security."<sup>23</sup> Another advocate of a stronger President, Marshall Knappen, suggests that Congressmen must in some way be forced to overcoming what he calls their "constitutionally-induced aversion" to the executive branch and its proposals.<sup>24</sup> Clinton Rossiter expresses similar views in his recent book on the Presidency.

On the other hand Robert A. Dahl warns: "to the extent that the executive is capable of solving its problems without accepting Congressional collaboration it must inescapably become more and more the democratic shadow of that grim alternative, a frank dictatorship."<sup>25</sup> Charles Beard was outspoken in his opposition to presidential dominance of foreign policy during World War II: "At this point in its history, the American Republic has arrived under the theory that the President of the United States possesses limitless authority publicly to misrepresent and secretly to control foreign policy, foreign affairs, and the war power . . . the test is here now, with no divinity hedging our Republic against Caesar."<sup>26</sup>

Complainants like Walter Lippmann who urge a stronger hand for the President in foreign affairs usually cite the example of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations as an illustration of presidential frustration by Congress. But, as one of his critics puts it: "Wilson had a genius for making his own path difficult . . . The outstanding fact is that today the executive has the initiative in foreign policy to a degree unknown before in our history . . . No first class proposal in foreign policy has been refused since the Wilson de-

bacle."<sup>27</sup> This has been especially true since 1941, and presidential dominance was boldly proclaimed to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 1, 1945 when he referred to the Yalta decisions on Poland having been "agreed to by Russia, by Britain, and by me."

Short of the expenditure of money, the binding conclusion of treaties, and the declaration of war, the President can well nigh do as he pleases in formulating and executing foreign policies. By virtue of his power of recognition, executive agreements, sending troops anywhere, etc., he can narrow the freedom of choice which constitutionally lies with Congress to such an extent as to eliminate it practically altogether. Presidents of the United States have ordered the execution of well over a hundred military operations outside the borders of the United States without reference to Congress; whereas Congress was primarily responsible for involving the United States in wars in 1812 and 1898, the Presidency can claim responsibility for our involvement in the Mexican and Civil Wars, both World Wars, and the Korean War. In the field of international agreements, the ratio between executive agreements and treaties (in which Senatorial approval is required) has steadily changed to the detriment of the latter. In 1940 the United States concluded twenty executive agreements and twelve treaties; in 1942, fifty-two executive agreements and six treaties; in 1944, seventy-four executive agreements and one treaty. Although there has been a tendency in the past eight years to submit more international agreements to the Senate for its approval, the ratio between executive agreements and treaties continues to be lop-sided in favor of the former, and Harold Laski's 1949 prediction is being borne out: "More will be done by executive agreements, of which the exchange of letters between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii is perhaps the classic example, than by formal treaty making. This is because the pace of events is likely to be swift."<sup>28</sup>

There are also critics who demand foreign policy be taken out of politics, that "politics should stop at the water's edge." Some scholars, some commentators, and some professional diplomats resent politics either frankly or subconsciously; they prefer *expertise* of their own particular brand to the democratic hurly-burly. Yet however superficially attractive the "no politics in foreign policy" thesis may be, the record still seems to indicate that foreign policies which have not been subject to constitutional restraints, however slight, have been no more successful or efficient than their opposites. Indeed it often seems that the foreign policies of so-called democratic states have reached their lowest ebb precisely when presidents and prime ministers conducted affairs on their own, without the benefit of advice and consent of others. Certainly the secret agreements of Lansing-Ishii, Hoare-Laval, and Roosevelt-Stalin have failed to stand the scrutiny of history from the point of view of the strengthening of constitutionalism and human freedoms. The plain fact is that debate (even partisan debate) helps to mold decision and action through enlightenment as well as compromise. Advocates of *expertise* in foreign policy may as well remember that it is the constitutional way or the dictatorial way. Diplomacy is necessarily based on politics. The professional should never be supreme. The good diplomat has a sympathetic, as well as an exact, understanding of political realities.

In the past two years there has been a tendency on the part of the President to take Congress into his confidence by asking for so-called standby powers. While such powers are not required by the Constitution, they do enable the President to carry out policies which will have a much broader base of support than would otherwise be so. Diplomatic-minded presidents have discovered that they can coerce, or gain the support of Congress, through consultation in the execution of foreign policy, participation in the execution of this policy, information about the operation of pol-

icy, and the device of bipartisanship. This last is, of course, a subterfuge to take foreign affairs out of politics, and it has not succeeded for any long period of time except in extreme international emergencies. Senator Vandenberg used to complain that whereas he was always invited to take part in the diplomatic crash-landings, he was seldom invited to sit in on the take-offs.

Secret and personal diplomacy and the use of special envoys to bypass normal channels often lead to friction within the government, and inefficiency. A learned and temperate British writer held that Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy was "personal and untidy, reducing the State Department to a cipher . . . during the latter part of Cordell Hull's tenure and the incumbency of Mr. Stettinius."<sup>29</sup> Early in 1940 Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles was sent to Europe in a special mission without Secretary Hull's approval, which "brought the latent antagonism between Hull and Welles into such an active state that they could no longer work together satisfactorily in the Department."<sup>30</sup> Hull complained that the utilization of private envoys "tended in many instances to create havoc with our ambassadors or ministers in the capitals they visited, even though the envoys themselves had no such intention."<sup>31</sup> In June, 1944, the President approved a British-Russian spheres of influence agreement in the Balkans without informing the State Department, with the result that for three weeks State pursued a directly opposite policy.

President Truman approved a 1946 foreign policy speech by Commerce Secretary Wallace, without reading it carefully, which was in complete opposition to the foreign policy which Secretary of State Byrnes was at that time trying to carry out. In spite of the desperate, last minute efforts of Defense Secretary Forrester to block it, Henry Wallace proceeded to denounce U.S. foreign policy before a pro-Soviet gathering in New York. Byrnes then demanded that Truman fire Wallace,

which he did.<sup>32</sup> In 1948 Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith was told to enter into negotiations with the U. S. S. R. on a number of key issues, but our ambassadors in Europe were not informed, so that world public opinion was confused about the real intentions of the United States. President Truman granted *de facto* recognition to the State of Israel so suddenly and quickly that our ambassadors overseas and at the United Nations were not informed, to their embarrassment, until well after the event. Also in 1948 the President decided to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow as a special envoy; this came as a surprise to Secretary of State Marshall and Under-Secretary Lovett, who protested vigorously and successfully against the plan. President Franklin Roosevelt died without informing the State Department fully about the territorial concessions made to the Soviet Union in the Far East at the Yalta conference. James Byrnes complained: "It was not until some time after I became Secretary of State that a news story from Moscow caused me to inquire and learn of the full agreement."<sup>33</sup>

"The only practicable principle on which to base our foreign policy," writes Corwin, "is to base [it] on departmental collaboration, unless we wish to establish outright presidential dictatorship."<sup>34</sup> A number of proposals have been put forth to implement this principle, with special emphasis on improving executive-legislative relationships. These include:

- 1) Inviting the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to sit in on cabinet meetings relating to foreign policy.
- 2) The creation of a Foreign Relations Council to include both foreign affairs advisers in the executive branch and Congressional leaders.
- 3) Amending the two-thirds Senate treaty rule to a simple majority in both houses (this is least likely to succeed).
- 4) Permitting the Secretary of State to

debate and defend his policies in Congress.

- 5) Electing members of the House every four years (to avoid the discordance politically which frequently exists between the executive and legislative branches in the last two years of the President's term of office).

Some of these proposals could only be realized through constitutional amendments, and even then might not appreciably improve matters. But the promotion of mutual trust and confidence between the President and Congress must constantly be uppermost in the minds of those concerned. The Hoover Commission recently urged that "Congress should appreciate that leadership in the conduct of foreign affairs can only come from the executive side of the government . . . (and) the executive branch must appreciate the role of the Congress and the propriety of its participation in foreign affairs where legislative decisions are required."<sup>35</sup>

Unfortunately, not all efforts at improving executive-legislative relationships succeed. In 1951 the State Department asked Congress for an appropriation to expand a departmental staff which would maintain contact with Congress. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Ben H. Brown, was testifying on the need of continuing an appropriation for Mr. Moreland, described as "liaison official with the House of Representatives." The Deputy Assistant Secretary endured a rather acid examination, especially when it developed that his Mr. Moreland was unknown to the Congressmen. As the verbatim testimony shows, this was too much for Representative John J. Rooney, of Brooklyn:

"Mr. Rooney: 'While we are on this subject: is there any particular reason why we have been denied the privilege of meeting with Mr. Moreland?'"

"Mr. Brown. 'No, and I shall see that this is corrected.'"

"Mr. Rooney. 'Perhaps you will not



need to do so!"<sup>36</sup>

For its part, Congress is not so efficient a guardian of the people's interests as it might be. It lacks sufficient staff and time to pay enough attention to foreign policy, and often it lacks objective information and even sufficient information. Congressional leaders should be kept informed commensurate with security. With respect to the Department of State and Foreign Service, it is desirable that the wholly commendable effort to understand foreign points of view not permit individuals to lose sight of Congressional and American public opinion points of view. After his years in France, Thomas Jefferson returned to discover how much out of touch he was with America, and recommended that Foreign Service officers be limited in the time they spend in posts abroad.

With about forty-five executive agencies involved in the formulation or execution of foreign policy in addition to the State Department, there have arisen jurisdictional and other disputes which leave little time for actual consideration of foreign policy matters. James L. McCamy, an administration specialist with considerable experience in government, writes: "Our failure to provide a way to settle conflicts over jurisdiction and policy within the executive has led to . . . a failure to use our full resources of government in either the formulation of foreign policy or in the conduct of programs in foreign relations."<sup>37</sup> Some of these failures might be cleared up with the adoption of certain of the Hoover Commission proposals concerning red tape and overlapping. But in any event it should be remembered that bureaucracy in other forms of government is often far worse. There the tendency of subordinates to cover up mistakes is greatly accentuated by the nature of the sanctions imposed.

We may conclude at this point that in the balance, constitutional systems such as ours, are still more efficient and successful in the long pull than totalitarian systems.

It is not true that for constitutional reasons an effective American foreign policy cannot be conducted. Furthermore, the United States Government can move just about as fast as any other, when there is decisive and determined leadership. The President has sufficient power to conduct foreign relations, and neither Congress nor public opinion need impair successful policy.

If our experiences in the Korean war and in recent months are any indication, it may well be that the United Nations, insofar as we abdicate policy formulation and execution to it, will prove to be a greater impediment to quick and efficient action in the national interest, than alleged constitutional bars. There is some evidence which indicates that in our anxiety to win over as many nations as possible to certain programs, these programs are either very much watered down, or not even acted upon at all. The demise of the hot pursuit of enemy aircraft doctrine in Korea is the most extreme case in point. But as the UN Charter itself makes crystal clear, there is no restriction on the pursuance of national interest on the part of member states, so long as they refrain from engaging in aggressive war. Reinhold Niebuhr recently wrote: "The Administration has accentuated a widely-held misconception of the United Nations as a super-government which will solve world problems. It is only a confederation of nations which originally assumed the unanimity of the great powers for its successful operation. The cold war destroyed this possibility for the organization . . . . Our devout expressions of loyalty to it therefore become but a screen for our irresponsibility; for the United Nations can do nothing without the leadership of the Western powers."<sup>38</sup>

Modern critics of our foreign policy under constitutionalism have deplored the spiritual, moral, and religious elements so characteristic of, and so essential to, democracy. George Kennan, in particular, decries the tendency to inject morality into policy which, he feels, should be founded upon cold calculations of power.

"The most serious fault of our past policy formulation", he writes, "lies in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems."<sup>39</sup> This criticism, like that of Lippmann, at first glance has merit, but let us consider its consequences: what policy would the balance sheet principle have suggested to Britain after the fall of France in 1940? Would it not have been surrender on the best terms available? Kennan's principle fails to take into account the human spirit. The Battle of Britain was won in large degree by heart, by courage, by faith—possibly more significant in sound policy making than all the detached calculations proposed by pessimists regarding democracy. "One person with belief", wrote John Stuart Mill, "is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests." The American revolutionaries doggedly fought

on against heavy odds in 1776 because they had the will to win; the same is true of the Poles who saved Warsaw from the Russians in 1920, the Spaniards who saved the fortress of the Alcazar in 1936, the Marines who held on at Guadalcanal in 1942, our stand on the Pusan perimeter in 1950, the Guatemalans who overthrew the Arbenz dictatorship in 1955, and the Hungarian patriots who succeeded in gaining their freedom for five days, thus confounding the army of pessimists who had denied the possibility of revolt within the Soviet Empire.

Situations of strength are still essential; a reasonable estimate of the relationship of commitments to potentialities is ordinary prudence. But armaments, economic strength, and alliances are not enough. Policy must be based upon moral considerations as well as the more tangible factors.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>*Democracy in America*, ed. P. Bradley, I, 234-235.

<sup>2</sup>*The Economist*, May 24, 1947.

<sup>3</sup>Joseph M. Jones, *A Modern Foreign Policy for the United States*, p. 37.

<sup>4</sup>As quoted in Henry M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in a Democracy*, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>*The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, p. 349.

<sup>6</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Ser., Vol. 317 (London, 1936), col. 1144.

<sup>7</sup>New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954, p. 680.

<sup>8</sup>Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street*, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup>*The Pollsters*, p. 11.

<sup>10</sup>Henry M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in a Democracy*, p. 66.

<sup>11</sup>*Congressional Record*, March 15, 1946, v. 92, pt. 10, p. 1400.

<sup>12</sup>*The American People and Foreign Policy*, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup>Dean G. Acheson, *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom*, Department of State Publication 3852, p. 17.

<sup>14</sup>As quoted in Wriston, p. 91.

<sup>15</sup>*The Foreign Policy of the United States*, p. 138.

<sup>16</sup>*The Federalist Papers*, no. 71.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, nos. 69 and 75.

<sup>18</sup>*Realities of World Power*, p. 322.

<sup>19</sup>*New York Times*, April 12, 1955.

<sup>20</sup>*U. S. News and World Report*, September 2, 1955.

<sup>21</sup>Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message, December 23, 1956, *U. S. News*, January 4, 1957, p. 110.

<sup>22</sup>Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers*, pp. 224-225.

<sup>23</sup>Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup>Marshall Knappen, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 195.

<sup>25</sup>Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy*, p. 264.

<sup>26</sup>Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*.

<sup>27</sup>Wriston, *op. cit.*, pp. 95, 104.

<sup>28</sup>*Journal of Politics*, Feb., 1949, pp. 171-205.

<sup>29</sup>As quoted in Wriston, pp. 42-43.

<sup>30</sup>Graham Stuart, *The Department of State*, p. 344.

<sup>31</sup>*Memoirs* (New York: MacMillan, 1948, vol. 1), p. 200.

<sup>32</sup>Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 206-210.

<sup>33</sup>*Speaking Frankly*, p. 43.

<sup>34</sup>Corwin, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

<sup>35</sup>Report on Foreign Affairs, Recommendation 7 and 8.

<sup>36</sup>House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Dep't. of State Appropriations Bill, *Committee Print*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>37</sup>James L. McCamy, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, p. 356.

<sup>38</sup>"Seven Great Errors of U. S. Foreign Policy", *New Leader*, Dec., 24-31, 1956.

<sup>39</sup>George Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, pp. 89-90.



# Dale Carnegie and American Diplomacy

CURTIS CATE

ANY AMERICAN who goes to Europe these days and who is not content to be insulated from a perilous exposure to native life behind the cellophane wrapping of a guided tour is bound to be asked one question. It won't be a question about anything as spectacular as President Eisenhower's new helicopters, the elephantiasis of the American automobile, of the future of the rock n' roll. The question for Europeans is a more urgent one. As a distinguished Frenchman recently asked me in Paris: "And what about your Monsieur Dudul?" He was referring, of course, to Mr. John Foster Dulles.

Now it would have been simple to have answered this question by expressing a personal distaste for a gentleman who, despite the thick clouds of incense in which he has been enveloped by certain journalists, falls short of being the greatest Secretary of State in our history. But I couldn't help recalling Tocqueville's warning in his *Democracy in America* that seeking the explanation of events exclusively in the character, ideas, and weaknesses of those who happen to preside over the destinies of a society at a particular moment is a failing of monarchist historians. Even for those of us who are neither monarchists nor historians it is only a partial explanation to say that Mr. Dulles behaves like Mr. Dulles because he is Mr. Dulles. And so, when confronted with this recurrent question, I usually found myself answering that many

of the recent contradictions in American foreign policy may arise from our desire, amounting at times to a morbid obsession, to win new friends and influence new peoples abroad; and that they might, therefore, be attributable as much to the philosophy of Dale Carnegie as to the idiosyncracies of our Secretary of State.

Mr. Dale Carnegie's view of life is one that hardly needs an introduction. His is an optimistic, and thus a characteristically American, philosophy. In this confident vision of life, the world is basically a friendly place, where we do not have to resign ourselves fatalistically to having enemies and to being surrounded by people we cordially dislike; it is a place where, with the proper know-how, we can neutralize all ill-will and undermine all hostilities. It is a world in which every stranger is a potential friend.

The French humorist Pierre Daninos recently remarked that all over the world people will tell you, when first introduced, that they are happy to meet you. But Americans, he says, genuinely appear to mean it: "When we French say 'very happy to meet you', we might just as well be offering our condolences or saying 'So long'. We never think for a moment of being happy, for we already know enough people as it is. But in the United States it's just the opposite. People there are delighted to get to know you and they seem to have been waiting for this blessed mo-

ment for years."

This innate friendliness of Americans is one of the things that most strikes the foreigner when he visits our shores, and it is certainly one of the qualities that most endears Americans — individually, at least — to foreigners abroad. But like so many virtues, it is shadowed by its own particular vice: the confident conviction that because we are prepared to like others, they in their turn will be ready to like us — in keeping perhaps with Emerson's famous maxim that "the only way to have a friend is to be one." Wherever we travel in the world, and whether we go as tourists, businessmen, G.I.'s stationed abroad, or as Philip Wylie's "innocent ambassadors", we carry with us this instinctive belief in our ability — inherent in our American nature — to be liked. We saw it exemplified in the behavior of our occupation forces in post-war Germany. Whereas the British and French occupation troops were first of all interested in gaining local respect, our G.I.'s and officers were from the beginning anxious to win sympathy and affection.

Now the desire to be locally popular and to win new foreign friends is not, of course, *ipso facto* a bad thing. In an age of massive, world-wide propaganda, many countries of the globe have been driven to building up elaborate networks of cultural and economic publicity destined to acquire friendships and preserve influence abroad. But when elevated to a cardinal principle of diplomacy this desire inevitably involves one major presupposition: that foreign friendships can be multiplied at will without engendering crippling contradictions.

This presumption has underlain much of our recent foreign policy. All over the globe we have been acting as though we could with impunity be friends with everyone — at any rate in the "Free World" — and that we can, without danger to our prestige and our position, favor both sides, or appear to favor both sides, in the various conflicts afflicting our planet. We have sought to hold on to our alliances with France and Britain while encouraging the

anti-colonial aspirations of Asians and Africans. We have curried favor with Israel, while striving to maintain cordial relations with the Arabs. We have tried to be good friends with India, while shipping arms to Pakistan.

What has permitted us to pursue such a course has, I think, been a tacit assumption, implicit in the Dale Carnegie approach to life, that these conflicts are neither deep-rooted nor inevitable; that, indeed, they are not really conflicts at all (comparable, for example, to the Cold War between the Communist and non-Communist worlds), but local perturbations due to temporary misunderstandings; and that given time, patience, and moderation, they can be made gradually to disappear, like ugly black clouds that have been obscuring what, to borrow a Leibnitzian phrase, might be called "the preestablished harmony" of the free peoples of the world.

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So much for the theory. But what happens, in reality, when the desire to win new friends is applied to an area, like the Middle East, which, far from exhibiting any preestablished harmony of local interests, simply bristles with national enmities, dynastic jealousies, and frontier tensions? With the possible exception of Iran, there is not one country in the Middle East that does not have at least one enemy. It is no accident, therefore, that the Middle East has proved the acid test for the Dale Carnegie approach to foreign affairs. Because of its deep-rooted animosities our attempts to remain on good terms with everybody in it have given rise to repeated misunderstandings and resentments. Every favor shown Turkey has aroused resentment in Egypt; every attempt to conciliate Egypt has annoyed Iraq; every concession to Saudi Arabia has alarmed Israel.

It is conceivable that a policy of multiplying friendships could have been more or less successfully pursued in the Middle East if our policy there had been essentially passive. Such, in fact, has been the policy of countries like West Germany and Italy,

which have managed to keep on fairly good terms with the lands of the Middle East by simply entrusting political responsibilities in the area to others. But a merely passive or static foreign policy was what the present administration in general, and Mr. Dulles in particular, vigorously rejected when they took office in 1953. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the Eisenhower administration felt it had to introduce a "dynamic" foreign policy, which is to say, a strongly anti-Communist one. But each time it has sought to carry this out, it has aroused a hornet's nest of trouble. The attempt to take a strong line has run headlong into the desire to remain friends with everyone — with an almost invariable result: the "dynamism" of our policy has been watered down to preserve our desire to offend nobody. In each case we have beaten a more or less hasty retreat. To do so gracefully and to save as much "face" as possible, Washington has striven to disguise the fact that it was a retreat at all, by claiming, whenever an American initiative has run into unexpected trouble, that the initiative was not really ours. We have sought to disclaim responsibility and piously to wash our hands. Thus to a policy of pressing affability we have added the refinements of hypocrisy. It might be called the Dale Carnegie approach with a Pontius Pilate twist.

Be that as it may, it must be said in all fairness to Mr. Dulles and the present administration that the practice of disclaiming responsibility in the face of setbacks does not date from yesterday. In his book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Robert Sherwood cited a revealing instance of it back in December of 1944, when there was heavy criticism in the United States for the British intervention in Greece, where they were trying to thwart a Communist attempt to seize power:

There was plenty of indignation in Whitehall, [Sherwood relates] at the somewhat sanctimonious, holier-than-thou attitude which the United States was assuming toward a situation in

which it was undoubtedly concerned but for the solution of which it was taking no responsibility whatsoever. It seemed that whenever developments were favorable in any part of the world, the United States was entirely ready to share the credit — but whenever and wherever things went wrong, the United States was quick to absolve itself of all blame. As one British observer expressed it, "America is like an inverted Micawber, waiting for something to turn down."

The classic example of this kind of behavior in recent times was our attitude after the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956, when Washington's whole policy was contrived to foster the illusion that our bluff had not been called, that neither our prestige nor that of our Allies was in any way affected, that no real showdown was involved, and that the whole troublesome issue could be shrugged off, as President Eisenhower once put it in a press conference, as "a certain international incident", and dumped in the lap of the United Nations.

Another good example of it can be found in the case of one of Mr. Dulles' first initiatives — his sponsorship of a Middle East Defense Organization, aimed at keeping Russia out of the Middle East. Mr. Dulles attached so much value to this particular objective that he made a special trip to the Middle East in the spring of 1953 to explore its feasibility. In two years, his wish seemed to have been answered by the creation of the Baghdad Pact, a defense alliance that stirred up bitter opposition in Egypt, Syria, and even Saudi Arabia. In his officially inspired biography of Mr. Dulles, John Robinson Beal has recorded Washington's subsequent reluctance to join this unpopular alliance with an astonishingly straight face: "One feature about the Baghdad Pact not generally known is that it was 100 percent indigenous in its growth." This is interesting news, for it confirms what many of us have long suspected: that Mr. Dulles is one of the greatest battlefield tacticians since the Duke of

Plaza Toro. Like that egregious soldier, he prefers to lead his regiments from behind, because he finds it less exciting.

In its ineffectual treatment of the flow of Soviet arms into the Near East during the autumn of 1955, too, the State Department seems to have endeavored to act upon the principle that a diplomat need not deal with realities, but need only win friends. At the end of this affair, however, we had succeeded only in providing a remarkably clear example of "inverted Micawberism."

But perhaps the most instructive example of what happens when you try to pursue a policy of "dynamic" friendliness can be found in our diplomatic behavior over the Aswan Dam. Our offer to finance the building of a high dam at Aswan was repudiated in July of 1956, as we now know from Mr. Beal and others, because our policy of befriending neutral countries that were unwilling to cooperate with us had led certain of our stout allies, like Pakistan and the Philippines, to ask themselves if they too should not begin acting up and flirting with the Soviet bloc in order to secure more American attention. Thus the Aswan Dam initiative, undertaken in the autumn of 1955 in a desperate attempt to buy Egypt's friendship at a price exceeding Russia's, was abandoned just nine months later when it was found to be undermining our existing alliances. It affords a unique illustration of the kind of diplomatic contradictions that an unrestrained desire to out-friend one's rivals will inevitably engender. It was quite simply, in its hurried conception and momentous consequences, the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Dale Carnegie approach to foreign affairs.

### 3

As applied to the problems of diplomacy, the Dale Carnegie philosophy has, as we have seen, been predicated on the assumption that we can be friends with everyone, at any rate in the "Free World", because of the presumed artificiality and impermanence of human conflicts. This assump-

tion in its turn reflects the belief, and it is a profoundly American one, that all men are fundamentally brothers, sharing the same basic human needs and interests. This idealistic notion has, in one form or another, made repeated reappearances in our recent history. It was eloquently expressed in Woodrow Wilson's passionate belief in the "brotherhood of man" — that phrase which runs through his speeches like a *leitmotif*. It was what inspired Wendell Willkie to write *One World* and Franklin Roosevelt to launch what he hopefully called the United Nations. It is what led as pragmatic an American as General Eisenhower to believe, as he later described it in the twenty-fourth chapter of *Crusade in Europe*, that the Russians and the Americans, being free of "the stigma of colonial empire building by force", were made to be friends, and to hope that by getting them to cooperate in Berlin, the United States and Russia could establish a "working partnership" throughout the world; an abortive idea he seems to have wished to revive at Geneva. It is, to come down closer to the present, what persuaded that well-meaning citizen, Mr. Edward Steichen, to organize that extraordinary exhibition several years ago in New York's Museum of Modern Art, "The Family of Man", a photographic *tour de force* intended to prove that all men are like all men, because all men eat, sleep, work, laugh, play, and make love. And it is the same idealistic notion which has made a startling reappearance in Washington ever since the beginning of the Suez crisis.

The idea that all men are brothers and that, if allowed to give free expression to their true natures, they will behave in a reasonable, pacific, and benevolent way goes back, as is well known, to the founder of the theory of modern democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is, as a matter of fact, an absolutely indispensable notion to any naïve belief in "pure" democracy, and the fact that this country is, for good or ill, the most "advanced" democracy in the West goes a long way to explain its pecu-



liar hold on the American imagination. Now Rousseau's case is interesting, not only because he is the patron saint of modern democracy, but because his philosophy offers us an illuminating exhibition of the contradictions and caveats that any simple belief in the natural goodness and friendliness of men ineluctably engenders. The world being what it is, it is distressingly evident that we meet every day people who are singularly different, not always reasonable, and sometimes far from amiable. Any vision of mankind, therefore, which presupposes that people are naturally wise and well-disposed must provide some explanation for why in daily life men so seldom behave like philosophers or saints. For Rousseau the explanation was simple: in the state of "nature" man is naturally good and naturally wise. But in the state of civil society his natural goodness and amiability are corrupted by those inveterate vices of society — envy, vanity, ambition, pride, wealth etc. Society, in this particular conception of life, is the arch-corrupter, the serpent in Adam's paradise.

If we now turn from Rousseau's formulation of this idea to its modern American equivalent, we can find a strange parallel. In the contemporary version of this belief — and it is one that the President, Mr. Nixon, and Mr. Dulles have all implicitly endorsed in their recent declarations on foreign policy — the role of villain or "snake in the grass" in human affairs is played, first of all, by despotism, which prevents men from being free and thus "naturally" reasonable and well-disposed, and secondly by what is essentially the international extension of despotism, that is, imperialism. If, in this view of the world, certain nations assume aggressive, unfriendly, or virulently xenophobic attitudes, it is because they have been weaned away from their natural benevolence on the sour milk of dictatorship, or because certain external pressures and "colonialist" provocations have intruded to disturb the natural order of their existence and to give them

complexes. [I do not wish to imply that there is not a grain of truth in this idea. Its real naïveté resides in the conclusions drawn from it; in the notion, that is, that these complexes, once instilled, can easily be eradicated if the "proper" psychological treatment is applied.]

Such was, in essence, the underlying motivation in Washington's recent handling of the Suez crisis, just as it was the guiding inspiration of Franklin Roosevelt's policy towards the Russians in the last years of the Second World War. When Roosevelt and his *alter ego*, Harry Hopkins, came to ask themselves, for example, why the Russians, who had benefitted from such a flood of Lend-Lease supplies during the war, should continue to display such aggressive suspicion, distrust, and hostility towards the Western allies, they came up with a simple explanation. Stalin and his fellow comrades, who were basically good chaps, had developed a morbid suspicion of the West as a result of the intervention of the imperialist powers, Britain and France, on the side of the White Russians in the Civil War of 1919-1921. Everything, then, must be done to efface the memory of this unfortunate event. The Kremlin and the Soviet High Command had — over the repeated protests of General Deane (head of the American Military Mission in Moscow) — to be granted every request, no matter, how exorbitant or preposterous. Everything must be done to keep Moscow happy. Washington must never say "No" to the Russians, for fear of reopening old wounds, of reawakening old suspicions.<sup>1</sup>

From the beginning of the Suez crisis we have been treated to a singular repetition of this psychological approach to a problem of national susceptibility. I do not wish for a moment to condone the Suez attack, which in its timing, planning, and execution was a masterpiece of miscalculation. But to anyone who recalls what happened thirteen years ago, it must have appeared a disturbing repetition of history. It was strangely reminiscent of what happened at the war-time conference of

Teheran, where Roosevelt set out to curry favor with Stalin by deliberately baiting "that old imperialist", Winston Churchill. The circumstances this time were obviously different, and it would be unjust to accuse Mr. Dulles of any intended collusion with Mr. Shepilov.

This time, in the view that still seems to predominate in many of the highest government circles in Washington, it is the Arabs who have been the victims of foreign provocation. If they show themselves to be so anti-Western to-day, it is because of all the humiliations they have endured under the former imperialist yoke of France and Britain. Everything must be done, therefore, to ease the burden of this past and to efface its cruel memory. Once liberated from the grip of the hated imperialists, the "natural" Arab, naturally well-disposed and naturally reasonable, will proudly arise from his abasement. He will become once more the friend of the United States, if not of the entire West.

This psychological approach to the present situation in the Middle East may be likened to that of the parent who one day discovers with a shock that her child has been entrusted to the care of a despotic governess. To repair the psychological ravages thus caused, the governess is dismissed and the child is coddled. After being tyrannized, the child must be spoiled. In the prevailing psychology this is the point where the ideas of Freud (or a caricature of his ideas) merge with those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

The predominance that this particular theory of psychology has come to have over our foreign policy may be explained by the fact that it is or was until recently, popular in the American school and the American home. In his latest book, *The Public Philosophy*, Mr. Walter Lippmann undertook, among other things, to show how the theories of Rousseau, interpreted and brought up to date, by Pestalozzi and Froebel, have flowered in the prevailing doctrine of democratic education. According to a favorite analogy of this particular school of thought,

the naturally good man (or infant) is compared to a tree planted near "fertilizing" water. In order that he may expand and flourish, he must be allowed to grow up unhindered, unfettered, and uninhibited, without barriers, duties, or sanctions being opposed to his natural appetites and pendants — like a tree which is allowed to grow up strong and sturdy by simply obeying the hidden ordinances of Nature.

This is, fundamentally, the psychological theory that Washington has adopted in its increasingly important dealings with almost all of the "uncommitted" countries. The analogy of the young tree being allowed to grow up naturally is a particularly appealing one with respect to the underdeveloped countries, above all to those that were once or still are under foreign mandate or colonial rule. The classic case has been that of Egypt. Having first engineered the British out of the Suez Canal zone in 1954, and having again intervened last autumn to free Egyptian territory of British, French, and Israeli troops, Washington hopefully expected that the Egyptians would regain their natural serenity and goodwill, and display their gratitude towards the United States by henceforth cooperating with us. It was a naïve expression of that hopeful expectation, implicit in the Dale Carnegie philosophy, that if you offer someone a friendly smile and a warm handshake, he will reciprocate in kind.

4

It seems to be an axiom of diplomacy, no less than of every-day life, that old habits die hard. Whatever hopes Washington may once have placed in a policy of blandishment towards the Middle East it has, it now appears mostly abandoned; yet there has been scant sign (from the capital) of any serious attempt at an agonizing reappraisal of the psychological axioms which gave rise to these hopes in the first place. What, I think, has been happening behind the tumult and confusion of the last few months is that the Dale Carnegie approach, having failed in its



direct application to the central problems of the Middle East, has been forced underground, but elsewhere has lingered in a number of scattered notions and practices.

Probably the most picturesque and innocuous of these has been President Eisenhower's personal sponsorship in the last year or two of a *People to People Foundation* — an ambitious organization, comprising some 40-odd committees, which has undertaken to "project" the American way of life to foreign countries on a "person-to-person" basis. This formidable, or at any rate potentially formidable, citizens' army of informal ambassadors is dedicated to multiplying the personal contacts between Americans and foreigners abroad, thus breaking down the barriers and prejudices that keep foreign peoples from seeing and appreciating what America and Americans are really like. The infancy in this Friendship Crusade is made up of a hard core of industrial committees, staffed by American businessmen and advertisers well versed in the subtle arts of public relations, and who now intend to extend their operations abroad. On the flanks of this hard core are highly mobile cavalry units, which are planning to surprise foreign audiences with dazzling skirmishes in the cultural field. A typical example is Al Capp's "Cartoonist Committee", which is working on a giant Comic Book, understandable to adolescents the world over, which is intended to make a regular Dogpatch of all the clichés ever held about America. Another is William Faulkner's "Writers' Committee", the members of which have pledged themselves, somewhat lackadaisically it is true, to proving to a dubious world that there are some Americans who write books and even some others who read them.<sup>2</sup>

The reverse side to this outgoing and essentially extrovert Dale Carnegie campaign has been President Eisenhower's recent experimentation with "personal" diplomacy. The President has recently manifested his predilection for this kind of diplomacy above all in his reception of

foreign leaders of note. Since last summer, President Sukarno of Indonesia, Nehru of India, Prince Abdul Illah of Iraq, and King Saud of Arabia, to name but a few, have come to the White House to be subjected for a few hours or days to the powerful radiation of the Eisenhower charm. Now there is, of course, nothing wrong in foreign statesmen making the pilgrimage to Washington. It is certainly far better for our President to receive foreign dignitaries at home than to travel all over the globe, like Mr. Dulles, to make personal magnetism felt. But the confidence which President Eisenhower seems at times to have placed in this smiling sunlamp treatment is disturbingly reminiscent of the faith Franklin Roosevelt placed in the effectiveness of his own unique charm. The trouble with this man-to-man approach to diplomacy is that it fosters the easy notion that a few hours of concentrated affability can produce miracles unobtainable by months or years of patient diplomatic spadework; that a week-end of informal amiability can make of a foreign statesman not only a lasting friend, but one who will forthwith modify his policies to suit our hopes and wishes; and that once the dose of effusive friendship has been administered, one can return quietly to the golf links in the serene conviction that the affairs of at least one sector of the globe are in the safe hands of solid friends.

Still another manifestation of what might be called a camouflaged Dale Carnegie approach to diplomacy has recently been provided us in the cautious wording of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The authors of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and those who subjected it to a searching scrutiny in the Senate, were obviously motivated by one paramount desire: they wanted to make it an emphatic declaration of America's interest in preserving the status quo in the Middle East, without at the same time making it look like an "imperialist" policy or pronunciamiento that might give offense to the peoples for whom it was destined.

The Eisenhower Doctrine is, consequently, an ambiguous declaration which is studded with hypotheticals, the most important of which are the clauses limiting any possible American military intervention in the Middle East to the request of a Middle East Country which has been openly attacked by another "controlled by international Communism."

Despite these elaborate precautions taken to give it an innocuous and inoffensive air, the Eisenhower Doctrine has received a stormy reception with the Arab masses, and with several Arab governments, as a disguised form of American imperialism. Even Jordan, at the height of last April's crisis, shrank from invoking any of its clauses. What is the explanation for this reaction? It is, I think, essentially because the Eisenhower Doctrine, as a formal statement of a great power's interest in a vital area, has an inescapably patronizing air about it. The Middle Eastern masses and their leaders instinctively resent it, not only because they are in the grip of a feverish nationalism; they resent it because any such diplomatic declaration on the part of a great power is bound to emphasize their own weakness and impotence.

5

This is, I believe, the lesson we must learn if we are to deal sanely and soberly with the Middle East and other areas of the world today. We are a great power; and because we are a great power we cannot expect foreign peoples and, above all, weak and backward peoples, to love us and trust us blindly, no matter how great the diplomatic bribes we offer them, or the military presents we bring to them. We cannot, as the recent outbursts of anti-Americanism in Formosa and Japan have made clear, exercise the attributes of a great power and still expect to be universally popular. Mr. Dale Carnegie's formulas may stand a chance of working in a republic where all men, in theory at least, are equal in the civic rights and human dignity they enjoy. They stand little chance

in a world, even the so-called "Free World", where at one extreme there stands a colossal country which wields much of its atomic, air, and naval power and consumes almost half of its raw materials; and at the other extreme there exist militarily impotent and impoverished countries whose standard of living has risen only a fraction above what it was in the days of the Pharaohs and Confucius.

Anyone who has had some experience with psychiatry knows that when a psychoanalyst begins his treatment of a patient, the first reaction he must expect will not be one of gratitude, but of hostility. The patient, no matter how clearly he may in his intellectual mind realize his debt to the therapist, reacts with instinctive violence to the terrible invasion of his privacy that psychoanalysis represents. It would be far fetched, of course, to liken our relations with the formerly subjected peoples of Africa and Asia to those prevailing between the psychoanalyst and his patient. But the parallel, if handled with caution, can prove enlightening in explaining the almost visceral reaction of the Arabs to something like the Eisenhower Doctrine. The authors of that now famous manifesto may not expressly have willed it, but they drew up a document with an unmistakably antiseptic aroma about it. For what could appear more therapeutic than an undertaking intended, no matter how clumsily, to protect the Middle East from Communist contagion? The Eisenhower Doctrine may be criticized on many grounds, but perhaps the worst mistake of its authors was the ingenious notion that in expressing a public concern for the Middle East, we would make new friends of the Arabs.

It may be galling to our self-esteem and our craving to be liked, but we must learn to live with the realization that there is no valid reason why Arabs or Asians should particularly like us, even disregarding our responsibility for the creation of Israel or our long-standing ties with France and Britain. The mighty wave of nationalism

now sweeping Asia and the Middle East is more than a simple revulsion against the former "colonialist" rule of our European allies. It is a revolt of relatively backward peoples who covet the material blessings of Western technical civilization, while resenting the feeling of humiliating impotence that the very power and wealth of the West engenders in them. As the richest and most powerful country in the West, we are naïve to think that we can successfully curry favor with these peoples by simply dissociating ourselves from France and Britain and proclaiming our freedom from imperialist sin.

All this goes counter, I realize, to the doctrine now dominant in Washington. This doctrine has recently been reaffirmed by as heretical an American as Philip Wylie, who is — Lord knows! — no particular admirer of Mr. Dulles. Stated simply and without the verbal flourishes with which Mr. Wylie has decked it out in *The Innocent Ambassadors*, this doctrine asserts that we must win the friendship of the "uncommitted" countries of the world, because if we can't "sell" ourselves to them and make ourselves liked by them, they will surely turn Communist out of hatred for us.<sup>3</sup> This is, in effect, a restatement of the black-and-white proposition, to which Mr. Dulles has on occasion subscribed, that those who are not with us are against us. It is an odd spectacle to see Mr. Dulles and Mr. Wylie, for once, lined up shoulder to shoulder in the same trench, but it attests to the singular strength and prevalence of this notion.

Another prominent American who has evidently subscribed to this doctrine is Mr. Nixon. The Vice President embarked on his recent "good will" tour of Africa in much the same spirit as a salesman going out to do a job of market research on a given area of potential consumers. He went out to "sell" America to the Africans, if not immediately at any rate in the years to come. It may be considered one more illustration of the Dale Carnegie quest for popularity, undertaken with all

the care and science of a Madison Avenue publicity campaign. It was a diplomatic gambit that came naturally to an administration that has from the start had a pronounced business flavor to it and which tends more and more to view the problem of winning favor abroad through the eyes of our advertisers and public relations experts.

In its most naïve form, our desire to be popular with the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa has recently found expression in the idea that nationalism, no matter what its form, deserves to be encouraged simply because it is "the wave of the future", a phrase that many Americans have unconsciously borrowed from Marxist ideology. The presumption in Washington and elsewhere today seems to be that the wave will be easier to ride if it is urged along. This is an attitude reminiscent of the famous answer once made by the nineteenth century French demagogue, Ledru-Rollin, who, when asked where he and his party were headed, replied: "I do not know. But I am their leader, so I must follow them."

Only too often of late, our policy in the United Nations seems to have been designed solely to make sure that never, on an important issue, should we find ourselves in the minority, even if it means sacrificing the interests of our Allies. Such a policy has inevitably forced us to try to chase with the hounds at one moment and to run with the hares the next. Just where it may ultimately lead us it is still impossible to say; but there is perhaps some food for thought in J. B. Priestley's friendly admonition: "How can you be boss and still be one of the boys? When we British were top dogs, we were represented by a ruling class that was arrogantly self-sufficient, not caring a damn whether we were liked or not. But the American, when he finds that he is not liked just because he is top dog, is shocked, bewildered, saddened, and occasionally very angry."

This is not to say that in assuming our

growing responsibilities as a world power we should barge ahead and start throwing our weight about in the clumsiest imperialist style. It is not to say that maintaining amicable relations with "neutral" countries is unimportant. But it is to suggest that trying to win new friends by turning one's back when it is convenient on our oldest allies is the worst of all friendship-formulas. It is to suggest that we shall find it easier to preserve our international prestige, and the alliances upon which that prestige ultimately reposes, by becoming more thick-skinned, more realistic, and less self-righteously sycophantic in our dealings with the world.

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace", in *Life*, August 30, 1948.

<sup>2</sup>For a full account of this multiple effort, see William Harlan Hale's article, "Every Man an

Ambassador", in March 21, 1957 issue of the *Reporter*.

<sup>3</sup>It is doubtful if any country has ever gone Communist out of simple xenophobia, let alone a specific hatred of Americans. The closest that any country has come to it was Hungary in 1919, when the Communist Bela Kun government was swept into office on a wave of anti-Allied feeling provoked by the terms of the Treaty of Saint Germain. But this government barely lasted out a few months and was unseated by the Hungarian army the moment that the Hungarian people had gotten over their initial indignation. The only other example that might be cited — that of China — is equally dubious. The Communist triumph of 1949 was due to many complex factors, and perhaps above all to the fact that the whole structure of Chinese society, land tenure, administration, and ethics was turned upside down during the twenty odd years of civil and foreign wars from 1927 on. We should not forget that as early as 1935 Lin Yutang was speculating on the possibility of a Communist triumph in China in his book, *My Country and My People*. Hatred of Westerners was not one of the reasons he put forward to support this hypothesis.

# *The End of the Old America*

HARRY ELMER BARNES

**The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941**, by Donald F. Drummond.  
*Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. vii, 409 pp.*

A NEW BOOK, true to its title, describes the most momentous and ominous transition in American history. The racial and segregation issue, which is so warmly debated at present, is surely an important item charged with political and social dynamite. But it is a relatively trivial matter when compared to the abandonment by the United States of the benign neutrality, international modesty, and pacific inclinations that generally guided our relations with other countries for nearly a century; and the wholehearted, even passionate, espousal of globaloney, world-meddling, and perpetual war for perpetual peace. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that even the Civil War was of less importance than the revolution in American policies on world affairs since 1917. However deplorable a permanent disruption of the union might have been, its results probably would not have been as momentous to American life and values as the loss of our neutrality and its aftermath since 1917. As the late Gareth Garrett pointed out, this change has made our country, as it existed before 1941, and especially before 1917, veritably "Ex-America."

This transition has been one from the tradition of Monroe to the Orwellian sys-

tem which now dominates the majority of the civilized world—all of it except the "neutrals." In regard to the United States, it may also be the harbinger of another menacing development, namely, that our country will become the new Byzantine Empire, devoted chiefly to bolstering up what remains of the British Empire, in the same way that the Byzantine Empire acted as the receiver and protector of the decaying Western Roman Empire. This was pointed up by the crisis in Cyprus, the "Eisenhower doctrine" on the Middle East and the Syrian crisis, the disputes growing out of the seizure of the Suez Canal, and the almost frantic Anglo-American collaboration after the release of the "sputniks." It is a rather striking coincidence that the most specific date and action connected with our entry into the Orwellian era came in March 1947, when President Truman took over the international burdens and responsibilities which Britain could no longer shoulder in the very center of ancient Byzantine glory and later distress, Greece and Turkey. The temporary clash with Britain over the latter's attack on Egypt in November 1956 was quickly smoothed out, and American power was pledged to maintain the *status quo* in the Middle East, so vital to what remained of the British Empire.

Opponents of state enterprise can get little comfort out of either Orwellianism or the new Byzantine trends. The enormous



increase of statism, military state capitalism, inflation, debt, and the like, has been inseparably connected with the Orwellian pattern of basing economic "prosperity" and political tenure upon cold and phony war, a gigantic armament industry, and a vast "giveaway" program. The lessons of history drawn from the experience of the Byzantine Empire indicate that any neo-Byzantinism would be equally fraught with danger to economic liberty. The eminent medievalist, the late Professor James Westfall Thompson, thus characterized the economic results of the Byzantine efforts to bolster and protect a disintegrating empire:

The industrial structure of the Eastern Empire at the beginning of the sixth century was a mass of exclusive trade and industrial corporations under governmental regulation. . . . . The economics of the Byzantine Empire was one supreme socialistic organization; but a selfish one, for its regulation was governed in the interests of the ruler and his government and not primarily in the interest of society. Industry was a state affair.

In what was probably the most timely and vitally important article in an American periodical in a decade, Felix Morley set forth the evidence that the United States may be on its way to Empire and decadence, in the first issue of *MODERN AGE* (Summer 1957).

*Essential Nature of Professor Drummond's  
Apology for Roosevelt*

As I implied earlier, Professor Drummond's book bears out its title in describing "the passing of American neutrality." It shows very adequately how our neutrality was lost. It does not deal with the subject in its broad theoretical principles and institutional developments, but is limited to the diplomatic maneuvers and intrigues whereby this momentous change was accomplished. It is unquestionably the best one-volume book on our entry into the Sec-

ond World War that is also devoted to vindicating the alleged wisdom and integrity of the Roosevelt-Hull foreign policy from 1937 to 1941, which, in reality, means the Roosevelt foreign policy. It is not as lengthy and comprehensive as the gigantic and erudite apology for Churchill and Roosevelt in the two-volume Langer and Gleason treatise. But it is far superior to Walter Millis' fantastic defense of Roosevelt and his entourage in *This is Pearl!*, and the effort of Basil Rauch to portray Roosevelt as a pacific benefactor of all mankind. The bibliography is fairly full, but is carefully selected to serve the author's purposes. Such basic and fundamental revisionist volumes on the background of the Second World War as W. H. Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade*; F. R. Sanborn's *Design for War*; George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor*; the symposium *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, edited by the reviewer; and Admiral Theobald's *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*, are not listed, nor is there any evidence that the author has used them.

Despite this, the book resembles the *magnum opus* of Langer and Gleason in making available to those scholars in actual search of the truth a large amount of material very directly useful to the revisionist interpretation of events between 1937 and 1941, when presented or interpreted in a forthright and logical manner. It is also true, however, that many events and acts of the greatest significance for the record and a full understanding of the international situation between 1937 and 1941 have been omitted because they would so obviously support the revisionist interpretation, and undermine the approach and conclusions of Professor Drummond and his fellow-apologists for intervention. This is especially apparent in the author's treatment of the immediate background of Pearl Harbor.

As a sample of these omissions, and surely one of the more crucial, we may cite the attempt to obscure the real purpose of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting off the



coast of Newfoundland in August 1941. By this date, it had become evident to these two collaborators in the effort to get the United States actively into the war that there was little hope of inciting Hitler and Mussolini to execute acts of war that would enable the United States to enter the war by the front door of Europe. Hence, as Professor Charles C. Tansill, Dr. Charles A. Beard, and others, have shown, they arranged this meeting at sea to explore the possibility of finding a back door to war by inciting Japan to attack in the Far East. The possibility of a naval war with Japan had also been in Roosevelt's mind since his first cabinet meetings in March 1933, a fact revealed by James A. Farley in his memoirs. Professor Drummond omits the overwhelming evidence relative to the "back door" program and portrays the meeting as primarily concerned with the idealistic effort of Roosevelt to circumvent any attempt of the British to involve him in a repetition of the secret treaties of the First World War. This effort, according to Professor Drummond, resulted in the Atlantic Charter, the supreme achievement of the meeting.

An "assistant president," Forrest Davis, and a specially favored political writer, Ernest K. Lindley, prepared a quasi-official book on this subject in 1942, *How War Came*. Here, on pages 9 to 15, they blurted out the truth about the "back door" plan, and showed that the only difference between Roosevelt and Churchill relative to the scheme was in the matter of timing. Churchill wished to kick the back door open at once, but Roosevelt demanded that he be allowed to "baby the Japanese along" for three months in order to gain time for further American preparations for war. This vital confession is omitted entirely. Indeed, there is no mention of the Davis and Lindley account. When he was later cornered by newspapermen in Washington, Roosevelt admitted that the charter was essentially a hoax and a protective propaganda stunt. The fraud was nailed down by John T. Flynn

in his *The Roosevelt Myth* (pp. 385-386).

### *Import of the Missing "Kent Documents."*

Friends of Roosevelt, Churchill, and the interventionist version complain that the revisionists like Beard, Tansill, Sanborn, Chamberlin, Morgenthau, et al., are extreme to the extent of unfairness or malice in their criticisms of the Roosevelt-Churchill actions and policies from 1939 to 1942. Yet these books are more moderate and generous than the ultimate verdict may be, if and when all the evidence is in and is available to scholars.

While there are other reasons for this statement, a main basis lies in the fact that far and away the most damaging evidence against Roosevelt and Churchill has never been opened for use even to the apologists for these men. On the contrary, there have been almost frantic efforts to prevent its use, and it is not impossible that the alarm over any future use of this material will lead, or has already led, to the destruction of the dangerous documents. We have reference here to the so-called Kent Documents, namely, the nearly two thousand secret messages illegally exchanged between Roosevelt and Churchill in the American code beginning in September 1939. Roosevelt, used the code name of POTUS (President of the United States) and Churchill the title of "Former Naval Person." Churchill himself has told us that these documents contain most of the really vital facts about the collaboration of himself and Roosevelt in their joint effort to bring the United States into the war, contrary to Roosevelt's public assurances and the obvious and repeatedly expressed wishes of the American people. As Churchill expressed it in *Their Finest Hour*: "The chief business between our two countries was virtually conducted by these personal exchanges between him and me."

That these Kent Documents contain diplomatic and historical dynamite of the first order is very apparent from the concern, if not alarm, expressed by Churchill

lest they be used, even by historians notoriously favorable to the Roosevelt-Churchill policies and intrigues. Professors Langer and Gleason were subsidized to the amount of some \$150,000 to produce the semi-official "court history" of the origins of the Second World War and American entry therein. It was well known to the historical profession and Washington officials that these able scholars intended to go to any reasonable length to defend Roosevelt and Churchill, and the latter was fully acquainted with all this. Yet he felt it necessary to forewarn Langer and to threaten him with a court suit if he made any use of the Kent Documents.

If and when the latter are made accessible to scholars intent upon the truth, we may rest assured that the indictment already presented in the books by Beard, Tansill, Sanborn, Chamberlin, and Morgenthau will seem almost like apologies for the Roosevelt-Churchill epic. No one can well doubt that if this material would refute, or even moderate, the revisionist indictment of Roosevelt and Churchill there would be no such alarm over its use; instead, it would have been brought forth already in their defense. I conclude that the Kent Documents would make the case against them much stronger than the revisionist verdict as it stands in 1958. These documents—supposing they still exist—are, along with Roosevelt's commitments to Eden in December 1938, and to George VI in June 1939, perhaps the most closely-guarded top-secret material in our national archives and the Roosevelt Library.

It may be argued that because the present writer has not read the Kent Documents, he has no right to comment on them. But one does not have to read them to grasp the fact that if these documents would clear Roosevelt and Churchill, they would have been made available long since to scholars. And probably this writer knows as much about the Kent Documents as anyone can who has not read them. I had a day-long conference with Tyler

Kent within forty-eight hours after he arrived in this country, following his illegal imprisonment in England, and have talked with him about them several times since. Both Mr. Kent and this writer are prevented by Federal law from divulging the contents of the documents.

#### *Omissions and Admissions*

Professor Drummond presents a picture of Roosevelt in pre-war diplomacy as a pacifically-inclined statesman who hated war, sought to prevent any European conflict, tried to end the war after it broke out, and resisted pressure to get the United States involved. As he summarizes the first two items on page 375: "Roosevelt brought his counsels of restraint to bear in all major European crises from 1938 to the outbreak of the war." There is no mention of Ambassador Kennedy's confession to James Forrestal that Roosevelt was urging Kennedy to "put iron up Chamberlin's backsides," so he would make no more conciliatory gestures after Munich, or of the evidence in the authentic captured Polish documents that Roosevelt both directly, and through his Ambassador in Paris, William C. Bullitt, pressed Poland to resist the reasonable German demands in 1938-39, and urged the British and French to back up the Poles in the policy and actions that led straight to war at the beginning of September 1939. It is not revealed that Roosevelt's support of the Munich appeasement was not due to his love of peace but to his feeling that, if war broke out in 1938, the odds against Hitler would be so great that the war would be over before Roosevelt could lead the United States into it. In conjunction with Churchill, Roosevelt resisted all the efforts of Mussolini and Hitler to end the war both after the Polish defeat and after Dunkirk.

In regard to Roosevelt and the entry of the United States into the war, Professor Drummond agrees with Dexter Perkins that the President was cautious, loath to become involved, and rather reluctantly pushed along by events and American

public opinion. He does not agree with the frank admission of another eminent fellow-interventionist, Professor Thomas A. Bailey, that Roosevelt deliberately snared this country into war because he thought that the great majority of American citizens were too dumb in 1939-1941 to know what was good for them and their country.

In treating the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Polish-German dispute is passed over hurriedly, and the completely misleading impression is given that the Germans were wholly in the wrong. No mention is made of the admitted evils of the Corridor arrangement, the Polish persecution of the German minority, the reasonableness of the German demands on Poland in 1938-1939 and the unreasonable Polish responses, or of the fact that Hitler decided to call off military action on August 25, only to be met by Polish resistance and mobilization. This the British approved but requested that it be kept as secret as possible, much like the French reaction to Russian mobilization in 1914. It has also been shown that Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, and Mr. Kennard, the British Ambassador in Poland, did everything possible to discourage the Poles from taking any diplomatic action which would remove the war threat in late August and the beginning of September 1939.

The German invasion of Norway in early April 1940, is interpreted as unique, unilateral aggression. There is no mention of the fact that Britain had laid plans for the invasion of Norway even before Hitler did. The old myth of a direct Nazi threat to the United States is repeated and emphasized (p.370), although even Langer and Gleason admit that Hitler did not have the most remote intention of striking at the United States. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence in Professor Drummond's book to refute this thesis.

The treatment of Japanese activities and interests is equally partisan. If we were to credit Professor Drummond's story, our cracking of the Japanese code (MAGIC) in August 1940, only enabled us to learn

of *aggressive* Japanese policies, rarely or never of their sincere efforts to preserve peace with the United States. Conciliatory and pacific Japanese efforts are either omitted altogether, glossed over, or minimized, from the several Japanese efforts to obtain a pacific arrangement with the United States, rather than enter the Axis, right down to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Even the strenuous and repeated efforts of the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, to meet with Roosevelt in the late Summer and early Autumn of 1941 and work out some reasonable means of preserving peace are passed over as of no real importance, although Konoye subscribed in advance to terms that Hull admitted would have fully protected American interests in the Far East.

While omitting, dismissing or depreciating the sincere Japanese peace efforts, from the amazing offer of January 1941, to the final efforts of November, Professor Drummond several times stresses with apparent seriousness the transparent hoax of Roosevelt's message to the Japanese Emperor, which was sent on the night of December 6 and did not reach the Emperor until a few minutes before the Japanese attack. Even Hull admits that it was concocted and sent only for the diplomatic "record."

The evasions and omissions in treating the immediate background of Pearl Harbor would require more than the space of this review for a mere listing. It is either directly implied or specifically stated that the Washington authorities had little reason to expect any attack at Pearl Harbor, even on December 7, 1941, that the reception of the Japanese reply to Hull on December 6-7 did not make Roosevelt feel certain about anything beyond the probability of war, that General Marshall was fully on the alert in first taking a leisurely horseback ride and then getting to his office at nearly 11:30 on the morning of December 7, and that he then did his best immediately to warn General Short by the most rapid available means of communication. Admiral Theobald's refutation

of all this is not mentioned, nor is his book listed in the bibliography.

Some vital items are omitted from the Pearl Harbor account: the fact that, of all the American outposts that the Japanese might have attacked, they made inquiry only through their espionage agents about the situation at Pearl Harbor, and that this careful checking and reporting by Japanese spies went on for months in full knowledge of the Washington military and political leaders; that Pearl Harbor had been denied a decoding (Purple) machine as early as April 1941, although one was even sent to Panama; the total omission of the "East Wind, Rain" message, picked up on December 4 and making it clear that war was imminent and that it would be against the United States and Great Britain; the fact that by around 8:30 A. M. on the morning of the 7th, Admiral Stark was in his office and realized that war would break out at any moment, surely by 1:00 P. M., but refused to warn Kimmel; that Marshall sent his already absurdly delayed warning to General Short about noon on December 7 by ordinary commercial radio, not even marked "urgent" (Professor Drummond incorrectly implies that the message reached Short far too late — long after the Japanese planes had returned to their carriers — only because its transmission was delayed by operational difficulties on a rapid means of transmission); that the commander of the Japanese task force moving to attack Pearl Harbor had been ordered to turn back if any diplomatic settlement had been reached, and that Nomura and Kurusu were unaware of the impending Pearl Harbor attack when they delivered the Japanese reply to Hull on the afternoon of the 7th.

Nevertheless, Professor Drummond's treatment of the background of Pearl Harbor is preferable to that of Herbert Feis, who avoids dealing with the damaging evidence against Roosevelt by virtually ignoring the events of December 3 to 7, or that of Langer and Gleason, who

go to the utterly preposterous extreme of stating that: "Of Hawaii there was apparently no thought" on the part of Roosevelt and his circle on December 6 and 7.

Just where General Marshall was on the night of December 6, 1941, perhaps the most dramatic night of his life, remains one of the major unsolved mysteries of the Pearl Harbor fiasco. Prior to the Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor, Marshall had been frequently pictured as having a simply prodigious memory akin to that of Lord Macaulay, but when questioned by the Congressional Committee early in December 1945, he maintained that he could not recall where he spent this momentous night. If Senator Homer Ferguson had revived the Pearl Harbor investigation in 1947, when the Republicans controlled Congress, instead of making his disastrous foray into the doings of Howard Hughes and his "cuties," this mystery could have been solved by subpoenaing the orderlies assigned to accompany Marshall on the night of December 6.

Only a complete simpleton could imagine that Marshall did not *actually* recall where he was on the night of December 6. Hence, it is evident that his denial must have been motivated by a desire to cover up an embarrassing reality. Since Marshall was a good family man of exemplary personal habits, there is little likelihood that he needed to conceal any morally shady behavior on that crucial night. He certainly did not spend the night in a brothel, a gambling den, or the apartment of a mistress. Confession of where he was on the night of the 6th must have involved something *politically* rather than morally embarrassing to Marshall and his administrative superiors. If this be true, then it follows rather directly that he must have been in conference with Roosevelt. There would have been no reason for his hiding the fact that he visited Stimson or any other member of the Cabinet or the military forces. But the revelation that he had visited Roose-



vult would have opened Marshall to sharp questioning by Senator Ferguson as to what went on at such a meeting, a matter which would have been delicate, to say the least, in the light of Marshall's strange behavior on the following day (December 7).

The Washington newspaperman who is best informed on this particular item, has informed me personally that he has evidence which leads him to feel certain that Marshall was summoned to the White House on the night of the 6th, after Lieutenant Schulz had delivered the first thirteen portions of the Japanese reply to Hull, to Roosevelt and Hopkins in the White House. It may well be that Marshall then and there received his orders from Roosevelt to stay away from his office as long as possible the next morning and not send Short any warning before noon, which would be far too late for Short to take any defensive action that might scare off the Japanese from an attack on Pearl Harbor. Since we know that Roosevelt talked to Admiral Stark on the phone after the latter left the theater on the night of the 6th, he may well have then given Stark his orders not to warn Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. As Stark knew by about 8:30 on the morning of the 7th that the Japanese were in all probability going to make an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor, presumably at 1:00 P. M. Washington time, and yet *never* warned Kimmel, such action on the part of an intelligent and patriotic officer can only be explained on the basis of his having been ordered by Roosevelt not to send any warning.

When, between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. on the morning of December 7, Stark received the Japanese message indicating the attack at 1:00 P.M., he, "cried out in great alarm" and exclaimed: "My God, this means war! I must get word to Kimmel at once!" He did nothing of the kind and his astounding failure to do so has never been explained. It may be that his exclamation was the automatic response of a trained naval officer, and that his later

lapse was the result of recalling his phone conversation with Roosevelt the previous night. Anyone with a better explanation is welcome to produce it.

If Stark had been free to act in an independent and unhampered manner, there is no doubt that he would have remained awake and alert all night on December 6, seeking all possible information as to the time of the Japanese attack. At least, he would have demanded that all information of this sort be brought to him immediately. The Japanese message which indicated that the attack on Pearl Harbor would come at 1:00 P. M. Washington time was available at the Navy Department at 5:00 A. M. Had Stark been ready to receive this information, some seven hours before the attack, and immediately transmitted it to Admiral Kimmel, there would have been plenty of time to have moved the fleet out of the harbor and dispersed it in battle formation. General Short could have put his planes in the air and gotten the anti-aircraft guns in readiness. There was still time for an effective warning at 9:00 A.M. We now know that had all this taken place the Japanese task force would have turned tail and started back home without even trying to drop one bomb. Professor Drummond calls Kimmel's failure to go on the alert without any warning, "unaccountable."

Apologists for Roosevelt grow indignant when such cogent and highly plausible circumstantial evidence is brought forth without absolute documentary proof. But it fits in with the logic of the circumstances and developments very perfectly and explains otherwise completely mysterious actions of the utmost importance. Such protests from the Roosevelt partisans come with poor logic when they, themselves, support such statements as those of Langer and Gleason, Feis, Millis, and Jonathan Daniels, who contend that Roosevelt and his group had no idea or evidence whatever that Pearl Harbor would be attacked, and were completely surprised by the assault.



This contention is disproved by a mountain of evidence. No evidence has been produced to prove that Roosevelt did not order Marshall and Stark to refrain from warning Short and Kimmel in time to avert the Japanese attack. In the light of the fact that both Marshall and Stark knew by the night of the 6th that there was every probability that the Japanese might strike at Pearl Harbor the next day, there seem to be only three possible explanations of why they did not warn Short and Kimmel: that they were idiots, that they were traitors, or that they had orders from Roosevelt not to do so. The last explanation appears the most plausible.

The present writer has been criticized by partisans of Roosevelt for listing these three possibilities. I have repeatedly challenged these critics to list other possibilities. They have not taken up the challenge. They cling still to the thesis that Roosevelt was completely surprised by the Pearl Harbor attack—that he had no idea it was in the making. Professor W. L. Langer puts this concisely: "Of Hawaii there apparently was no thought." Readers of the material in this present review-article may form their own opinion of the plausibility of this alternative.

It would appear that Roosevelt partisans will never concede his responsibility for the failure to warn the Pearl Harbor commanders unless revisionist historians produce a full confession in his own handwriting, signed by a notary public, with the notary's commission attested by a county clerk. Such a document is not likely to be produced.

Roosevelt and his circle had been alarmed on December 5 and 6 lest the Japanese might move deep into the South Pacific and compel Roosevelt to make war, even though the Japanese did not attack American territory or vessels. Roosevelt had approved a secret promise made to the British and Dutch at Singapore, late in April 1941, to do just this, a violation of his 1940 campaign pledge. But when Schulz brought to Roosevelt the Japanese

reply on the night of December 6, all such worries vanished. On the 7th, Roosevelt was fully relaxed over his stamp collection, while Harry Hopkins fondled Fala, the President's Scotty terrier.

I offer here only a few samples of Professor Drummond's statements which support the revisionist position. The unneutral attitude of the Roosevelt administration is conceded by the statement on page 376: "Although neutrality remained its official text, every major aspect of United States policy was thus (by early 1940) oriented toward Great Britain and France." Again, it is remarked that the United States was virtually at war by the middle of March 1941: "By the middle of March 1941, therefore, the United States had assumed almost its full place in the world crisis. Nothing short of an immediate declaration of war could have rendered its alignments more clear."

One of the most important admissions is the explicit and repeated statement that, from June 22, 1941, onward, Stalin seemed far more concerned about what he could grab *after* the war was over than in sound military strategy and the best means of winning the war. Nothing could make clearer the mistake of Churchill and Roosevelt in expecting Stalin to be interested in a war for idealism, democracy, peace, or justice. He showed his hand from the start. His policies and demands flew in the face of the quasi-bogus Atlantic Charter.

Stalin's attitudes and policies were well known to Churchill and Roosevelt many weeks before Pearl Harbor. They attested to the wisdom of the pleas made after Hitler's invasion of Russia in June 1941, by former-President Hoover and Senators Taft and Truman, that the United States remain aloof from the conflict and permit the two dictators to battle themselves to a stalemate which would leave them both in too weak a condition to offer any threat to democratic countries.

Again, it is acknowledged that Japan was really forced into war by the eco-

conomic acts and diplomatic aggression of the United States in July and August 1941, and that no Japanese diplomatic actions, however conciliatory, could well have averted war: "The freezing order, taken in conjunction with the warning of August 17, reduced the Japanese government, for all practical purposes, to a choice between surrender and war." In discussing the efforts of Prince Konoye to meet Roosevelt in August and September 1941, and preserve peace, Professor Drummond details fully (p. 306) the fact that Konoye was willing to agree in advance to "the four principles laid down by Hull in April as a basis for a Japanese-American settlement."

#### *Summary of the Facts about Pearl Harbor*

In the light of the effort of Professor Drummond and other anti-revisionist historians to demonstrate that Roosevelt and his circle had no reason to believe that there was any basis for fearing a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in early December 1941, it may be useful here to summarize briefly the more important, but by no means all of the evidence that refutes any such contention. First, as to the reasons for expecting that the attack would be made at Pearl Harbor.

For years before the Pearl Harbor attack, practice maneuvers of the American Navy in the Pacific had envisaged a surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and in 1938 the aircraft carrier *Saratoga* had launched a successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor from a point only a hundred miles distant. It was well recognized by the American Navy that Japan could not rationally risk a war with the United States unless it could deal an initial smashing blow against our Pacific fleet. Leading naval officers, including Admirals Stark and Richardson, had opposed bottling up the main Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, where the ships would be exposed like "sitting ducks" to a surprise Japanese attack. Roosevelt was so annoyed by the opposition of Admiral

Richardson, commander-in-chief of the Pacific fleet, that he removed Richardson from his post.

Ambassador Grew had sent a warning from Tokyo that he had received an authentic "leak" to the effect that, in the event of a war between the United States and Japan, the latter would launch its part of the hostilities by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The leading Washington authorities then admitted the probable validity of this warning.

Most important of all was the fact that, of all possible points of attack on American outposts, the Japanese demanded reports on American military and naval details only at Pearl Harbor from their espionage agents, but they did lay great emphasis on the Pearl Harbor reports and after November 15, 1941, required that they be turned in at least twice a week. All this was well known to Washington authorities for months as a result of our breaking the Japanese code in August 1940.

The fact that, very early, the Administration apparently decided to make it impossible for the Pearl Harbor authorities to obtain their own warnings of a possible Japanese attack is underlined by the Washington decision to deny Pearl Harbor a decoding ("Purple") machine to intercept Japanese messages, although a machine was sent to the Philippines and Panama, and even to London. This decision came in April 1941, at the very time when American Army and Navy representatives were making the secret agreement with the British and Dutch to go to war, even if the Japanese did not attack American territory or ships. This agreement made it all the more desirable to promote a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, so as to assure American popular support for the war. Hence, whatever orders Roosevelt may have given Marshall and Stark on or before the night of December 6 to refrain from warning Short and Kimmel, the idea of leaving the latter two in the dark as to the facts about Japanese war plans long antedated December. It would appear

that, even as early as April, it had been decided not to permit Short and Kimmel to know or do anything that might possibly avert a Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. In the light of all this evidence, no serious and informed person can well doubt that Roosevelt and his circle knew well enough by December 1, 1941, *where* the Japanese would, in all probability, launch their surprise attack.

How thoroughly Short and Kimmel would have been prepared for the Japanese attack if they had possessed a decoding ("Purple") machine to use on the spot at Pearl Harbor can be discerned from the fact that Panama, with such a machine, went on an all-out alert on November 29, days before the far more alarming intercepts were picked up by our Intelligence force on December 3 and 4. Indeed, Short and Kimmel would certainly have taken steps which would have led to the abandonment of the attack. This, we now know from the Japanese documents about their task force which we have obtained since the war.

The answer to the question of *when* the surprise attack would be made was just as slowly but surely built up by December 6 and 7. The "Magic" intercepts, which had been going on ever since August 1940, had repeatedly revealed not only the basic Japanese desire for peace with the United States but also the clear determination of the Japanese, after the embargo and freezing actions of the United States in July 1941, to go to war if no diplomatic settlement was reached. It was rather generally agreed among both the political and military authorities in Washington that these economic, financial, and political actions of July and August 1941, meant war with Japan unless they were rescinded, and there was no intention on the part of Roosevelt and Hull even to modify them. It was fully recognized by Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson, Knox, and others in Washington that Hull's ultimatum to Japan on November 26, 1941 ended diplomatic relations with Japan and meant certain war with

Japan. Hull himself frankly admitted this at the time. Hence, the Washington authorities knew that the Japanese reply to the ultimatum would be the signal for war on the part of Japan.

Remembering the proclivity of the Japanese to begin a war by a surprise attack and to make such an attack on a week-end, the more alert Washington authorities expected that the attack might even come on November 30. A Japanese message had been intercepted on the 28th which stated that diplomatic negotiations were to be broken off in "two or three days." When the attack did not come on the 30th, there was far greater expectation that it would fall on December 7. Hence, after November 30, more careful attention was given by the Intelligence officers picking up the intercepts of the Japanese messages to discovering any information that would throw some possible light on the probability of war coming on December 7. They found plenty of evidence of this.

On December 3, a crucial Japanese message ordering the destruction of code machines and documents in all the main Japanese embassies was intercepted. This was recognized as proof of war at any moment. The next question was whether the war would be against Russia or against the United States and Britain. This was settled when the "East Wind, Rain" message was picked up on the 4th. Through previous intercepts, our Intelligence staff knew that this meant that the war would be against the United States and Britain, not against Russia. By the late afternoon of the 6th, the Japanese reply to Hull's ultimatum began to come in, and it was immediately apparent that this rejected the ultimatum and would break off diplomatic relations. From this time onward, it was evident that war would break out at any moment through a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. By 8:00 on the morning of December 7, the decoded final point in the Japanese reply to Hull, and an accompanying message to the Japanese envoys in

Washington, revealed the fact that the Japanese would, in all probability, strike at Pearl Harbor at 1:00 P. M. Sunday afternoon, Washington time. When the Intelligence officers brought in the decoded final point to Stark, they told him just this. Therefore, by morning on December 7, both the time and place of the Japanese attack were known to the top political and military authorities in Washington.

The exact time when Roosevelt ordered Marshall and Stark not to warn Short and Kimmel is not known. It has been suggested that it might have been when Roosevelt phoned Stark late on the night of the 6th and during his likely conference with Marshall in the White House that same night. Others think it must have been as early as the alarming intercepts of November 28, and December 3 and 4. Admiral Robert A. Theobald, who has made the most careful study of the subject, logically concludes that it must have been *before* the afternoon of the 6th. By mid-afternoon of that day the Army Intelligence had decoded the so called Japanese Pilot Message which announced that the ominous reply to Hull's ultimatum was about to be delivered. As Theobald concludes: "The Washington silence which followed the receipt of the Pilot Message was the most vital key to the Pearl Harbor story. War, within 24 hours, initiated by a surprise attack which, according to all evidence, would be delivered on the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii, stared General Marshall and Admiral Stark in the face from that moment onward, and they made no move during 21 of the 22 hours which intervened before the attack to inform Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Nothing but a positive Presidential order could have so muzzled them after the receipt of the Pilot Message."

Some of this evidence is admitted, even if reluctantly, by Roosevelt apologists, unless they prefer to dodge the issue by ignoring most of the events after November 26. But they try to go on defending the "surprise" doctrine and the "Day of

Infamy" myth by contending that, just before the attack, Roosevelt and his associates had forgotten all about Pearl Harbor in their momentary panic of December 5 and 6 — mainly on the 6th — lest the mounting Japanese naval movements into the south Pacific would compel Roosevelt to make good on the secret agreement of April 1941, with the British and Dutch to go to war even though the Japanese did not attack American territory or ships. This would, indeed, have been most embarrassing to Roosevelt. It would not only have been contrary to the Democratic campaign pledge of 1940, but would have deprived Roosevelt of the indispensable popular support which he could count on in the event of a prior Japanese attack, especially a surprise attack. Therefore, there is no doubt that he and the war group in Washington were actually in a panic on the 6th when they received the news of the advancing Japanese ship movements in the South Pacific.

But this temporary excitement and distraction ended on the evening of December 6, when Lieutenant Schulz brought to the President the Japanese reply to Hull. Roosevelt could then breathe a sigh of relief, return to the Pearl Harbor situation, and see to it that Short and Kimmel had no warning which would incite them to take any steps that might scare off the Japanese task force from executing its mission at Pearl Harbor. Indeed, it is evident that the panic on the 6th was based more on political fears than strategic realism. There was little probability that the Japanese would launch a war against the United States in the South Pacific without first attempting to destroy the American fleet, and this was anchored helplessly at Pearl Harbor.

It is also obvious that any Washington panic as late as the 5th or 6th of December provides no excuse whatever for the failure of Roosevelt, Marshall, and Stark to warn Short and Kimmel in ample time. The sending of the Hull ultimatum on November 26, the intercept of the 28th



revealing the imminent breaking off of diplomatic relations, the intercept of December 3 concerning the destruction of Japanese code machines, and the intercept of the 4th making it certain that the imminent attack would be against the United States and Britain, all came before the 5th.

The revisionist historian who has made the most exhaustive study of the nature and amount of anti-war sentiment in the United States on the eve of Pearl Harbor has come to the conclusion that the only real panic on the part of Roosevelt and the war party in the White House was one based on the fear that the Japanese might *not* attack Pearl Harbor. Anti-war sentiment was so strong and widespread throughout the nation, even as late as December 6, 1941, that Roosevelt realized that he simply *had* to have a Japanese attack on American territory and forces to lead the United States into war with any success and popular enthusiasm.

Striking confirmation of the previous assertion that the intercepts of Japanese messages provided ample prior knowledge of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor has recently come to us from British sources. London had a "Purple" machine which had been denied to Short and Kimmel. General John N. Kennedy, Director of Military Operations in World War II, has recently published his memoirs, *The Business of War*. In these memoirs he reveals the fact that the British had picked up the information on December 3 that the Japanese were about to attack. This accords definitely with what we know about the Japanese messages, for it was on the 3rd that they ordered the destruction of the coding machines and diplomatic documents in their embassies, an act that was universally recognized as indicating the immediate onset of war. There is little doubt that the British believed that this attack would take place at Pearl Harbor. It is highly likely that the able and alert British Intelligence Service would have picked up the Japanese messages directing their espionage agents to report on Amer-

ican military and naval activities at Pearl Harbor, and not elsewhere. Hence, there is every probability that Churchill was as fully aware of the coming attack as was Roosevelt.

One may rest assured that neither Churchill nor Kennedy made any effort to warn Roosevelt and urge him to alert the commanders at Pearl Harbor. They were far too eager for American entry to do that. Earlier, Kennedy had noted that: "I am sure that we can make a plan for losing the war, but the only way to end it quickly is to get America in. We must concentrate on that." And, on the 3rd, he observed: "Japan looks like coming into the war at once. If we can get America in we shall gain on balance in the long run." Churchill heartily agreed. Whether Churchill and Roosevelt were in close secret communication between the 3rd and the 7th, while holding their breath in expectation of the Pearl Harbor attack, is not known at present, but it is highly likely that they were.<sup>1</sup>

*Official Historians Now More Willing  
to Present the Truth Than the  
Academic Fraternity*

That there is a real danger in the work of court and official historians cannot well be doubted. But, in all fairness, it must be said that, thus far, the official historians have shown a greater inclination to face the facts about the coming of World War II than have the academic historians, fairly represented by Professor Drummond. As far back as the meeting of the American Historical Association in December 1954, two official historians, Dr. Stetson Conn and Dr. Louis Morton, reviewed the background of the Second World War and American participation in more realistic fashion than Professor Drummond or any other academic historian has done, outside the handful of revisionist professors. And in an article on the literature of the American entry: "Pearl Harbor in Perspective," in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April



1955, Dr. Morton dealt with the books on this hotly debated topic in a far more competent fashion than does Professor Drummond or any of his academic associates. This may be explained by the fact that, whatever the reluctance of academic historians to admit the factual justification for such a policy, the United States has gradually adopted a "revisionist" political and military attitude toward Western Germany and Japan since 1945 which can be defended logically only on the basis of revisionist historical evidence. Official historians are more likely to assimilate and reflect such official changes in policy than are their academic brethren.

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Lest any reader get the false impression that I have clutched at every possible straw to indict Roosevelt, it may be pointed out that there is considerable new and important material on Pearl Harbor which I have not cited because of limitations of space, although I have examined it. It confirms or amplifies the interpretation given in the above article, but affords no grounds for altering any statement. Such material is Walter Lord's *The Day of Infamy*, which espe-

cially emphasizes how jittery the commander of the Japanese task force really was and how certainly he would have turned back if there had been any evidence that the Pearl Harbor commanders had any inkling of a prospective Japanese attack; *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, which reveals how thoroughly he and General Short were prevented from having available any of the vital "Magic" intercepts between November 26 and December 7, and how easy it would have been to prevent or intercept the Japanese attack if this material had been sent to them; Don Whitehead's *The F.B.I. Story*, which shows how the F.B.I. agents in Hawaii were prevented from cooperating with Short and Kimmel in putting before them discoveries which would have enabled them to anticipate the Japanese attack; the book by the Japanese Foreign Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor, Shigenori Togo's *The Cause of Japan*, that stresses the Japanese efforts for peace in November 1941, and shows how Japan was forced into war for self-preservation; and the admirable series of articles by George Morgenstern in the *Chicago Tribune* bringing together the latest information on the Pearl Harbor attack. A Japanese spy was detected signalling the task force from Hawaii. Another vitally important document was left on a desk on December 6th (Saturday) ostensibly for editing on the following Monday, although its crucial content was readily apparent. None of this information reached Short or Kimmel.

# The Case of Milovan Djilas

SLOBODAN M. DRASKOVICH

WHILE THE unexpected launching of the Soviet earth satellite has focused the frustrated attention of the free world on the scientific achievements and military plans of the communists, we appear to be in the process of losing the war in the more decisive field of the struggle for the minds of men. To be unable to identify the enemy is dangerous. But to interpret a message of doom as a message of salvation and hail as a martyr for freedom a communist who is desperately trying to save communism can lead to disaster. That is the essence of the West's acceptance and interpretation of Milovan Djilas' *The New Class* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1957. 214 pp.).

In the past decade hardly any political book has been greeted so enthusiastically and promoted so lavishly and persistently as *The New Class*. Djilas' admirers and promoters have told us that it took extraordinary courage to write the book, smuggle it out of communist Yugoslavia, and above all to send the message that the book must be published "regardless of what happens to me personally."

*The New Class* is allegedly revealing the innermost secrets of communist rule, exposing for the whole world to see its moral ugliness, ruthlessness, deceit and betrayal of all its heavenly promises of equality, brotherhood, progress, justice and freedom. The book is said to be exceptionally important because it was written by a man who was until 1954 the No. 3 communist of Yugoslavia, and because in exposing communism he has used the dialectical method, thus turning against the communist power-holders their main weapon

of political analysis and persuasion.

On these grounds, Djilas was proclaimed a hero and martyr for freedom, and *The New Class* a historical event marking the end of one epoch and the beginning of another. The Communist Manifesto in 1848 marked the birth of the communist world movement. *The New Class* is — assertedly — an anti-communist manifesto marking the beginning of its end.

Should this be the case, the book unquestionably deserves the greatest possible attention. But if the free world is hailing as anti-communistic a book which predicts the coming victory of communism, and if it is idolizing as an anti-communist fighter a communist using all the stratagems of communist dialectics to save communism, *The New Class* and its author deserve even greater attention.

## *Djilas Started "Deviating" in 1951*

*The New Class* is by no means a bolt from the blue, a reversal in Djilas' political thinking and writing, or a surprise to his fellow communists. Djilas started "deviating" as early as 1951 when he was a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and No. 3 in the Yugoslav communist hierarchy. He wrote a series of articles in the official organ of the Party, *Borba*, in September, 1951, on "the freedom of criticism," "the duty of communists and progressive people to learn . . .," the "necessity of looking for new roads," and "the spiritual misery and brutality of the bureaucrats."<sup>1</sup>

These views bear great resemblance to the views presented in *The New Class*. Djilas is alarmed at the sad state of affairs in the ranks of Yugoslav communists. The unselfish, progressive, and militant communist of the struggle for power has given

way to the selfish, corrupt, sterile communist now exercising and enjoying power. The practice of communism in Yugoslavia has become bureaucratic and "a hindrance to further development, and thus reactionary." This is because Yugoslav communists think that it is enough to hold power, forgetting that "socialistic democracy" which is being born in Yugoslavia must be different both from the Soviet bureaucratic system and from bourgeois democracy. At the same time he stresses that if Yugoslavia is building socialistic democracy, it is not in order to create "something third" between bureaucratism and capitalism, but "something new in the general direction of the march of all peoples towards socialism."

To avoid bureaucratic stagnation, says Djilas, the Yugoslav communists must realize that "the revolution" must develop towards democracy, i.e. towards relationships "genuinely socialistic, genuinely democratic, genuinely human." What matters is to effectuate the "dialectic jump" from seizure and consolidation of the power of the proletariat to the withering away of that power.

However, the Yugoslav communists seem to be far from fulfilling these precepts, since "ideological and practical examples are nowhere to be found . . . and the masses of Yugoslav communists are helplessly stumbling between the Cominform morass and . . . the warming up of the hopes in the capitalist West." This shows "the lack of faith in the forces of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the lack of faith in the new roads they have taken and a lack of understanding of our new reality."

To scare the Yugoslav communists away from the path leading to bureaucratism, Djilas declares that "the bureaucracy is in a state of permanent war against . . . the working class and working masses." It especially "hates the true intellectuals who in their quest of artistic and scientific truth cannot help exposing the true nature and the parasitic, insatiable

and uncultured soul of the bureaucracy." That is why the bureaucracy wants "to break the intellectuals, bend their spines . . . orientate their activities towards vulgar sycophantism and praise-singing." The work of the bureaucrats is "sheer imposture, parasitism, despotism and exploitation" of the workers. But at the same time, Djilas, contradicting himself, is unworried about bureaucratism, since it does not pertain to the essence of communism but is only "an irrational and transitory remnant of the past."

The fact however remains that the communist order has not kept its promises. The revolution has taken place, the means of production belong to society, and the power is in communist hands; but, while the basic economic pre-requisites of society have been more than met, the surplus does not go to the proletariat. The Marxian surplus-value, says Djilas, is in effect asking: "Where am I being led, furtively, what am I being used for, why, after the millennial sufferings of mankind, after so much blood spilt and tears shed, am I not being given today, now that the material conditions have been met, to those who have created me at the price of their blood and sweat?"

What prevents a satisfactory answer to that question is apparently that before tackling that task, it is necessary to do away completely and thoroughly with capitalism. "The democratic and socialist world has not yet been able to unmask the bestial cruelty and the propensity to the worst crimes (committed in the name of the loftiest ideals) because on the other side there is capitalism with all its exploitation and oppression." Djilas concluded that nevertheless, "social development itself some day will force this world to see the evil, fight it and do away with it."

It should not be difficult to identify, in this first document of Djilas' "deviation" the two basic and permanent contradictions in Djilas' thinking: (1) that bureaucratism is an unavoidable consequence of "the

power of the proletariat," i.e. communism, and that it is as Kardelj says, "the last rampart, the last remnant of the class society in the USSR"; (2) that communism in Yugoslavia is thoroughly different from communism in the USSR because the latter has degenerated into bureaucracy, while the former is socialistic and democratic — but that bureaucracy is engulfing communist Yugoslavia as well as the USSR.

In any case, Djilas' "deviation" in 1951 was by no means heresy. It was the official Yugoslav line, promoted by Tito, Kardelj and all others. After the break with Stalin in 1948, the Yugoslav communists (especially Kardelj) did their best to prove at all costs that the regime in Yugoslavia was identical with the regime in the USSR. But since they were meeting rebuff after rebuff, they could not help but embark on the path of proving that they were basically different: the Soviets were bureaucratic and imperialistic, while they, the Yugoslav communists, were democrats and fighters for national independence. With all their harsh criticism of Yugoslav conditions, Djilas' "reflections" were expressive of the Yugoslav communist "general line."

Having full confidence in Djilas, Tito sent him as head of a three-man mission (with Colakovic and Bebler) to Asia to preach at the Congress of the Asian Socialist Parties in Rangoon the message of "different" communism (December 1952 — February 1953). Djilas performed the assigned task with great success since he apparently convinced the Burmese, Indians and others that communism "need not necessarily be imperialistic" (as a high Indian official expressed himself), that besides bad imperialistic Soviet communism, there was also good democratic communism, as practiced in and preached by communist Yugoslavia.

*"The Beginning of the End and of the Beginning"*

A few months later Djilas resumed his anti-bureaucratic writing. In the periodical

*Nova Misao* (New Thought) of August 1953, he wrote a long article under the revealing title of "The Beginning of the End and of the Beginning" in which he re-examined the problem of bureaucracy. He attacked it more strongly than two years before but became even more deeply involved in his own contradictions. He declares that bureaucracy is an unavoidable product of communist power since communism cannot defeat its enemies without becoming bureaucratic. At the same time he contends that bureaucracy is not identical with communism and socialism, but only a remnant of the past. Further, he assails Stalin's rule, i.e. bureaucracy in the USSR, as a regime "more totalitarian than any in history," under which there is less freedom and more misery than under any regime "from the pharaohs to the proletariat." At the same time he glorified Stalin ("the only real personality in the USSR") as a man who rendered unparalleled services to the cause of socialism and therefore enjoyed the support of the masses.

But under bureaucracy "the relationship of exploitation remains." The only change is that "the old antagonism: worker-owners, assumes a new aspect: producers-rulers." So Djilas seems to predict the end of communist rule in the USSR through popular revolt. "Silence and darkness reign over the huge spaces from the Danube to the Yellow Sea, but underneath the smooth surface are brewing storms and passions collected from the whole history of mankind." And further: "The working masses of Eastern Europe . . . have put a bloody stamp on the beginning of the end of the Stalinist rule. They have opened the volcanic crater, above which the bloody and entangled knot of bureaucratic social relations has started unravelling. The volcano is smoldering and chilling the bones of the cowardly and frightened bureaucracy." But these ominous threats of doom, typical of *The New Class* condemnations, are not taken too seriously by any red-blooded

dialectician, particularly by Djilas himself. First of all, the bureaucracy is much stronger, compact and elastic than any other class, "because it is constantly being renewed from the depths of the people." Any expectation that communism could be overthrown is completely unfounded and ridiculous, says Djilas, because the people while being against bureaucratism, are for true communism. The "Soviet bureaucracy is very vulnerable before a really socialistic, democratic criticism (as presented by Yugoslavia for instance) . . . (but) it is and will in the future resist and almost be immune to any capitalistic criticism and all tendencies aiming at restoration of the old order in East Europe."

As for Yugoslavia, it has been only slightly affected by bureaucratism, because it has — under the leadership of Tito, who is "a true revolutionary, always close to the masses of the people" — followed the true "democratic socialistic" path. This means that communist Yugoslavia is ruthlessly against "the class enemy" and is consolidating its power. At the same time the state is withering away, since the Yugoslav communists are giving power directly to the people through decentralization, workers' councils, etc. In any case bureaucratism cannot be destroyed before capitalism is destroyed: "Before 'pure', 'ideal', complete socialist conditions can be created . . . capitalism must be broken, capitalism must collapse."

Djilas had finished his article when he learned about the speech which Malenkov, the then Soviet Premier, had delivered on August 8, 1953, before the Supreme Soviet. So Djilas wrote a postscript to his article, re-asserting his belief in the unavoidable democratization of bureaucratism as a consequence of the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR. "Malenkov is a transitory form, — little Stalinism, Stalinism in decadence. Democracy has begun in bureaucratic shell and garb."

*Djilas' "Heretical" Articles (1953/54)*

But while he proclaimed that bureau-

cratism had been mastered in Yugoslavia and was yielding to democracy in the Soviet Union, Djilas knew that he was not telling the truth. The basic problem remained: communism had not kept its promises. Why? And how to force communism really to become democratic? Djilas attempted to find the answer in a series of articles he wrote from September 1953 to January 1954.

As readers of *The New Class* know, Djilas is master of unprecise and contradictory thinking and of confusedly abstruse writing. In his "heretic" articles of the Fall of 1953 he was even more so. But his aim is clear. Djilas realizes that communism has failed in Yugoslavia, in the same manner as it has failed in the USSR, to put into practice the theoretical concepts of communism. Bureaucratism is advancing irresistibly and Djilas is "scared to death that bureaucracy may win in Yugoslavia." The more so since bureaucratism springs "from our own system, from the conditions in which we live." The Yugoslav regime is actually "Yugoslav Stalinism," but Djilas cannot accept the idea that communist Yugoslavia instead of saving the revolution is betraying it in the same manner as the Soviet communists. Djilas wants the Yugoslav communists to save the communist idea and the world revolution at any cost.

"The Yugoslav battle is in the center of all world knots," exults Djilas. It is "an unseen battle which the whole world is watching breathlessly." Communist Yugoslavia is "in the center and is the center of all controversies." The fate of communism in the world depends on communist Yugoslavia: "If only one — our — revolution ends up in the splendor of the new democracy, that will give a new brilliant lustre to the intoxicating idea of the revolution . . . the faith in the new world, in socialism becomes reality."

To achieve this task Djilas has only one remedy, — to democratize communism. Political power will safely remain in communist hands to prevent the restoration



of the "bourgeois order." But democracy will be promoted by drawing non-communists into the discussion of various problems, and by increased ideological activity on the part of the communists who will use persuasion, not force, to convince the people of the superiority of communism and thereby convert them to Marxism-Leninism.

Later, in January 1954, when Djilas had to answer before the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) for his views, everybody suddenly knew that his ideas were non-Marxist. But it is noteworthy that while he was writing, everyone seemed pleased and Tito himself encouraged him to write. Moreover, while Tito claims that in December he began to disapprove of Djilas' views, the fact is that Djilas was appointed President of the Yugoslav National Assembly on December 25, 1953, that is, *after* uttering most of his "heretical" blasts, including the one about the Yugoslav regime being Stalinistic and "therefore stinking with similar ideological stench." Djilas was stopped only after publishing on January 8, 1954, an article in which he sharply criticized the leaders of the Yugoslav communist hierarchy and their wives, with hardly concealed personal references.

The important thing, which has ever since been misrepresented — and most recently and most flagrantly in the TV dramatization of *The New Class* (CBS Network, February 5, 1958) — is that after two days of hearings Djilas did *not* stand his ground, but admitted his anti-Marxist guilt. He never said, as alleged: "I will not retract a single word of what I have said or written," but on the contrary accepted the criticism of the Central Committee completely and in detail. He stated: "Outside of the Communist Party and outside of the state and economic organs, I do not visualize nor can I imagine the realization of socialism in our country and its democratic development . . . it is completely certain . . . that I found myself in the position: either finally to reject all communist practice

and idea . . . or to attempt in some way or other to turn to you, (the Central Committee), to the Party, and to that whole policy of ours."

For almost a whole year after his deviation was dealt with Djilas lived comfortably on a state pension, in political retirement. Towards the end of 1954, while Tito was in Asia, Djilas gave an interview to a foreign newspaper man, assailing the Yugoslav regime as Stalinistic. Both he and Tito's official biographer, Dedijer, who defended him, were tried and given suspended sentences. The press in the free world praised Djilas' "courage" to speak his mind, but none gave heed to the very simple and very basic fact that Djilas was able to contact foreign newspapermen only because the Yugoslav "Stalinist" regime made it possible for him.

#### *Djilas in 1956*

In 1956 Djilas was assertedly subjected to close police surveillance. Nevertheless he was able to write to the *New York Times* (May 31) and complain that the Yugoslav authorities were preventing the publication of a book he had written. Oddly enough the regime, which did not want the manuscript published, failed to display the slightest interest in what the manuscript contained. Djilas had been demoted in 1954, resigned from the party a few months later, was given a suspended sentence in January 1955 for attacking the regime, and was harried by constant surveillance, but the authorities did not seem the least alarmed by what he was writing.

In June 1956, when Tito was visiting the Soviet Union, sealing his reconciliation with Moscow with joyous celebrations and pledges of indissoluble solidarity in war and peace, Djilas was not prevented from having several articles published in American and French newspapers, wherein he criticized Krushchev and the collective leadership of the Soviet Union as being more dangerous to the West than Stalin. Was it just a coincidence that Djilas was

permitted to criticize the regime's policy precisely at times when Tito was outside of Yugoslavia making important moves in favor of world communism? Or was the intent possibly to show to the world that whatever Tito might be doing, the very fact that Djilas was openly criticising him, was an irrefutable proof that the regime was democratic?

### *The "New Leader" Article*

In November 1956, immediately after the Hungarian revolution was bloodily suppressed, Djilas wrote an article for the magazine *The New Leader*, in which he said that the events in Hungary were marking "the beginning of the end of Communism generally," and had "brought to the fore . . . the replacement of communism by a new system, and, along with this, the right of a people heretofore under communist rule to choose its own—non—communist—path of development." While this sounds very revolutionary and anti-communistic, let us not forget that we are dealing with a communist dialectician whose efforts to "democratize" communism fit perfectly in the de-Stalinization campaign pursued by Moscow. By attacking Stalin, who was the symbol of communist victories, the new Soviet leaders were deliberately taking a uniquely bold step which alone could exculpate communism in the world from the crimes committed by all communists and inherent in communism as a system of thought and of power.<sup>2</sup> "By attacking Stalin, Communism may be protected as an ideology," wrote perspicaciously the *U.S. News and World Report*. "This could be a very convincing line both inside and outside Russia, and mislead a lot of people."<sup>3</sup>

This may help understand the logic of Djilas' denunciation of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. While all communist leaders, from Mao to Tito, approved of the Soviet intervention, the "democratic" face of post-Stalin communism could be saved only by indicting the Soviet intervention. Djilas, the "deviationist" from another

"Deviationist" (Tito), was best qualified for that task. Djilas explained that the revolution in Hungary signified the "beginning of the end of communism generally" only in the sense that "Yugoslav communism, separating itself from Moscow, initiated the crisis of Soviet imperialism." The facts are, however, that the Stalin-Tito rift did not hurt imperialism, but made it more penetrating, especially in Asia.

As for the right of the people to "a new system" and a "non-communist path of development," Djilas gives no direct explanation. He is disappointed by the failure of the Hungarian communists to "institute the kind of reforms that would gradually transform and lead communism to freedom." Whatever the Hungarian communists could have done and failed to do, the essential problem of our age remains, according to Djilas, "the problem of freedom in communism." (In *The New Class* on page 45 he makes it clear that he is in favor of putting an end to "communist monopolism and totalitarianism," but only in favor of "democracy and freedom in communism.")<sup>5</sup>

On November 19, 1956, Djilas was arrested.

Towards the end of July 1957, it was announced that Djilas had written a sensational anti-communist book which would be published shortly. The promotion campaign for *The New Class* (published on August 12, 1957) was under way. These are the facts which constitute the indispensable background for proper understanding of this work and its true message.

### *Djilas Condemns Communism*

It is undeniable that in the course of his lengthy, repetitive and contradictory presentation of the various facets of communism, Djilas has uttered very harsh judgments on the practice of communism, as well as on the main characteristics of communist power. To sum up Djilas' views, communism is the most oppressive, most brutal, most deceptive, most corrupt, most

wasteful, and most shameful regime in history. If he were not a communist and a dialectician, if we were not living in the era of "different" communism, and if *The New Class* were Djilas' first "deviationist" writing, his devastating statements on communism would undoubtedly establish him as an enemy of communism determined to fight with all his strength against such a uniquely evil regime. But Djilas is dialectician, a communist and, as we have seen, a deviationist with a long record.

From the Communist Manifesto (1848) on, the task of the communists has never been to interpret events, but to help shape them. The communist doctrine has never been anything but a "guide to action" to seize power for the Communist Party and to keep it once firmly in hand. Thus when a communist writes a book, he is "shooting an arrow at the target of the communist revolution," to use Mao Tse-tung's formula. This is precisely what Djilas has done — very methodically — in his new work.

#### *Djilas Defends Communism*

First, Djilas has made it clear from the very beginning (p. vii) that he has not criticized "communism as an idea," nor the communist theory, but only "contemporary" communism. Throughout the book Djilas has followed this standard communist procedure of saving the communist idea by divorcing it from the communist practice. Original, pure, true communism is to him full of virtues, "... a Communist movement always begins as one of highest idealism and most selfless sacrifice attracting into its ranks the most gifted, the bravest, and even the most able intellects of the nation." (p. 152). "Loyalty, mutual aid, frankness about even the most intimate thoughts—those are generally the ideals of true, ideal Communists" (p. 153). Communism was corrupted after it "tasted the fruits of power. In practice nothing is done according to Marx," (p. 104). "The communists are not developing any sort of true socialism." (p. 98). Thus "contemporary"

communism is un-Marxist. It represents the betrayal of the communist idea, not its realization. "The heroic era of Communism is past. . . The new class has been created . . . it is without new ideas. It has nothing more to tell the people. The only thing that remains is for it to justify itself." (p. 54).

Thus the task which Djilas has taken upon himself is: to justify communism historically and politically. The law of mankind being "to increase and perfect production," Djilas explains the success or failure of communism in various countries according to their success or failure in industrialization. Western Europe and America succeeded in building up industry under conditions of "bourgeois" democracy and have avoided communism; "in such places revolution becomes nonsensical and unrealistic." In other countries (Russia, China, Yugoslavia), however, the fateful question of industrial development can be solved only through communist revolution. "There was no other way of bringing about industrialization." Communism not only was inevitable, but it "made possible rapid economic progress." And the most important thing, he contends, is that the industrial revolution in the undeveloped countries of Europe and Asia opened the road to freedom in those countries. "The communist revolution cannot attain a single one of the ideals named as its motivating force. However, the Communist revolution brought about a measure of industrial civilization to vast areas of Europe and Asia. In this way, material bases have actually been created for a more free future society. Thus, while bringing about the most complete despotism, the Communist revolution has also created the basis for the abolition of despotism. As the nineteenth century introduced modern industry to the West, the twentieth century will introduce modern industry to the East. The shadow of Lenin extends over the vast expanse of Eurasia in one way or another. In despotic form in China, in democratic form in India and Burma, all of the remaining Asiatic and

other nations are inevitably entering an industrial revolution. The Russian revolution initiated this process. The process remains the incalculable and historically significant fact of the revolution," (pp. 30/31). And he goes even further: "Backward peoples in communist systems experience a cultural renaissance along with the technical one." (p. 136).

Then Djilas commences to justify even the worst features of communism, in the same breath as he denounces them. "Absolute brutality . . . is in accord with the grandiosity of communist aims." "History will pardon communists for much, establishing that they were forced into many brutal acts because of circumstances and the need to defend their existence." Djilas speaks enthusiastically of the "grandiose ventures" which communism has accomplished. He praises Lenin and Stalin as the two greatest figures in history. He stresses the positive qualities of the new class. He especially emphasizes the strength of communism, at the core of which is the strength of the new class which is "better prepared for greater sacrifices and heroic exploits" than other classes in history, and "is strong enough to carry out material and other ventures that no other class was ever able to do." (p. 60). "The Communist society is as a whole more unified than any other." (p. 97). Communism has "penetrated into all the pores of society and of the personality—into the vision of the scientists, the inspiration of the poets, and the dreams of lovers." Djilas asserts that, after all, the people are *for* communism. "Most of the individuals in the Communist system are not opposed to socialism, but opposed to the way in which it is being achieved." People are against the new class only because it is not realizing *true* communism,—because it is not communistic enough!

Finally, the evils of communism are of a temporary nature and can be eradicated. "It has not always been like this in communist systems, nor is it in-

evitable that it should be so."

What then is to happen? Djilas' admirers and promoters have tirelessly spread the line that he predicted the end of communism. This is a gross misstatement, for such an idea is as remote from Djilas' mind as from Tito's, Khrushchev's or Mao Tse-tung's. In 1953, Djilas had announced "the beginning of the end" of bureaucratic communism of the Stalin era and the "beginning of the beginning" of communist "democracy" under Malenkov. He had stressed that the only way to criticize bureaucracy in the USSR was "from socialist positions." Any other kind of criticism would only strengthen capitalism and bureaucracy and obstruct the realization of the new world of "real freedom and the real free association of mankind," towards which all peoples are "already advancing, passing from capitalism to socialism, advancing inexorably, be it through dictatorships and wars and revolutions, plunder and oppression, but — they are advancing."

#### *The Role of the U. S. and the "Practical" Contemporary Communists*

In that process the United States could lend a very helping hand. "The United States is carrying out nationalization . . . by putting a considerable portion of the national income into the hands of the government." (p. 199). "If the United States would achieve a completely nationalized economy, tendencies toward the unification of the contemporary world would receive still greater impetus." (p. 199).

But the main promoters of world unity, of course, are the communists, according to Djilas. "Contemporary Communism could help achieve the goal of world unification most of all by political means — by internal democratization and by becoming more accessible to the outside world." All that is necessary is for the "greatest minds to perceive that it is the exploiting class and that its reign is unjustified," and after that "to renounce the means it is using." The main sin of the



"new class" is that of being unrealistic by stifling criticism *completely* and holding *absolute* power. Fortunately however, reality, i.e. "the basic tendency toward the unification of production," is forcing the communist leaders to be realistic. They are learning and improving, "they are now more practical men than they used to be." Those practical communists, according to Djilas, are the "collective leadership" in the Soviet Union and Tito in Yugoslavia.

### *Djilas and Tito*

The "heretic" and "anti-communist" martyr Djilas is unchangeably full of praise for Tito, the head of the Yugoslav "new class." "Tito is a great revolutionary. Tito is a representative of the people." (p. 53). While in the Soviet Union communism has gone through the revolutionary phase (Lenin) and the dogmatic phase (Stalin) to arrive at its present "realistic" phase under Khrushchev, Yugoslavia has passed through all three phases in a relatively short time and with the same personalities at the summit. (p. 168). And evidently because Tito represents a "three-in-one" combination of revolutionary Lenin, dogmatic Stalin and realist Khrushchev, "Yugoslav Communism has been more consistent than other parties in preserving the substance of Communism, yet never renouncing any form which could be of value to it." (p. 53).

### *Djilas' Message*

Consequently, the message of Djilas' book, skillfully concealed by a flood of high-sounding anti-communist phrases, yet unmistakable and unequivocal, is that:

- communism was unavoidable in those countries where it came to power;
- communist methods were historically justified;
- communism "accomplished grandiose ventures;"
- communism will unavoidably conquer the whole of Asia and Africa and other underdeveloped countries;

- capitalism will be destroyed;
- communism will remain and the main problem of our age, freedom, will be solved within communism, through the device of communist self-improvement.

In other words, *The New Class* is not a book about the imminent defeat of communism, but about its imminent victory. For all the failure of Western observers to grasp Djilas' message, the fact remains that his thesis of communist self-improvement, his prediction that Western Europe may keep its capitalism, but Asia and Africa will go communistic; his forecast of the disappearance of communism as a consequence of world unification, not however before liquidating capitalism, — are all thoroughly Leninist, i.e. truly communistic.

This conclusion is corroborated not only by what Djilas said about communism, but also by his choice of the issues he carefully avoided discussing.

### *The Issues Which Djilas Did Not Discuss*

Djilas has discussed communism as a moral, political and economic system within various countries, but not as a system of power which has conquered one-third of the world and is bent upon further conquest. This can hardly be accidental. Communists relied not on the laws of mankind, but on organized political action to seize power from Russia (1917) to Northern Vietnam (1954). If Djilas has now undergone a change of heart through a democratic awakening, why does he avoid discussing the Stalin-Tito rift of 1948, the Khrushchev-Tito reconciliation of 1955 and the pledge of Tito in Stalingrad (June 1956) to "march in time of war as in time of peace shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people toward the same goal, the goal of the victory of socialism?"

Another basic omission is Djilas' failure to discuss his own role in Asia (1952/1953). Why did Tito send him to Asia? What did he do there? If communism marches in Asia under the banner or shadow of Lenin — who proclaimed that



the road to Berlin leads through Peiping and Calcutta — why does Djilas not say a single word about the connection between that Leninist concept of world conquest and his own “world unification?”

Finally, in discussing in 214 pages the mortal sins of communism against freedom, Djilas does not say a single word about the freedom of greatest concern, *the freedom of the people to decide about their government*, i.e. whether to remove their communist dictators and destroy — not improve — communism. Can the silence of an “anti-communist” on this issue be accidental in a book which is “rocking the communist world?”

### Conclusion

Criticisms and mutual attacks between communists are partly a result of their craving and struggle for power, but they do not affect their stand toward communism and communist world conquest, nor do they affect their loyalty to communist power. Trotsky rebelled in 1927 against Stalin who had “betrayed the Revolution” and whose regime he called “the most inquisitorial system of all time.” However, he continued to pledge his loyalty to the USSR and Stalin personally.<sup>6</sup> Djilas himself quotes in one of his articles of 1951 the instance of the Albanian communist Kochi Džodze, “who was slandered, hurt, abused, cheated and finally assassinated by the Albanian sycophants in the service of Moscow and who, in spite of all that, remained faithful to Moscow and Stalin.” The Soviet leaders called Tito an imperialist agent, a Judas, a fascist dog, and Tito reciprocated in kind; but a few years later they reconciled and became again “dear comrades” and “brothers-in-arms.” Dedijer, Tito’s official biographer, became a “heretic” in 1954 by defending Djilas; he was given a suspended sentence in 1955 and ever since has been considered a “subversive” element. But in September 1957 he declared himself willing to “put my hand in the fire for Tito.” Gomulka was restored to power to save Poland from Stalinism. But

Stalin’s agents Cyrankiewicz and Zawadski kept their posts after the “big change” in October 1956.

Thus the notion that Djilas is against communism because of *The New Class* contradicts all known experience about intra-communist disputes and conflicts. And far from being a matter of conjecture, it is a matter of factual evidence that Tito does not consider Djilas an enemy. Why otherwise would he in November 1956 allow the telegram of the *New Leader* to be immediately delivered to Djilas, and his article immediately sent to New York? And especially how can one explain the total inefficiency of the Yugoslav police regarding Djilas and his “heretical, anti-communist” writings? According to the *New York Times* of November 20, 1956, Djilas had lived “for nearly a year under the close watch of the Yugoslav police . . . there had been a police car parked at the curb outside, an officer to question any visitors and a cameraman stationed in a window across the street to take their pictures.”

And according to a number of reports, when Djilas was arrested on November 19, 1956, “all his papers and manuscripts . . . were confiscated” (The *Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., November 20, 1956). The Reuters version (November 20) was that the police “went through all his belongings and took him away with a suitcase full of his manuscripts.” All of which means that he either took his finished manuscript of *The New Class* to jail or finished it in jail.

According to the Voice of America broadcast of September 27, 1957, the manuscript was smuggled out of Djilas’ prison cell. This is also the version of the International News Service (October 4, 1957). The most competent testimony is that of Jakov Levi, long-time Yugoslav communist correspondent in New York (turned defector a few months ago) who confirms that “Djilas smuggled the manuscript of his explosively anti-Communist book right out of his jail cell . . .”

The majority of the 18 million people

in Yugoslavia are strongly against the regime. Is it not strange, very strange, that not a single anti-communist could write and smuggle out of jail an anti-communist book, but that this was reserved for the former third ranking communist of Yugoslavia?

The appraisal of Djilas' book would be incomplete if we ignored that fact that we are not dealing with a naïve intellectual who fell in love with a political idea, while remaining aloof from its practice, but a politician with a devastating record, a true member of the "new class." Djilas is responsible for the death of many people, especially in his native Montenegro. He has been, with Kardelj, a chief philosopher and architect of whatever Yugoslav communism represents today. When he condemns contemporary communism today, he has as many skeletons in his closet as does Khrushchev indicting Stalin, or Mao Tse-tung expressing his love for blooming flowers and ideas after liquidating twenty million Chinese.

In view of this it is quite possible that Djilas is being groomed to play the role of Gomulka in Yugoslavia. A reconciliation between a benign forgiver Tito and the "democratic" hero and martyr Djilas would make the Yugoslav communist regime appear irresistibly and irrefutably democratic and humanitarian (Tito only recently spoke of the necessity for communism to be "humanitarian"). When Djilas in *The New Class* (p. vi) wrote that he had become "increasingly estranged from the reality of contemporary communism and had come closer to the idea of democratic socialism," many reviewers in the free world gasped with delight. Djilas was becoming a democrat almost a freedom fighter! They overlooked the fact that such was precisely the Leninist line of Khrushchev and his friend Tito who declared in May 1956 that "the big change in the Soviet Union was carried out through socialist democratization."<sup>8</sup>

*The New Class* is a symptom of the grave crisis of communism throughout the

world. It could be used to expose communism and inflict on it a strong propaganda defeat and loss of face in the world. The very risky game of self-criticism which the communists, — faced with their explosive internal troubles and unrest — are playing today is good strategy only as long as the free world does not use against the Communists the weapons which their self-criticism offers. While *The New Class* has revealed nothing about communism that had not been known for years, it is nevertheless a very useful document, full of admissions which could be used with great effect against communism and all its leaders, Stalinist and Titoist and Djilasist, unregenerate and "repentant" alike, throughout the world.

But this work is also part of the new communist strategy of winning, not by missiles and nuclear war, but by a psychological warfare which will induce us to hail as allies and saviors would-be executioners. It was written and in some quarters is being promoted and idolized not to enlighten communists, but for the sake of confusing the public opinion of the free world. It was written to confirm once more and with renewed emphasis the fundamental strategic slogan of communist propaganda: that communism must inevitably win, because history wills it. From Marx and Engels to Lenin and Stalin and Mao and Molotov and Zhdanov and Khrushchev and Kadar and Gomulka and Tito and Djilas, all communists, purgers and purged alike, were and are in perfect agreement on this basic point, because they know that once the "bourgeois enemy" starts viewing communism as "the wave of the future," all struggle against communism becomes senseless.

This psychological offensive cannot be promoted more successfully than by having the communists monopolize all the positions and play all the roles on the scene of modern history in the decisive battle between freedom and communism. So, the communists pursue ruthless imperialist and colonial policies and at the same time are

the champions of national independence and self-determination. And while on the one hand communists (Krushchev, Mao, Tito, et al.) extol the glorious and unique achievements ("grandiose ventures") of communism, they at the same time appear as its most severe and best informed critics (Djilas). Thus the aggressive communist drive and the opposition to it, the ruthless bureaucratic and tyrannical communist rule and the opposition to it, and the unification of the world through communist self-criticism and self-improvement are virtually all safe in communist hands. In the popular-front era, the communists were telling us who are our enemies and who are our allies. Now, in the era of "different" communism, they are apparently even willing to undertake the task of fighting communism for us! Back in 1953 in one of his "heretical" articles, Djilas had written: "to renounce power is progressive and socialistic, but only insofar as . . . nobody (no other class, party) seizes it. In any case to relinquish power is equal to treason." Four years later he was not writing *The New Class* to destroy communism, but rather to place the blame for communist failures, crimes and betrayals upon the new class scapegoat, thus clearing the path for the "improvement" of communism, its expansion in Asia and Africa and its final victory. He has thus been playing an important role in the present strategy of world communism, in which the struggles for national independence, the collective leaderships, the denunciations of the "cult of personality", the "rectification campaigns," the administrative decentralizations, and the workers' councils all serve only better to disarm the hostility of the people against communism. Consequently communism is able to consolidate the ruthless dictatorship, promote communist ideas, debilitate and confuse the thinking of the free world, make acceptable communist solutions, and advance on the path of communist conquest.

While Djilas cannot presently exert any direct political influence on Yugoslav poli-

cies, he is playing an important role in the process of the political disarmament of the West. The same Western political circles which for years have been glorifying Djilas as a most deserving enemy of Moscow, are now glorifying Djilas as a most deserving enemy of communism. They are at the same time for Djilas and for Tito. No Djilas supporter and believer of the anti-communist message of *The New Class* has noticed this striking fact much less attempted to explain it.

By writing *The New Class* Djilas was not serving — nor did he mean to serve — the cause of freedom. Instead, he was shooting another efficient arrow at the target of the communist world revolution. We do not say that the Djilas case was pre-arranged any more than the Stalin-Tito conflict of 1948 was pre-arranged. Both events took place as a result of internal communist tensions, troubles and difficulties of adaptation to changed world conditions. But in both cases communists turned their predicament into advantage. If this maneuver is not thoroughly understood, the communists will continue to use *The New Class* as a weapon to impose on us political concepts designed to pave the way for ultimate communist victory.

<sup>1</sup>These articles were published in the official Yugoslav monthly review, *Questions Actuelles Du Socialisme* (Paris, November — December 1951), under the title "Reflexions Diverses."

<sup>2</sup>The nature of de-Stalinization was revealed in "Text of the Soviet Communist Party Announcement on the Anti-Stalin Campaign" published in the *New York Times*; July 3, 1956.

<sup>3</sup>"Why Top Reds Turn on Stalin," *U. S. News and World Report*; March 30, 1956.

<sup>4</sup>Italics added.

<sup>5</sup>Italics added.

<sup>6</sup>*The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report on Hearings on the Charges Made Against him in the Moscow Trials*, by the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937) p. 292.

<sup>7</sup>"Jakov Levi: The Bravest Man of the Year," *The American Weekly*; December 29, 1957.

<sup>8</sup>"Tito Lauds 'Socialist Democratization' Achieved by Kremlin," *Christian Science Monitor*; May 8, 1956.

## FOUR VIEWS

### THE CONDITION OF EUROPE

THESE FOUR ARTICLES on the state of modern Europe have in common a deep concern for the homeland of our civilization. Mr. Kirk's comments on his recent European travels, and his part in the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society and at the Conference on North Atlantic Community, are set against a background of *Romanitas* and Christendom.

Professor Röpke's criticism of the prospects for an effectual common market in Europe are the world of a political economist aware of the limitations of his chosen discipline, and thoroughly acquainted with the Platonic virtue of Prudence.

Dr. von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, a vigorous but highly unconventional Roman Catholic, defends the medieval view of crime, sin, and atonement which still struggles, in the Catholic lands of Europe, against the morality of modern times.

Counsellor Starke's moving essay on Archbishop Reinis of Latvia, in his Russian prison during 1950 and 1951, requires a brief preface. Counsellor Starke, a Lutheran, is now in the East European Section of the German Foreign Office. Before the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland, he was a member of the German diplomatic staff at the German embassy in Warsaw. Later, attached to the German Embassy in Moscow at the time German-Russian hostilities commenced, he was arrested by the Russians, who kept him imprisoned until 1955. In prison he met Archbishop Reinis of Latvia, who probably now is dead. In this portrait of a great churchman who did not fail to follow the example of the Suffering Servant, Counsellor Starke touches upon the heroic Christian spirit that has not yet passed out of Europe.

### *Cultural Debris: Two Conferences And the Future of Our Civilization*

RUSSELL KIRK

WE LIVE IN a world that is giving at the seams. Sometimes, indeed—especially to anyone who travels a good deal—there

comes an uneasy feeling that the garment of civilization already has parted; and that if one were to tug even the least bit, a sleeve or a trouser-leg of our social fabric would come away in his hand. In half the world, the decent draperies of the old order



have been burnt altogether, and King Demos struts naked, like the Emperor with the imaginary new clothes in Hans Christian Andersen's story. When the garment of civilization is worn out, we are confronted by the ugly spectacle of naked power.

Yet cheerfulness will keep breaking in. At this hour when the Communists and other totalitarians are busy ripping to shreds the "wardrobe of a moral imagination" (Burke's phrase), certain people of a very different cast of mind have turned tailors, and are doing their best to stitch together once more the pieces of that serviceable old suit we variously call "Christian civilization" or "Western civilization" or "the North Atlantic community" or "the free world". Not by force of arms are civilizations held together; but by the subtle threads of moral and intellectual principle. In the hands of the Fates are no thunderbolts: only thread and scissors. Last Autumn, I went to two gatherings of these moral and intellectual tailors, who are bent upon restoration of our civil social order. One group met at St. Moritz, in Switzerland: the tenth anniversary meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society, composed principally of political economists. The other met at Bruges, in Belgium: the first Conference on North Atlantic Community, an assembly of political theorists, serious journalists, political leaders, and men of business. Either group talked for a week, and stitched away at their work of restoration. Certain interesting discussions took place, and I propose to set down some brief account of these deliberations.

During the week before I got to St. Moritz in the Grisons, I tramped about England and Scotland with an American friend, an executive in a great industrial corporation. Being something of a classical scholar, my friend collects sixteenth- and seventeenth-century editions of Latin works—particularly Cicero and Seneca—and pokes happily about Roman remains. We found for his library, in the dusty caverns of British second-hand bookshops, a num-

ber of admirable things at trifling prices. There was the noble elephant-folio of Strabo, in two immense volumes, for a mere thirty-five shillings; and the Strawberry Hill edition of Lucan, beautifully bound, at five guineas; and a twelve-volume set of Cicero for a pound. In an age of progressive inflation, one commodity alone remains stable, or actually diminishes in price: good old books. At the devil's booth in Vanity Fair, every coup of dross may find its ounce of gold; but the one thing which the devil can't sell nowadays is learning. Who wants classical texts? No twentieth-century Faustus disposes of his immortal soul for mere abstract knowledge. The copies of Strabo and Lucan and Cicero for which a Schoolman would have risked his life ten times over are now a drug on the market. As my friend remarked to me, "These things are cultural debris. It's as if a great ship had sunk, but a few trifles of flotsam had bobbed up from the hulk and were drifting on the surface of the ocean. Who wants this sea-drift? Not the sharks. You and I are going about in a small boat collecting bits of debris."

Whether our civilization really retains coherence enough for restoration to be possible may be made clear to all thinking men within a few years. If the fabric of our ancient society has declined to the condition of a mere heap of debris, all the tailors in the world cannot put it aright. The totalitarians say that the old order is a corpse, and that man and society must be fashioned afresh, in a grim fashion, upon a grim plan. Yet there are among us some men of intellectual power who hold that the wardrobe of our moral imagination is not yet altogether depleted. Some such met in St. Moritz and in Bruges.

The common bond among the members of the Mont Pèlerin Society is a belief in the enduring relevance of the "classical" political economy: classical not in the sense of Greek and Roman learning, of course, but the fundamental doctrines of the champions of a free economy, enunciated prin-

cipally in the last three decades of the eighteenth century and the first three decades of the nineteenth. The Society's president, and principal founder, is Professor F. A. Hayek, of the University of Chicago; and it is a mark of his influence that he is able to bring together, annually, some two hundred men seriously interested in the problems of economic and social order. The United States and Britain furnish most of the members of this international association; then France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands, with a sprinkling from other countries. The Society's purpose is summarized in the final article of its "Statement of Aims": "The group does not aspire to conduct propaganda. It seeks to establish no meticulous and hampering orthodoxy. It aligns itself with no particular party. Its object is solely, by facilitating the exchange of views among minds inspired by certain ideas and broad conceptions held in common, to contribute to the preservation and improvement of the free society." An able secretary, Dr. Albert Hunold of Zurich, keeps the Society lively, and its papers are published in Switzerland annually.

As the word "conservative" is used in the popular press, the Mont Pèlerin Society is a conservative body; and certainly its intention is to conserve the body of liberties which the Western world has known a long while—especially economic liberties. So far as social first principles are concerned, however, most of the members have their intellectual roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism. A considerable diversity of view exists, nevertheless: Professor Wilhelm Röpke of Geneva, for instance, is what Walter Bagehot would have called a "liberal conservative", a believing Christian, an opponent of the "cult of the colossal"; while Professor Ludwig von Mises is the complete disciple of Jeremy Bentham, contemptuous of religious belief and social tradition, dedicated to pure efficiency—what he called himself at this meeting (though with

a degree of irony), an "entrepreneurial Marxist."

The Society's Tenth Anniversary Meeting took up several important questions. State aid to "underdeveloped" countries was among them; and the majority of the members were opposed to such programs, at least in the form they take at present. The European common market was the subject of another lively exchange: in general, the opinion of the Society on this topic seemed moderate and prudent, not given to expectations of economic miracle-working, though very friendly toward the diminishing of economic barriers. All in all, the members of the Society seemed to be moving away from the more extreme doctrines of nineteenth-century Benthamite liberalism, although remaining attached to liberal concepts of the free market and individual political freedom. Bentham's "greatest happiness principle" and pleasure-and-pain calculus were rejected by several speakers, notably Frenchmen.

Near the end of the week's conference, nevertheless, the presidential address by Mr. Hayek went counter to the trend of much of the meeting. Professor Hayek, in a paper called "Why I am not a Conservative", called upon all faithful liberals to reject alliances with conservatives. For conservatives, he declared, are timid, authoritarian, paternalistic, anti-democratic, anti-intellectual, illogical, mystical, and many other distressing things. Yet he confessed that most liberals, old-style or new-style, are no more to his taste, and approved only two political thinkers, Tocqueville and Acton. The choice of these mentors—both of whom were Catholics—seemed a little odd in the light of Mr. Hayek's strong prejudice in favor of nineteenth-century rationalism. For his part, Professor Hayek declared, he was not a liberal in the popular twentieth-century sense, nor yet a "libertarian", but an Old Whig. Now the original Old Whig was Edmund Burke, the founder of conservatism: Burke's *Appeal from the New Whigs to the Old*, even more than his *Reflections on the*

*Revolution in France*, is the touchstone for conservatives. That fact left Mr. Hayek's stand not altogether clear.

When Benthamite Liberalism was at the height of its influence, Sir Walter Scott observed, "The Whigs will live and die in the belief that the world is governed by little tracts and pamphlets." Scott meant, among other things, that the New Whigs—and their Liberal successors—tended to leave out of their reckoning some of the deeper longings and instincts of the human heart, relying wholly upon private rationality and appeals to enlightened self-interest. But the world really is governed, in any age, not by rationality, but by emotion: by love, loyalty, faith, and imagination. One of the reasons for the decline of the liberals in this century has been the doctrinaire view of human nature and society taken by the leading lights of liberalism. An intense preoccupation with practical economic questions, to the exclusion of theology, morals, and the works of the higher imagination, has afflicted the liberals from the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. Dr. Hayek himself suggested that he is not unaware of such shortcomings in liberalism; yet he brushed aside the question of the religious origins of our social order.

Behind Mr. Hayek's chain of reasoning—and, to an extent still greater, behind the arguments of other members of the Society, among them Mr. von Mises and Mr. Alexander Rüstow of Heidelberg—seemed to lie the assumption that if only a perfectly free market economy could be established, all social problems would solve themselves in short order. But this is very like saying that if only the Sermon on the Mount were universally obeyed, sin would vanish from among men. No doubt; but the Sermon on the Mount will not be universally obeyed until the end of all things earthly. There are reasons for believing that the ideal universal free market is nearly as difficult of attainment.

The world, in short, never is governed merely by little tracts and pamphlets; nor

can an economic order arise or endure apart from a moral and political order. That many members of the Mont Pèlerin Society seemed to recognize this ineluctable condition of political economy was an encouraging symptom of the altered climate of liberal opinion. As an assembly of scholars, writers, and men of business generally prudent in their views, and devoted to the conserving of social freedom, the Mont Pèlerin Society is one body for stitching together the rent garment of our civilization. Its Tenth Anniversary Meeting was held high among the Alps, in the Romansch-speaking district of Switzerland, where an ancient tongue and ancient ways of life have persisted little altered to our day. The Grisons are governed not by little tracts and pamphlets, but by living traditions. If the better features of old-fashioned liberalism—or Old Whiggery—can be joined to an intelligent defense of continuity and stability in society, much may be done to resist the fell spirit of collectivism, which detests equally the conservative and the liberal of life.

Among the ancient canals and towers of Bruges, the first Conference on North Atlantic Community was held to seek means for resisting the totalitarian assault on our civilization. The College of Europe (situated at Bruges) and the University of Pennsylvania were the sponsors; and the Conference was intended to provide a moral and intellectual equivalent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. More than a hundred scholars, serious journalists, and political leaders took part, including representatives of all the countries in the NATO except Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Several Germans and Swiss took an active part, and a small number of émigrés from Eastern Europe were present. Among the moving spirits of the Conference, in addition to Dr. Henri Brugmans (rector of the College of Europe) and Dr. Gaylord P. Harnwell (president of the University of Pennsylvania) were Dr. Hans Kohn and Dr. Robert Strasz-Hupé, American professors who were born and edu-

cated in Europe.

The Conference was divided into several working-groups: religion and spiritual values; education and language; scientific and technological advance and economical problems of Western civilization; causes of tensions; the North Atlantic and totalitarianism; the North Atlantic and the underdeveloped world; institutional framework. At the end of a week, these several groups presented reports, and some general resolutions were adopted, recommending in particular the establishment of an Atlantic Institute (with a branch on either side of the ocean) and the further organized study of the many questions raised at this Conference. As an Irish participant, the writer Mr. Monk Gibbon, remarked to a plenary session, the conclusions of the working-groups were platitudes; but, as he added, platitudes are true. By and large, the Conference was a successful exploration of the foundations of our common civilization, and it was remarkably free from extreme views. The stand taken by the Conference against the Communist power was forthright and intelligently expressed.

Among the participants were conservatives, liberals, socialists, and Christian communarians (the last group led by Mr. Adriano Olivetti, the Italian industrialist); there were no Communists or fellow-travellers, though some of the social democrats present still called themselves Marxists. This being so, the considerable degree of agreement which was attained is worth remark. Some subjects, naturally, were slipped over somewhat uneasily, and upon others there were rather ineffectual compromises. In the group concerned with economical problems, Mr. John Davenport, of *Fortune*, endeavored vainly to have inserted a recommendation favoring the institution of private property; the phrase itself was anathema to the socialists. Yet when this group's recommendations were presented in plenary session by their *rapporteur* (an English socialist, Mr. Arthur Gaitskell, brother of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell), the original stand of the socialist members

had been much moderated by the discussions, so that Mr. Gaitskell spoke of capital as a scarce thing, not to be lavished recklessly upon every "underdeveloped" country, and of "trade, not aid." In the group concerned with totalitarianism, some of the socialist members were bent upon including some sort of reproof of the Spanish and Portuguese regimes; but no one doubted that the real menace to the North Atlantic community comes from Communism, and "national" Communism had no sympathizers; the group's condemnation of "national" and "decentralized" communism were drawn up, indeed, by a Belgian socialist, Mr. Arther Wauters, formerly ambassador to Moscow. In the group's final report, there was no reference to Portugal, and the censure of Spain was moderate.

When so much concurrence upon first principles is possible, among a congeries of anti-totalitarians, the North Atlantic community seems to have come a good way toward moral and intellectual harmony. The Conference did not attempt to define precisely the common patrimony of Europe and America. There would have been squabbling at the outset, had such an attempt been made; and it seemed to be well enough understood that a common heritage of religious and moral principle, of culture, and of social institutions does exist. Very prudently, the Conference refrained from drawing up any such abstract document as the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights. This deliberate lack of precision, however, had the disadvantage of leaving unuttered the great principles which command the loyalty of most people in our trans-Atlantic society. In his closing address to the Conference, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak got briefly to the root of the matter when he declared that the unifying element in the North Atlantic community is Christianity. He hastily qualified this doctrine, nevertheless, by adding "as enriched by humanism and the French Revolution". Now though humanism (properly understood) did enrich Christianity, the French



Revolution did nothing to the Christian faith except to kick it downstairs. This equivocation from a gentleman usually unequivocal doubtless was a concession to the rationalist and equalitarian persons present, but it suggests a certain ambiguity which must afflict any preliminary attempt among anti-collectivists to find common ground in this divided world.

It seems to me that, cant and equivocation dismissed, there are three great bodies of principle and conviction that unite what is called the North Atlantic community. The first of these is the Christian faith: the theological and moral doctrines which inform us, either side of the Atlantic, of the nature of God and man, the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, human dignity, the rights and duties of human persons, the nature of charity, and the meaning of hope and resignation. The second of these is the corpus of imaginative literature, humane letters, which is the essence of our high culture: humanism, which, with Christian faith, teaches us our nobility and our limitations—the work of Plato, Virgil, Cicero, Dante, Shakespeare, and so many others. The third is a complex of social and political institutions which we may call the reign of law, or ordered liberty: prescription, precedent, impartial justice, private rights, private property, the primacy of the individual person, the nature of genuine community, the rights of the family and of voluntary association. However much these three bodies of conviction have been injured by internecine disputes, nihilism, Benthamism, the cult of Rationalism, Marxism, and other modern afflictions, they remain the rocks upon which our civilization is built.

This Conference on North Atlantic Community did a pious work in moving so far as it did toward a recognition of this common inheritance. If its endeavors are continued, the military alliance of America and the free European states may be sustained by something more important than guided missiles and atomic bombs: by a

common and coherent faith.

Shortly before I flew to Switzerland, my classics-collecting friend and I walked some miles of Hadrian's Wall, away at the back of beyond in Northumberland. Here for centuries, *Romanitas* and *humanitas* looked northward into barbarism. It is an empty country still, much of it; Pictish hill-forts still scowl almost within bow-shot of the Roman masonry. To the men of the legions, garrisoned here generation upon generation, it must have seemed—even toward the end—that Rome was indeed immortal; and that the barbarian, however vexatious he might be in one year or another, never could put an end to a civilization that extended from Mesopotamia to the land of the Picts, from Africa to Germany. Yet in the fullness of time, when the common faith of the Roman world had lost its virtue, the Picts came over the wall. The end of Roman civilization was as sudden as its beginning had been slow.

In material accomplishments, the barbarians never equalled the Romans; nor did they need to. They had the will to endure, and in the end the Romans had not. So all that remains of the material achievement of Roman civilization is some fragments of cultural debris: a few coins, a smashed helmet, scattered beads, a ruined wall, a battered stone head. And as for the Roman moral and intellectual accomplishment, it is sold nowadays for a price not much better than that of wastepaper. We used to put some value on our Roman heritage, and I hope we may do so again. There still are men and women enough among us who know what makes life worth living—enough of them to keep out the modern barbarian, if they are resolute. If they are not resolute, and if they cannot make common cause, the garment of our civilization will go to the rag-bin, and the cultural debris of the twentieth century will drift down the rubbish-heaps of the future. As the participants in these international conferences knew, not many years of drifting are left to us.

## POLITICAL ENTHUSIASM AND ECONOMIC SENSE:

### *Some Comments on European Economic Integration*

WILHELM ROEPKE

A GENERATION ago, Alfred Marshall said that it is difficult for an economist to be at once a good patriot and to have the reputation of a good patriot. Economic sense urges the trained mind to seek national welfare in measures that are sure to be rejected by superficial patriots; enlightened patriotism, for instance, often calls for free trade rather than national barriers. What Marshall said is true still; and more, it is not easy for an economist both to be a good European and to have a reputation as a good European.

Mere enthusiasm will not suffice to accomplish the desired European unity. Enthusiasm, true enough, is indispensable for overcoming the obstacles that still are in the way of a united Europe, but here patriotism alone is not enough. European patriotism—if it is not too soon to use this phrase—needs to be guided by good sense, lest damage be wrought by a well-intentioned but misguided impatience to see things done. This applies especially to the economic realm; and this is why the present writer, an economist who has sympathy and understanding for the efforts toward European economic integration, feels impelled to put the case of economic sense without a sugar coating. In doing so, I do not intend to discourage the political enthusiasm at work in the European endeavor; but I indulge the hope of serving the best interest of Europe by contending against errors and illusions.

#### *Regional Free Trade: a Two-Faced Proposition*

Several questions arise, and are put here in order of their importance. The most important is this: In what circumstances will the contemplated common market—whether it be the economic and tariff union of “Little Europe” (the six Messina countries) that is meant by the phrase, or the looser “Free Trade Zone” of all OEFC countries—bring about the expected benefits from a more advantageous trade, a more advanced division of labor, and a general European increase in wealth? To ask this question is to correct the widely-held unqualified view that these benefits are to be expected in any event; and that any *regional* removal of tariff barriers, in liberating trade and increasing wealth, would differ only in quantity (not in quality) from a *general* abolition of trade barriers. In point of fact, this view is quite erroneous, and it is of the greatest importance that this should be recognized.

For one thing, it is quite clear that the expected benefits will be the greater the more countries join in the contemplated exercise. Since the more ambitious proposition, that of an economic and customs union, is even in the most favourable circumstances not likely to be achieved over the whole geographical area, a Free Trade Zone could well cover it (being a mere

preference system without a unified external economic policy), it stands to reason that the *less ambitious scheme has decided advantages* over the more ambitious one.

Moreover, it is obvious that the benefits of an internal trade liberalization are offset to the extent to which barriers are erected against third countries. The smaller a country and the greater its dependence on foreign trade because of density of population and intensity of economic activity—the rule in Western Europe—the more such a country will be subjected to a wholesome compulsion to encourage free international trade relations and to moderate its own protective policies. Thus Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium are known as low-tariff countries. If now several such countries unite to form a common economic area, there is a certain chance—which is yet to be examined in detail—that a more advanced division of labor and economies of scale will help to increase productivity in that area. Against this chance, there is the danger that economic nationalism, which is more virulent than ever, will make tariffs and other barriers against the outside world go much higher.

Where such a disadvantage outweighs the benefits—and this possibility is anything but an academic concern in Western Europe—the whole scheme may prove to be a catastrophic misfire. Terms like “Common Market” and “Free Trade Area” become catchwords which serve to concentrate our attention on the internal goings-on and—similar to the catchword of “Empire Free Trade” which Lord Beaverbrook used to propagate a closed Commonwealth economy—excuse the suspicion that it is their purpose to serve as a red herring or to camouflage the whole thing. What happens if the external tariff of a common market is higher than the previous national tariffs of a number of participating countries is that the internal “common market” (if, indeed, it is real and not itself partly fictitious) comes into existence at the cost of a “less common” external market.

It is for several reasons very much to be expected that a customs union will adopt a common tariff whose rates are higher than they used to be on national levels. The ever-present danger of increased external barriers is particularly grave in cases where one of the uniting countries is greater than most others, of considerable political weight, and with a protectionist tradition, and where this country refuses to join unless a high common tariff—the natural line of least resistance—is agreed upon. This is exactly what is happening, unfortunately, in the negotiations about the Common Market of the Messina countries, with France as the country which pushes the common tariff up. In consequence, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, which had raised its tariffs—some excessively, only a few years ago—must accept not only considerably higher protection against third countries but even tariffs for raw materials, which have so far been duty-free. If this danger, with its very serious implications, cannot be averted, it would be a lot better to drop the whole scheme of a common external tariff, and try to achieve European economic integration solely by the OEEC's method of establishing a “Free Trade Area”, despite the embarrassing complications (continuance of intra-European frontier controls, certificates of origin, and the like) which this less ambitious system would entail.

A third point requires consideration if one tries to drop wishful thinking and get a sober idea of the actual possibilities of European economic integration, a point, it is true, which is a lot more difficult to render plausible than those made so far. At first sight it looks like a paradox: Even without external barriers, regional free trade may disturb rather than help international trade. The idea seems less paradoxical as soon as we realize that any system of regional free trade—be it a customs union or a preference system—is two-faced; while it means internal freedom, it brings about external seclusion. While a producer in country A, who so far had to

overcome the tariff barriers of country B, is now able to compete freely with the producers there, a producer in country C, which remains outside the free trade system, may have to give way to country A's producer in country B's market as he has to overcome a tariff barrier which does not exist for the latter. While one door is opened, another is closed.

The one thing that matters is thus whether more doors are opened than are closed, whether or not the effect of liberalisation outweighs the effect of seclusion. Let us take a concrete example: Let us suppose a common market is established—which Switzerland could in any case join only as a member of a Free Trade Zone (a point made recently in the excellent series "Switzerland and the European Economic Integration" [*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nos. 331 and 342 of February 5 and 6]) and the effect is that the Swiss watch-making industry can enter into free competition with German and French watchmakers in the German and French markets. So far, so good. In this event, those two competing countries will probably have to put up with a considerable curtailment of their watch-making industries in favour of Switzerland, while in Switzerland the same will happen to other industries. These shifts of industries to the most profitable location, though painful to the affected producers, bring about that increase in overall productivity which is the purpose of any economic integration. It is, however, quite a different proposition if one Swiss producer found it more profitable, in the past, to buy crude silk from Japan rather than from Italy, but is now compelled to resort to a less advantageous source of supply, as under the new arrangement Japanese silk would be subject to a duty while Italian silk would not. In this case, regional "free trade" would result in the substitution of a less favourable for a more favourable flow of trade. International division of labour would be less advantageous than before, and "free trade" would be little less than the facade of a very clever protectionism.

The more the average benefits to be derived from a customs union promise to outweigh its setbacks, the greater will be the anticipated unshackling of international trade and the resulting improvement in the international division of labour. But if things work the other way, the fusion will be a mere make-believe and quite a disappointment. Which turn events will take depends on the circumstances, which in the case of the present European integration require very thorough examination—more thorough than the heat of preparations so far permitted.

The overall balance of the integration, when seen from this angle, will be the more favourable, the lower the external tariffs are. It has already been mentioned that the contemplated common market does not look promising in this respect, and this will be hardest on those countries which have particularly close trade relations outside the common market area (e.g., the Netherlands).

Another important feature which will decide whether the effect of freedom or that of seclusion will prevail is the economic structure of the countries involved. If there is a great similarity, so much the better, for then it will be likely that "inside" producers will take the place of other, weaker "inside" producers and not supplant equally or more efficient "outside" suppliers; in other words, there will be good prospects for an improved international division of labor. If, however, the national economies are complementary rather than similar, the outlook is not so bright, as witness the former economic union of France and Indochina, under which Indochina had to buy the more expensive industrial output of France instead of getting cheaper supplies from Japan. If the sense and purpose of international trade is to allow for a more advanced division of labor, it stands to reason that a customs union of complementary economies will result in an artificial and wasteful distortion of the already existing international division of labor, whereas a



union of competing economies permits a regrouping of production which will ensure the desired higher efficiency that an improved international division of labor is expected to bring about.

As far as this is concerned, European integration certainly seems promising. But there is something else to be taken into account: Even in favourable circumstances a fusion will be trade-diverting rather than trade-creating if the abolition of tariffs is riddled by exemptions, with the result that goods which are in any case bought from third countries are duty-free, while goods produced inside the union's territory remain protected. As trade-creating tariff reductions will hurt inside producers, while trade-diverting reductions operate against outsiders, it is only to be expected that the items which will be freed in the course of a step-by-step abolition of tariffs will be so selected that the overall effect is trade-diverting rather than trade-creating. If a customs union is to fulfill its purpose, namely, to increase the overall gross regional product, the abolition of tariffs must hurt, and that is precisely why it is so difficult to get it done. It follows that a common market in Europe can in good faith only be advocated if it provides for as nearly as possible a complete "community". Otherwise, a general reduction of tariffs for the benefit of all supplier countries would be preferable.

A nearly complete abolition of tariffs, without which a customs union will not yield its full economic benefits, is for political and psychological reasons very difficult achieve; in addition to this it is an economic *tour de force* which has little to recommend it. On the other hand, it has been shown that a too timid advance will fail to produce the full economic effect of the exercise. This is the dilemma of any regional (as against a universal) abolition of tariffs. To mitigate hardships, a very complicated apparatus has been designed at Brussels with the purpose of assisting the necessary adjustments in the

affected industries. Apart from the general consideration that such a device will add to the already strong "planning element" in the whole set-up, the experience so far gathered in the coal and steel community with such a "death-bed insurance" is not exactly encouraging.

#### *Other Major Problems*

As any customs union has two faces, it becomes understandable why this is a proposition in which both free-traders and protectionists hope to win their case. Who actually wins depends, as we have seen, on the way the union is set up, and it is for this very reason that our judgement of the economic merits of the contemplated common market — bound up as they are with the political merits and demerits — must be kept in abeyance. We will not, however, deny that there seems to be more ground for pessimism than for optimism. If the common market is to fulfill its promises, if it is to be a real step ahead towards a genuine and productivity-increasing integration of the various national economies, then it must meet requirements which are far above what has been planned to date and which probably have little chance of being met anyway, as they exceed the limits of what can possibly be done in a customs union. If they cannot be fulfilled (particularly the requirements of low external tariffs and a far-reaching tariff reduction), it would be better to confine the present efforts to the less ambitious scheme of a regional preference system (Free Trade Zone) or to devote the more energy to the liberalization of trade so far pursued in OEEC and GATT. No less strange than the fact that preference systems and customs unions are a field where economic nationalism and internationalism meet, is another: the project of the common market is a combination of tendencies toward both a market economy and economic planning.

The story of the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community repeats itself; it is as necessary now as it was before to be

watchful lest the "common market" turn into a "common *dirigism*". It has already been stressed in another contact that this danger — particularly as regards a European control of investment — must not be underrated. Here as elsewhere, political enthusiasm may well lead to disregard for economic sense.

Another danger became apparent when the French demanded a "harmonization" of labor cost, in particular welfare burdens, to precede the actual setting up of the common market; in other words, all other countries were asked to hoist their labor costs (wages and welfare expenditure) up to the French level. It should not be necessary to point out that this demand for an *a priori* harmonization of labor costs is incompatible with the most elementary conclusions of political economy and is for its economic insight on a level with the request of American protectionists to be shielded against imports from countries with lower wages by a tariff that makes up the difference. No responsible economist has ever claimed that free trade presupposes equal costs of labor (or capital), as this is not even true in a national market. On the contrary, it is free trade that will reduce existing differences of labor and capital cost. This applies even where free movement is limited to commodities, and will apply even more when the migration of manpower and the flow of capital are just as free; this, of course, marks the ultimate highest degree of integration which Europe, with all its good intentions, will be able to reach only in the final phase of a long development.

Let us hope we would wrong the propagators of this French position, were we to assume that they are lacking this elementary insight. The problem is not quite so simple. The cost of labor (wages and social benefits) in France, which today appears higher than in other countries (on the basis of the existing rates of exchange) does not indicate a corresponding superiority in productivity; it is even less a measure of productivity than in other

countries. French wages and social benefits have rather been pushed up and out of proportion with productivity by political and social forces, particularly in the more recent past, with the result that they have become a spearhead of inflation, as in other countries, only more so. Since France has thus become the country where this process has been going on with most momentum, inflationary pressure there has become stronger than elsewhere, so that the country suffers from a chronic and quite severe balance of payments disequilibrium and its gold and exchange reserves flow to countries with a lower inflationary pressure, in particular Germany. How bad this is will be seen from the fact that the situation cannot be even tolerably redressed by a system of import obstacles, deliberalization, and export subsidies.

Thus the French demand for a "social harmonization" really means something quite different. For one thing, it is guided by the quite correct conclusion that French wage and welfare policies, highly inflationary because particularly oblivious of economic reality, have created a serious disequilibrium in the national economy, which must be put right if there is to be anything like a genuine common market. On the other hand, it implies that equilibrium is to be restored along the line of least political resistance, which happens to be at the same time the line of least economic sense. The most reasonable and fair procedure would be for France to adjust its fictitious rate of exchange to the inflated internal cost-and-price structure, in other words, to devalue the franc in the face of all political and rhetorical make-believe, to abolish the system of import obstacles and export aids — which will become unnecessary — and forthwith keep wage rounds and social benefits within reasonable limits. Instead, the spokesmen of France insist that there will be no devaluation, that the system of import obstacles and export aids must be retained to the maximum extent even in a common market, and that their own wage and wel-

fare policies must be imitated by other countries which have so far been more moderate in sinning.

What this means should be quite clear. It means that the indispensable minimum of an international balance in the union is to be secured by making the highest inflationary pressure — the “marginal pressure” of inflation, as one might call it — the standard for all. Thus “social harmonization” means in the last analysis “harmonization of inflation”. This would set a precedent for all later instances in which one single country would be permitted to dictate the pace in inflationary wage and welfare policies.

This example is highly instructive. It indicates the direction in which a solution will be sought in the future common market for a general problem which has from the very beginning been the central problem of European economic integration, a most uncomfortable subject which has again and again been ignored or pushed beneath the surface only to come up again, like a dead body one throws in the river in the fond belief that that is the way to get rid of it. It will not help either to tie stones to it, not even as weighty ones as the European Payment Union. It is again significant to note that this ugly skeleton has been passed over in eerie silence during the recent common market negotiations.

It need not be explained to those who know the story that the real question is this: How can free trade in Europe be conducted with countries which, by their economic policies, allow an inflationary pressure to develop that will disturb the balance between the various national economies and thus create conditions which are incompatible with the restoration of free currency convertibility? That this problem has not been solved, not even by the European Payment Union will be seen from the fact that the EPU can only keep itself going by tolerating contraventions against the principle of free trade, of which those of France are the most

serious; by a continuous flow of gold and foreign exchange from high-pressure to low-pressure countries, and by the not unlimited compulsory credit granted by those countries which have external surpluses; the most important creditor country being Germany. There just is no ersatz for convertibility, or rather for the conditions which alone render the free convertibility of currencies possible, viz equal monetary discipline of all countries, unless, of course, a hardly tolerable amount of obstacles to trade or else freely fluctuating rates of exchange are preferred.

In trying to create today a common market — even for capital! — in Europe, and in considering it as substitute for the listlessly abandoned aim of convertibility, one should realize that it is impossible to have all of the following three things: Free trade, national differences in monetary discipline, and stable rates of exchange. One of them must be sacrificed, as will eventually be found out, and we can only consider which combination is most advisable and likely to be achieved in practice. In other words: What is the best thing to do and what will probably happen if there are serious balance of payment difficulties within the common market? Should uniformity in monetary discipline be aimed at and is it likely to be achieved? Or should a restoration of the balance rather be sought in an adjustment of rates of exchange?

This should be the subject of a long and useful discussion. However, there can be hardly any doubt as to what would be desirable and what is likely, and it is unfortunately already quite clear that that will not be one and the same thing. It is most devoutly to be wished that a solution be sought in an equal and high monetary discipline by all parties who would take up a determined fight against the inflationary tendencies of our time and thus get ready for convertibility. But this is unfortunately not likely to happen. Now that, furthermore, the latest example of Germany and France has shown how hard it is to get a

country to revalue or devalue its currency, even if all circumstances speak for such a step, it is not likely either that the solution would be sought in an adjustment of rates of exchange which would rank second in the order of desirability.

If, therefore, the common market is not to become a farce but a serious reality without a new "see-saw of liberalization", the most likely thing to happen — in particular if we think of France — is a solution sought or at least accepted along the line of least political and social resistance, namely a general adjustment to the highest existing degree of inflation and to the degree of inflation and to the lowest existing monetary discipline. That is the road on which we are already travelling, albeit with brakes which will then disappear. Just as there is a danger that the common market will give rise to common regimentation, with so much less external "community" of markets, there is another danger that the outcome may be a common inflation.

The problem of European economic integration should not make us forgetful of the existing threat of inflation. Fortunately, brakes and counter-forces are not lacking so far. As Dr. M. W. Holtrop, President of the Bank of Netherlands, recently pointed out in a remarkable lecture at Brussels, the most effective anti-inflationary impulse comes from the fact that a country which goes rather too far in its lack of monetary discipline will run into a balance-of-payments deficit and external illiquidity as a direct consequence. The smaller a country is — let this be repeated — the more it must rely on foreign trade, and the less it is relieved from its responsibility for consequences of its policies, the more effectively the brake will operate. The credit arrangements of the European Payments Union served rather to weaken this brake to some extent. The common market, as it seems at present to take shape, threatens to put it altogether out of operation. Who dares take this lightly?

## *Revolution, Crime, and Sin in the Catholic World*

ERIK VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

THE OLD AND unquenchable problem of brigandage and the *Mafia* continues to preoccupy the Italian press. Shots fired at the car of a high official and the debate about the big pilgrimage of the Madonna di Polsi in Calabria brought the matter once more forcefully to public attention. The government wanted to forbid the pilgrimage because it offered an ideal opportunity for the members of the *Mafia* to meet with the local brigands. But fear

of a wholesale rebellion, in the end, prompted the government to withdraw its prohibition; and the pilgrimage took place.

The press of Northern Italy treats these conditions as a national disgrace, but the Southerners shrug their shoulders and patiently pay "protection" fees to the *Mafia* and/or to the brigands. They do not believe that Marzano, Italy's number one crime-buster, will be able to change



conditions in the South. The North, on the other hand, is convinced that economic reconstruction will succeed where Marzano is bound to fail.

The roots of the problem lie far beyond the reach of either, deep down in theology. A country riddled with secret societies, indifferent to banditry, with no respect for the state and no civic sense, with little interest in technology or higher living standards, with a highly individualistic and 'indolent' outlook on life, is commonly considered "backward" — and bad. The societies of, let us say, Norway, England, or the United States, by the same token, will be rated "progressive" — and good. Although popular in the Western World, such terminology, obviously, is totally unscientific. There is no evidence to prove that people in Palermo, Syracuse, or Reggio di Calabria lead a life less full and happy than the inhabitants of Aberdeen, Copenhagen, or Kalamazoo. We can well imagine that a tourist from Kalamazoo, perhaps, may cherish the memory of a visit to Palermo.

We will find ourselves on much safer ground if we exchange the terms "backward" and "progressive" for "archaic" (ancient) and "modern", thus substituting chronology for a somewhat moralizing nomenclature. In spite of the revolutionary temper of the Catholic, and the conservative (but evolutionary) character of the Protestant and post-Protestant world, the mind and outlook of Calabria have changed less than that of Denmark, at least in the past three of four centuries. A Jutlander today will have whims and tastes, concepts of honor, happiness, disgrace, beauty, or joy entirely different from those of his remote forebears; whereas the Calabrese will show a much greater resemblance to his ancestors. And there is little doubt that a gentleman from Aarhus in 1450 was closer to a Calabrese gentleman than are their respective present-day descendants to each other. It required several weeks to make the trip from Aarhus to Reggio which today, by

plane, takes several hours; but the fact remains that today the *Mafioso* from Reggio and the shopkeeper from Aarhus would not see eye to eye on most questions. Five hundred years ago a common Faith united Aarhus and Reggio. Denmark no less than Calabria had a violent tenor of life; the colorful ways of the Middle Ages were common to the entire Occident — piety, brutality, hate, passion, love, robbery, jealousy, deviltry and a frequently flamboyant form of sanctity swayed that "primitive" world.

Why, we ask ourselves, did the Danes and the Calabrese live in "One World" five centuries ago, and why are they so different today? For, undoubtedly, the Calabrese have changed little. Who, then, is modern man and where does he come from? Why do Germans "make such good citizens" whereas South Italian emigrants so frequently engage in 'asocial' activities? Even if one dislikes generalizations, it is difficult to reject outright certain notions cherished by North Europeans and Americans: i.e., that the further South one travels in the Old World, the less punctual, reliable, cooperative, industrious, clean, efficient, honest, and truthful people become. To make matters worse, statistics tell us that crimes and felonies flourish in the South (and East) far more so than in the North (and West), a phenomenon present even within the boundaries of certain countries, for instance in Germany and Holland.

Why this curious difference between North and South? Racial, climatic, and ethnic elements certainly account for some of it, but more important than any of these elements is the religious factor, because religion alone can explain to man the "why", the "wherefrom", and the "where-to" of human existence. In Europe denominational boundaries rarely are identical with either political or ethnic frontiers. There are regions where Catholic Teutons live contiguously with Calvinist Latins, providing an object lesson in the distinction between national and religious

psychology, clearly showing which traits are "racial" and which come from a specific creed. Again, there are ethnic entities with one national conscience but with divided religious allegiances, creating different outlooks, cultures, and behavior patterns among one people.

The intelligent reader will have guessed that "North" and "South", as used by us to simplify the line of argument, should not always be understood in the strictly geographic sense. The terms may apply to what really is East and West — as in the case of the English and the Irish — or they may be reversed as is between the Rhinelanders and the Swiss. The key to this situation, as we said before, is religion. The Protestant world is based on discipline, hard work, cooperation, law and order; it is modern *par excellence*, bourgeois, reliable, communitarian, pragmatic, and evolutionary, as against the Catholic world which is revolutionary, personalistic, colorful, which believes in absolute values, and is ruled by the strong ties of personal affection. This means the 'modernization' of any country — Catholic, Schismatic, or pagan — implies the acceptance of Protestant or post-Protestant behavior patterns. Seventeenth-century Spain showed the greatest tolerance toward any kind of crime, while Britain hanged a man for appropriating an article worth more than forty shillings and this until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In the eighteen-twenties whole Spanish provinces went into rebellion when the already powerless Inquisition was replaced by a police force. People took to arms with the shout: "*Viva la Inquisición! Muera la policía!*" The Inquisition was merely after doctrinal deviations, but the police embodied the menace of "law and order", the spectre of Scotland Yard.

Much has been written about "Protestant Man" and "Catholic Man", but I feel — and this includes my own writing — that another important if synthetic type has been neglected — the "atheist-agnostic". His negative creed which spread

all over the Occident could enter into a more organic symbiosis with the "North", where it could come easily to terms with "liberal" "Protestantism, than in the "South". It is an important, but frequently overlooked point, that the antithesis between the Catholic and the Protestant "worlds", which was considerable during the first century and a half after the Reformation, became even more substantial with the "liberalization" of Protestantism and the subsequent extension of Deism, Pantheism, and Agnosticism. Until the end of the Seventeenth Century, the Protestant world remained revolutionary because it believed and extolled absolutes as fervently as the Universal Church did. The notion that either Luther or Calvin defended "private interpretation" is a fairy tale believed by Protestants and Catholics alike. Only after 1700 Protestantism became gradually secularized and, having lost its religious fervor under the impact of relativism, it also lost its revolutionary temper and became evolutionary. George Washington headed no revolution like Oliver Cromwell — or Maximilien de Robespierre.

In the light of these facts it must be understood that the phenomenal rise of the Protestant nations actually came *after* their religious emancipation, *after* the enthusiasm of the Reformation and Protestant orthodoxy had fizzled out. A hundred years after the disaster of the Armada, Spain still was a great power; and even at the end of the eighteenth Century, Charles III decided to join Louis XVI in his Aid-to-America program. Spain's downfall is a nineteenth century tragedy. The Industrial Revolution was facilitated not only by Calvinist notions, but, above all, by a materialism which is the concomitant to all conscious withdrawals from the supernatural. The Protestant spirit of cooperation and discipline merely served as a basis for the achievement of material improvements. "Progress" in the form of wealth, a longer life, painlessness, security, comfort could be reached only by hard

work, organization, thrift, and frugality. Yet it need hardly be pointed out that "Progress" (including the H-Bomb) does not necessarily lead to a happier mankind. Fun is not joy, and Swedish gym teachers or senior executives in New York's suburbs (or "exurbia") do not necessarily look much happier than Calabrian bandits.

While the Catholic nations (and certain "retarded" Protestant ones) remained 'backward', they continued to lead a more colorful life in an ambience of beauty, savagery, and 'primitiveness' with few neurotics and many criminals. But even if Sicilians were as well off as Danes, it is doubtful whether the stream of Sicilian tourists to Denmark would be very great. The beaten track of American tourists in Europe, significantly enough, leads almost exclusively through Catholic regions.

The higher Catholic (and Schismatic) crime rate is a sore subject for all those who are not Catholic Christians, but merely 'Catholicists', i.e., mere 'partisans' of the Church afflicted with an inferiority complex. 'Moral' statistics, we should admit, must be read in their sociological context. In countries where the Catholics have a lower living standard than the non-Catholics, temptation must be taken into consideration. Yet in this connection it is worth remembering that Continental legal practice respects the right to 'expropriate' in the case of dire need. Cardinal Frings of Cologne, following the teaching of St. Thomas, told his faithful in 1946 to take fuel where they could find it. (Hence the humorous expression *Kohlen fringsen* for 'stealing' coal.) For us the positive law (*ius gentium*) is binding only in a relative way, and it is by no means accidental that legal positivism rose contemporaneously with the emergence of totalitarian tyranny. Adam — man — precedes the Leviathan State as well as the Behemoth of Society. The deification of the state, significantly enough, is an Anglo-Prussian (Hobbesian-Hegelian) revival of pagan notions in antiquity. Conversely, there al-

ways has been a suspicion in the Protestant world that Catholics are not 'ideal citizens' and if blind obedience, subservience, compliance, and trembling respect for the written law are the measuring rods, this suspicion is justified, because the Catholic adheres to *reason* and is subject primarily to his *conscience*. (The French verb *raisonner* not only means to reason, but also to oppose with intelligent arguments.) For Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., State and Society were ultimate coercive realities, but to us they are not.

Recently an interesting debate took place between some editors of *The Commonweal* and the diocesan weekly of St. Louis about the Catholic as a citizen. Now it is quite true that our theology can provide us with valid reasons for being a good citizen whereas the agnostic cannot be 'reached' by similar cogent arguments. For him, however, the state represents the ultimate. He is impressed by the (debatable) fact that "crime doesn't pay", and beyond the state he sees no other tangible authority. For us, God's Will and conscience come first. Hence also the shining example of Catholic resistance against tyranny. In tyrannicide, from Charlotte Corday to Stauffenberg, we always have been leading.

Yet at the same time we have to admit that a look at the criminologist's map of Europe shows a pretty bad Catholic record. It is true that certain Protestant regions in North-Eastern Europe are not much better, and that devout Lutheran Finland compares most unfavorably with progressive Sweden. Even if the 'Catholicist' considers all sociological aspects as well as the fact that the surplus population from Catholic regions with a high birth-rate migrates to Protestant parts and there swells the lower layers, this will not diminish his irritation at our higher criminal rate which thwarts his worldly and petty efforts to let his religion compete with Protestant and secularist environments on their own terms. We always ought to remember the Irishman who, teased by his English friend about the fact that

three-quarters of the Royal Constabulary had to be stationed in Ireland and so few in law-abiding England, replied: "Of course; it's no use muzzling sheep."

A tree, no doubt, shall be known by its fruits, but it would be most erroneous to use the findings of law courts as spiritual indicators. There is no reason to believe that there are more lost souls in penitentiaries than in highly restricted apartment houses or in smart summer resorts. The sinner and the criminal are not necessarily the same person. The ideal picture of man as conceived by religion (the Saint), by society (the Hero), and by the state (the Good Citizen) are by no means identical, except, perhaps, in times of great religious fervor when the Faith also 'colors' the Hero and the Citizen. Not only in the Soviet Union, nay, even in the United States or in Switzerland, I could imagine a Saint being hauled before the courts . . .

The law, everywhere in the world, protects a specific material and external order — nothing else. It will severely punish a man who in an uncontrollable fit killed another man (perhaps, before God, only a venial sin, since there is no premeditation), but it remains perfectly neutral towards a "good citizen" who, for years, nourishes a glowing hatred against some fellow man. I am certain that there are gangsters in the United States who, eventually, will be found among the saved, and "good citizens" without a single conviction on their driver's license, without any blood on their hands, but with undiluted poison in their hearts, who will run the danger of dying unredeemed. The mind and outlook of a gangster (or of a Mediterranean brigand) occasionally resembles that of a robber knight, and it is not surprising that a modicum of religion sometimes enters his life — religion, and not only superstition. (Remember the startling conversion of "Dutch" Schultz Flegenhimer!) On the other hand there are those who arrange their lives in such a way that whatever luxury or fun they enjoy, is deductible from their taxable in-

come, and others yet whose existence is designed to avoid all "conflict with the law". For them disgrace is not God's wrath (or Christ's tears), but the disdain of society or condemnation by the state. They remain "on the right side of the law." They have sinned only in their thoughts, with carefully selected words or with perfectly legal actions. Adaptation towards their environment has "kept them out of mischief." They commit their crimes vicariously — by reading detective stories.

Yet the study of criminal statistics based on denominational backgrounds still leaves some questions open. I grant that the sinner should be distinguished from the criminal; but often they overlap. In pre-war Holland, Catholics had the highest rate of criminality, followed by the Protestants, the Jews, and, finally, by those without religious affiliations. In the mixed areas the pattern follows a sociological gradation, but the fact remains that solidly Catholic areas have a higher criminality than purely Protestant regions. In Germany, it is interesting to note, the maximum of Nazi votes in 1932 were cast in Lutheran districts with a particularly low criminality rate, a very important sidelight on our problem.

Thus not only the criminal "belongs" to the Catholic scene, but also the *sinner*. Whereas morbid concentration on sin is definitely Jansenistic and alien to a healthy Catholic attitude, the sinner no less than the criminal is an integral part of the Catholic world. Religion is not primarily ethical action. The Catholic, above all, is Christocentric man — believer, worshipper, lover of God (and of His Image); his religion, before being anything else, is faith, charity, and liturgy — and not "public service" or a community organization to train docile taxpayers. Even the rejection of divorce, of artificial birth-control, or of shoplifting belongs to the conclusions, not to the very essence, of our Faith. With God's Grace and the inherent strength of his "royal priesthood", the sinner, overnight, can become a saint.



Hence sin saddens and depresses, but it does not 'shock' the real Catholic.

It is interesting to note that Protestantism originally overemphasized the transcendental and theocentric character of Christianity. Luther's *Faith Alone* was an exaggeration of St. Augustine's *Love (God) and do whatever you like*. Calvin put forth his *Glory to God Alone*. The dialectic and evolutionary character of Protestantism, in this as in so many other of its domains, has resulted in a complete reversal of the original attitude. Luther's *By Faith Alone*, coupled with the rejection of good works, produced, in our times, the 'Social Gospel' and the emphasis on "deeds, not words". If Luther were alive today I think he would feel a much greater kinship with some of our mystics than with certain "enlightened and broadminded" ministers of community churches.

Crime and sin, undoubtedly, have assumed a "new" character in the secular, post-Protestant world. They have transcended the framework of the ordinary law-book or the penny-catechism. On one hand we have the personal crime of a coldness and monstrosity which makes one wonder whether the perpetrator is, at all, human; he no longer is a mere sinner, and therefore a potential saint, but only a medium of evil, a denier of creation. Like the man who brutally murdered his mother and forty-three other innocents on an airliner, he moves resembling a phantom in a society of otherwise well-behaved, 'orderly' citizens, as a grim reminder that even in their pharisaic self-centeredness they have to choose between God and the Devil.

On the other hand, there are the great impersonal and legally "perfect" crimes of the masses in the "North". In the "South" wickedness always is of a strictly personal nature — one joins the brigands or one doesn't; one violates a nun and cuts her throat, or one sides with the angels and is executed onself. The blood orgies in the

Spanish Civil War; the terrors of the Commune; the horrors of the Russian Revolution — they all are unknown to the "progressive North", where sin and crime are demoted to the level of mere 'mental disease' or 'band social conditioning'. Headlines like "R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. Slaughters 150,000 in Dresden" or "Operation Killer: Thousands Roasted in Napalm" diabolically gladden the hearts of patriotic housewives at the breakfast table listening to 'light' radio music. The truly modern sinner lacks all the redeeming features of the Christian called upon to repent. A member of a huge *Société Anonyme*, parroting coined phrases, thinking and "doing what comes naturally", he engages in the vicarious and sadistic pleasure of the "good citizen" watching patriotically what his State dishes out to others. (Remember the West Coast beauty queen who had the privilege of making a cross with her lipstick on the map of Tokyo to mark the place where a bomb should be dropped?) Often feeling insecure and feeble as a person, he finds refuge in a collective 'patriotism' which, as Dr. Johnson plainly told us, is the refuge of scoundrels. The modern sinner would not even understand us, if we'd ask him to go down on his knees. He was quite regular, wasn't he? Statistics bear it out, don't they? Yet the teaching of Scriptures on this point is entirely clear: "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil!"

Centuries divide us from the spectacle of King Henry II walking in a torn shirt and with ashes on his head to do penance for instigating the murder of St. Thomas à Becket. His subjects saw this with awe and understanding: there was a repentant human being, there was a forgiving God, there was the endless drama of old Adam. They also remembered that the Lord dying on the Cross promised eternal bliss to a thief, and that at his feet wept Mary Magdalen, a saint and former harlot, and that for this reason there always will be hope for the Christian sinner and criminal.

# *Archbishop Reinis in the Prison Of Vladimir*

GOTTHOLD STARKE

VLADIMIR IS a city situated two hundred kilometers East of Moscow. From the end of the twelfth to the beginning of the fourteenth century it was the residence of the Grand Duke and the Metropolitan. It is famous for its sacred icons of the Mother of God, its cathedrals of the Ascension and of St. Demetrius, and its convent of Our Lady. In later times, it became notorious as the first station on the painful road to Siberia, as well as for its isolation camp in which innumerable prisoners of all nations, religions, and political parties suffered and died.

There, on September 1, 1950, I first met Archbishop Reinis of Vilnius whose cell I shared for a year. In 1947, he had been condemned for alleged anti-Soviet activities; and, like me, served the same heavy sentence of ten years imprisonment of Vladimir. I vividly remember our first meeting. After section III of our prison had been renovated, the twelve inmates of my cell were changed. Nearly every one of us spoke a different native language. Apart from the Archbishop of Vilnius, there were other prominent personalities; among them Shulgin, the Russian leader of the Duma and one of the most widely known writers of the emigration; Dubin, the president of the Jewish Club in the Parliament of Latvia; and Sabatta, the leading Japanese economist in Southern Manchuria, all three very remarkable and important men.

Archbishop Reinis, however, towered above them all — not physically, for he was not very tall, but by his bearing and personality, expressed in the spiritual distinction of his features. He was assigned a bed by the north wall in front of the window, and my iron bedstead was cemented into the floor next to his. After stowing away our poor belongings, we introduced ourselves to each other, stating who we were, why we had been arrested, and what other prisoners were known to us. The archbishop first prayed for a long time; then he told me the story of his life, to which he would later often return. He told me of his youth in his beloved peasant home, where he was the youngest of many brothers and sisters, of his poverty-stricken schooldays at Riga, of the Ecclesiastical Academy in Petersburg, his studies at Strasbourg and Louvain, of Rome, the Eternal City, and of his work in Denmark. Afterwards he taught at Kaunas, the University of his native Lithuania, and then became foreign minister. He was appointed successively Bishop of Vilkoviski and Archbishop (in partibus) of Titi in Africa. Finally, in 1945, he succeeded his Polish predecessor who had left his diocese and gone to the West in the wake of the German troops, and thus became the spiritual leader of martyred Catholic Lithuania.

His was, indeed, a most remarkable and noble life. Yet the facts I have mentioned

are as nothing compared with the manner in which my neighbor spoke to me of the various stations on his way. His attitude was that of a saint of his Church, who attributed all his work, successes, and dignities solely to the grace of God in which he found all his happiness. He liked to call the last hard years of his episcopate, in the words of St. Paul, "a good work." In deep anxiety he prayed for his flock whose sufferings he shared. His eyes would light up when he spoke of them, as they did when he mentioned his beloved mother or his sister who had remained in their native village and whose letters kept him informed of the cruel fate of his large family, many of whose members had been exiled to Siberia. The money she sent him regularly he would use to buy additional bread and sugar for his fellow-sufferers. In Lent, he used to retain nothing for himself. Only 'machorka' he would not provide, because he thought tobacco bad for one's health. When a Manchurian shaman once stole something from him he said nothing, but gave him a double share at the next distribution. Then the man confessed his guilt to him with tears, asking his pardon.

Archbishop Reinis was truly a faithful servant of his Lord. He prayed much at all times of the day, and I saw him lying on his bed with folded hands and open eyes even at night, when our cell was glaringly lit up so that the guard could constantly watch us through the spy-hole. He spoke to God in a whisper. When, in our striped prison clothes, we went for our daily half hour's walk in the tree-less prison yard he would walk up and down by himself, his hands joined behind his back, saying his breviary from memory.

Yet the archbishop was also a fighter, though perfectly self-controlled. I remember how, on the feast of St. Michael, whom the Eastern Church calls the 'arch-strategist,' we spoke of the special veneration this prince of the angelic hosts received in ancient Russia. Then the archbishop whispered to me: "The spirit of the militant

arch-strategist who vanquished the dragon of the Apocalypse ought to be alive not only in the Eastern Church, but in all Christians, who, from ignorance, often serve God in a wrong way; for instead of fighting the evil they recommend co-existence with it as a Christian duty, saying, 'peace, peace' — where there is no peace. Only in the Russia of today even the arch-strategist, fighting with the devil, is not allowed to pronounce his judgement aloud, but as formerly when he guarded the body of Moses (cf. Jude 9), he must keep silence and leave the judgement to God."

The battle between good and evil which he saw personified in God and the devil governed also the philosophy of this believing and learned man. He had once taught it at the University of Kaunas, and I now learned it from him as his grateful student during this year without vacation. He himself had been greatly influenced by the neo-Scholasticism taught at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at Louvain, especially also in the discussion of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologica* in the light of modern science. The well-stocked prison library contained an old, hence useful, manual on the philosophers of antiquity; of these he greatly esteemed Anaximander, the disciple of Thales, who taught 'the Infinite' as the principle of all being. Five hundred years before Christ, this philosopher had already seen the opposition between light and darkness, and conceived of punishment as the consequence of injustice. Socrates' 'daimonion,' the voice of conscience, the archbishop considered not at opposed to the objective moral order that had been established by religion and society, but as its presupposition as well as its effect. We studied Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Albert the Great, as well as Kant and Hegel, whose works we could read together in the Russian translation of Kuno Fischer. Naturally our discussions were greatly influenced by the most timely subject of Marxism and Leninism which constantly challenged our logical analysis.

These lectures were held in the most extraordinary surroundings. Our illiterate man from Amur was trying to learn Russian by speaking loudly to himself; beside him old Shulgin, now an almost fleshless skeleton, covered the sheets given him by the archbishop with his fine poems. One of these was an epic on the life of Jesus which would well deserve to exchange its probable place in the inaccessible archives of the central Moscow prison administration for the libraries of the free world. Somewhere near Shulgin, Dr. Dubin, the member of a strict Jewish sect, would stand before his bed, weeping loudly and reciting Hebrew prayers from morning to night. Several times a day he was seconded by a dignified old Cabardine who, in a similar way though in a different religion, implored Allah to give him freedom and eternal salvation. An Ukrainian painter, who had been forbidden to make portraits of his fellow prisoners, tried to sketch the scenery of his home at the Black Sea. His products were invariably confiscated at the next inspection. An Estonian teacher with a magnificent head, whose kindly eyes, alas, were soon to go blind, sought to season our poor vegetarian food (dry bread and cabbage soup) by memories of the slaughter-feasts in his peasant home. He also comforted us by his much appreciated dream interpretations and political prophecies from Nostradamus to the contemporary seers of his own homeland.

The Japanese Buddhist and Shintoist Sabatta, a well-balanced man who always knew how to 'save his face,' had 'healing hands' and hypnotic powers which greatly helped our sick. He grew furious only if somebody else dared to take the swab cloth and broom when it was the archbishop's turn to do the cleaning inside or outside the cell. The Japanese would also mend his patron's clothes, and on his feast — and birthday, on New Year's Day and on the great Christian festivals he would stand in position and deliver a well-composed address in excellent English. All this he regarded as his special privilege, be-

cause he had shared a cell with the archbishop before.

The archbishop spoke fluent German, Russian, English and Danish and had an excellent knowledge of the old languages. He could also make himself understood in French, Italian, and Spanish. He was understandably proud of his Lithuanian mother tongue, which is nearer to Sanskrit than any other European language and whose beautiful poetry he liked to recite.

He loved his people and nation and often gave striking accounts of the glorious periods of Lithuanian history and of the rebirth of Lithuania as a state after the First World War. With sorrow and anxiety, yet also with strong trust in God's gracious help, he looked to the future of his homeland, as whose faithful son he had now to sacrifice his freedom for the second time. He had good cause to assume that a man whom he had known and helped had a share in the false accusations that had led to his last conviction. When he met this slander again in a book printed in Lithuanian which he borrowed from the prison library, he was so profoundly shocked that he could not sleep.

When, in August 1951, Archbishop Reinis had to leave our cell, he was, as usual, given only a very short time to pack and say goodbye. We were all deeply moved. He had been sincerely revered and accepted as an authority by our small community with its changing members, to which belonged excellent men as well as a few scoundrels. His reputation had spread through the prison walls from one strictly isolated cell to the other. I myself owe a great deal to his eminent personality, who combined vigorous faith and great knowledge with Christian humility and charity. When we parted I asked for his blessing which he gave, deeply moved, together with an unforgettable confession of the 'Una sancta' of Christendom.

At the end of July, 1955, I left the isolation prison of Vladimir after I had served my term. Only a year later, I heard from Rome that other repatriates had reported



that the archbishop had died already in 1953. He had had a robust constitution, and when he left our cell we knew from his own statement as well as from his looks that he was in good health. Nor had any news of an illness penetrated from his quarters to mine, which were then frequently changed. But in prison, death comes without witness. The one who is to die must await his last hour in a lonely cell. Only his last companions may sense what has happened and perhaps gain final knowledge from the hint of a guard.

Since today such knowledge seems to be assured, we conclude this short memoir with a passage from the last chapter of the First Epistle of St. Peter which, we would suggest, sums up his work and may be regarded as a promise of his eternal life: "Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking care of it, not by constraint but willingly . . . Neither as lording it over the clergy but being made a pattern of the flock from the heart. And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never fading crown of glory."

## *The Scissors Grinder*

The scissors grinder belled the street  
of our moping town,  
and in me somersaults of dread  
cramped upside down.

My mother used to coax me out  
with our sluggish ware;  
he singed me by his bristly touch  
and razored glare.

Plying hand and eye, he ground  
—my flesh was on that stone:  
as he cut, the jagged sparks  
seared the bone;

and at my feet in fiery pools  
splinters winced and bled.  
But when he iced my palms with steel  
I fled, I fled.

I fear I shall remember  
until the night I die  
the grindstone of a hairy hand,  
the blade of an eye.

RAYMOND ROSELIEP

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# America

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*The great powers, and some of the small ones, have commenced their partition of the frozen South.*

## *Claims to Antarctica*

D. P. O'CONNELL

EVERY AMERICAN has heard of the partition of the extra-European world between Spain and Portugal in the famous bull of Pope Alexander VI. The pretensions of certain states to large slices of the Antarctic continent have been likened to this famous event, and recall its ultimate futility. A British writer, commenting nearly half a century ago on the instrument by which his government assumed, in his words, "in a lordly, and even pontifical fashion to dispose of islands and lands in the Antarctic circle", stigmatized it as a document "as inept in intention as it is ungrammatical in expression." During this half century the disposition of the one uninhabited and substantially unexplored continent has been the subject matter of academic exercise. In the days before the war, theorists were prophesying that technological progress would eventually raise the issue of the ownership of the resources of Antarctica in critical form, but until that age was reached they could regard the wastes of the south with some detachment. Today we are on the threshold of that age, and solution of a problem which once was academic cannot be long postponed.

Nations, like men, have a peasant land hunger. This formerly manifested itself as an appetite for America, and then for Africa. Now that it can no longer be satisfied in the world of yesterday, it is directed to the world of tomorrow, to Antarctica and to space. Only Antarctica on this earth is available for exploration and exploitation to any competitor. What we know of

it today is very little. We do not even know its exact area, which is anything from three to five million square miles. Much of it is higher than the European Alps, much of it is perhaps no more than frozen sea. It is becoming warmer, there are areas of bare ground, and men are now living there the year round and growing vegetables.

Before the war, whaling was the only industry immediately interested in Antarctica. What other industrial prospects in the way of oil, coal, iron, molybdenum, and uranium there may be, the next five years will substantially disclose. Strategists are contemplating the uses to which Antarctica could be put as a submarine and air base to dominate the airways and the seaways between Australia, South America, and South Africa. Altogether thirty-six expeditions of one sort or another are actually working in Antarctica or are projected. Work begun as a feature of the geophysical year will be extended perhaps for many years, and expeditions of countries like Russia that have hitherto exhibited no interest in the continent could perhaps lay the ground for future territorial claims.

All of Antarctica, with the exception of the sector informally annexed for the United States by Admiral Byrd, is already claimed. The problem of the future will be the validity of these claims in the face of increasing competition from outsiders. The earliest claim was that of Great Britain to the Falkland Island Dependencies in 1908, just a half century ago. This was so badly framed that it caught part of the South American mainland and accordingly it had to be reframed in 1917. At the time it was

based on no other ground than the discoveries of Cook and Weddell, but it has been fortified by the subsequent activities of magistrates and constables supervising sealing, whaling, and penguin hunting, and by permanent settlements on certain of the outer islands. When in 1947 the United States flag was flown at the American base at Marguerite Bay, the local British Commander in his capacity of magistrate protested at this derogation from British sovereignty. In 1923 the Ross Dependency was placed under the jurisdiction of New Zealand. Apart, however, from the part-time activities of one government official, the extension of New Zealand law, the enactment of whaling regulations and statements of government policy, New Zealand until very recently exhibited little interest in its acquisition.

The least substantial of all the claims was that of France the following year, which asserted sovereignty over Adélie Land on the sole ground that it had been discovered by Dumont D'Urville — who, however, did not land — and despite the fact that no Frenchman had been there since. The French decree provoked a reply from the United States to the effect that discovery could never give a legal right, and also from Australia whose own Mawson had charted Adélie Land in his expedition of 1912. Subsequently in 1933 the British Crown was to place nearly half the Antarctic continent under Australian jurisdiction, but significantly excluding the wedge claimed by France. This action was tantamount to acknowledgement by the British government that discovery was a sufficient ground of title. Indeed, Great Britain could hardly act otherwise, since the Imperial Conference of 1926 had asserted that a British title to most of Antarctica "already exists by virtue of discovery." Norway in 1929 advanced the argument that Amundsen's explorations gave her priority of interest, and followed it up ten years later by actually claiming sovereignty over the area intervening between the United Kingdom and Australian sectors. Chile and Ar-

gentina have also reserved their rights, based partly on the propinquity of Antarctica to South America, partly on history, and partly on actual occupation. These claims compete to some extent with one another and with that of Great Britain.

The United States, despite the gestures made by Byrd and Ellsworth, has consistently denied the validity of any title to Antarctic territory, and has treated the whole continent as open to the activities of all nations. Whether this attitude is based on the view that Antarctica is by its very nature not susceptible of acquisition, or on the judgment that actions taken up to now are insufficient in law to create a title, it is one that can be maintained for only a limited period of time. After this geophysical year, permanent settlements, at least of a scientific character, will be features of the Antarctic situation, and there is no doubt that occupation of at least a limited area will be an actual fact. The question then will be one of delimitation of the area. There is merit in the suggestion that while the situation remains fluid the continent should be internationalized, perhaps under the United Nations. There seems little immediate likelihood of this, and permanent occupation of at least limited portions of the coastline will have occurred before international action is even initiated. It cannot be predicted that the occupants, whoever they may be, will prove amenable to such a solution.

The problem, therefore, cannot be discussed except in terms of the exclusiveness of the claims that have been made. To deny that any of these claims is valid is too facile an approach. Each of them differs from the other in nature and in quality. Discovery may not be an actual ground of title, but it does at least keep the door open to the discovering state, to whom international law accords some measure of priority in the absence of more substantial competition. To this extent the French claim cannot be dismissed as absurd, any more than it can be regarded as indefeasible. So long as neither one of two com-

peting claimants can show a preponderance of activity, the first of them to manifest any interest at all has the equities in his favour. But by the same token he may lose this advantage if the competitor does establish the requisite preponderance. Gestures of sovereignty, therefore, are by no means of insignificant value, and a record of them may in fact add up to something substantial.

It is in this light that the Australian claim can best be examined. For geographical and political reasons it seems that controversy, when it does arise, will concern primarily the Australian sector. On no sensible theory can the immensity of the claim made for Australia be justified. Nearly half the Continent is included on the basis of Australian surveys of portions of the coastline, intermittent administration over exceedingly limited areas, and the maintenance for some years of one, and now of two, scientific bases at widely dispersed intervals. Much of the area claimed has not even been discovered, as that word is intelligibly used. And now there are other nations with bases in the Australian sector exercising at least as much activity in the area as Australia itself and without Australian invitation. To preserve its rights, Australia has accorded the Russia expeditions a hearty welcome and issued a set of commemorative stamps boldly indicating the Australian Antarctic Territory.

Traditional international law settled competing claims to territory by resort to the concept of effective occupation. Obviously the effectiveness of occupation will vary from circumstance to circumstance. The International Court has adopted the most liberal views on this question in relation to Greenland, and it seems that the minimum of occupation is what is required in the case of Antarctica to validate a title. But what is minimal? What was minimal a generation ago is by no means so today, and what is minimal today will not be so in ten years time. The most that we can say is that in order to constitute occupation of territory there must be such ad-

ministrative control as is adequate for the protection of nationals of other States who visit the territory and are, according to the claims of the occupying power, excluded from invoking the protection of their own state.

The point may be illustrated from the case of a Japanese whaler and an American whaler that become involved in a dispute over a catch on the French or the Australian sector. The facilities that France has for rapid intervention and settlement of the dispute are obviously less than those of Australia. If the test is one of correlation of claim and duties, it does not follow that the facilities for protection and administration must be available at all points at all times. The problem of assessing Antarctic claims is one of judging the reasonableness and continuity of the administrative facilities available in relation to the size of the area claimed. There can be little doubt that Australia has a valid title to the area immediately around its two bases, provided these are to be permanent. In time this could expand with administrative jurisdiction to a much wider area. The question now is whether the whole of the existing claim can be defended, and of this there is room for doubt.

The earliest discussions of the Antarctic problem tended to import from the Northern hemisphere the sector theory, according to which arctic areas should be carved up into segments, much as a cake is dismembered, by lines projected down the meridians to meet in an apex at the Pole. In the Northern hemisphere this is a satisfactory geographical device because there are definite anchoring points on the sub-jacent continents for the extremes of the two arms. Geography has not been so accommodating in the Antarctic. If Chile and Argentina are to be extended in this fashion, the extensions would cut very narrow slices indeed out of the cake. If the extreme points of Australia are to be used these would not at all correspond to the limits of the area at present claimed, and in any case such a thesis is open to the challenge for



vagueness to which any claim of propinquity is subject. If the sector notion has any validity in Antarctica at all it is as a device for asserting sovereignty over the hinterland between the Pole and the coastline. But it presupposes a valid claim to the coast.

A note of urgency enters the discussion when we come to examine recent Russian attitudes towards the problem. The academic headshakes in which we have indulged on the doctrine of discovery as a root of title are insignificant gestures compared with the trumpetings of Soviet supporters of the doctrine. If the Soviet wants a stake in the Antarctic, it has only to proceed through preponderant activity to subversion of the Australian priority. But Soviet theorists go much further, and a significant pattern of argument has crystallized in the past few years in academic discussion which may be the preparation for a more official attitude. In short, the Russian interest in Antarctica is seen to be "historic", based upon Bellinghausen's remarkable circumnavigation of the continent in 1819 and Lazarev's visit in 1821. Actually Bellinghausen did not set eyes on any portion of the continent proper, and one would say that on the Russians' own terms Cook's voyage would have established the priorities.

The Soviet writers who have devoted attention to the problem of arctic regions in recent years have been compelled by their objective and by the coercive facts of geography into "double-think." The sector theory, as applied to the Antarctic, they consider no more than camouflage for the predatory activities of countries only a degree less remote from the continent than is Russia Herself. The sector notion correctly belongs only to the Arctic, whose proximity to Russia and the centres of population make it a legitimate subject of strategic interest. An interloper will interest himself in the Arctic only for "imperialist" purposes, whereas Antarctica is an object of economic interest to all states. This line of argument, one would conclude,

should lead the Soviet to approve of a joint sovereignty over the continent or to its internationalization. But this is not the case. Soviet priority is constituted by discovery, and as one writer puts it this priority is eternal. And monopoly by discovery is not "imperialism." In essence this doctrine is no different from that which underlay Pope Alexander's bull and the claims made in consequence of it.

The present Soviet expedition in Antarctica, if it is not so extensive in its operations as the American, is at least as active as the Australian whose sector it occupies. If the Australian title is not indefeasible, these activities, if continued for sufficient time, could eventually crystallize a Soviet title to at least a portion of the continent. The American attitude towards existing claims can only assist this process, for when Washington judges that the facts sufficiently justify recognition of a claim by occupancy it will find that there is no preponderance of value in the facts relied on by Australia against the Soviet, unless it lie in the fact of prior claim and actual administration in the broadest sense.

The fact is that claims will be made and will collide. A *de facto* partition of the continent cannot be long delayed, and there is little likelihood of immediate international action on the question. Aircraft and radio can put widely separated areas of Antarctica in quick communication with each other, and the facilities for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction will be present in a way and to a degree that earlier theorists did not envisage. Occupation is an extremely elusive concept even if it is a valuable one. Historically it meant actual settlement coupled with administration. In the future the International Court might well attach more value to a claim followed by acts of administration by air and resident officials, even over extended areas, than to scientific and exploratory activity. Perhaps the first in will be the first to be served; and if there is any lesson to be drawn from the grab for Africa it is just this, that a claim is nine points of the law.

## TWO VIEWS OF AMERICA

SEÑOR MARIAS, who has travelled and taught in America, here continues the perceptive observations on our country—in a vein remarkably understanding—that began in the last number of *MODERN AGE*. We expect to publish soon more extracts from his long essay on American life, including his notes on American women.

Dr. Roshwald boldly points out certain ominous failings in American culture; and his criticisms, like those of Tocqueville a century and a quarter ago, are filled with foreboding at the tendency of mass-tastes.

### *American Loneliness and Its Remedies*

JULIAN MARIAS

*Translated by J. Richard Andrews and Joseph H. Silverman*

WE FORGET TOO easily that life is constantly menaced by loneliness: loneliness that lurks behind every corner. But man does pay it heed, at times unknowingly, and tries to ward it off. Half of the things that man has invented are to comfort him in his having to die; the other half, or a bit less, to defend himself from loneliness while he is alive. In Europe, loneliness as a *manner* of life—not as a personal situation which suddenly catches one unawares—is rather infrequent. Why? Europe is too full, and loneliness is, above all, solitude, devastation, emptiness, lack of human company—not just solitude, but solitude with others, solitude among people. Loneliness is, if an extreme definition is wanted, the opposite of the communion of saints. And in a similar way one might understand hell.

But if loneliness occurs only when one is among many, how then can Europe's fullness defend it from loneliness? I for-

got to mention *what* Europe is filled with: it is filled with history, and this means it is filled with the dead. In Europe we have near us, behind us, the innumerable legions of the deceased. Those who have lived before us in the same houses, in the same places. The people of Madrid who lived and died on Pez Street and acclaimed or cursed Espartero; those who went to see La Calderona or gossiped about the latest witticism of Villamediana; those who greeted delicate ladies by touching the brim of their top hats at the Prado; and the past inhabitants of the *Rue du Bac*, who lived again through Balzac; and those collected souls have mellowed with age the *Place des Vosges*; and those who have made the Neapolitan street of Toledo ring through the centuries with their loquaciousness; and those who have walked arm in arm over the myriads of dry leaves, fallen from the chestnut trees along the Neckar.

When we live only with the living, we are alone. And we are easily afflicted by loneliness. That is the case with young countries, new countries, "officially" happy. What a man does to escape from loneliness moves me beyond words. I have known this emotion in the United States, especially in New England. In this part of the world man has struggled to invent remedies against loneliness, probably without knowing it; for example, the smile. Do Americans smile because they are happy? Or in order to be so? To be sure, in order to *look* as if they are, because melancholy is in bad taste, and sadness is quite improper. But in its deepest and most authentic meaning, a smile is the expression of community feeling, the recognition of the existence of a fellow human who should be loved like oneself—or a little less—the expression of conviviality as a blessing.

And in a similar way, another remedy for loneliness is the improvisation of history. It is said that the United States is a "very modern" country, aseptic and atemporal; and it is, some times, as a diversion or a pastime; but when it is a matter of serious living, the American turns determinedly to evoking the past. How "old" everything is! Houses from Colonial days; intense interest in every scrap from the past; nineteenth-century Gothic in colleges, where the sounds of a carillon hover at dusk over lawns like those where William of Ockham strolled, colleges reminding one of Oxford or Cambridge, with their tradition of seven centuries of Latin studies; but it is only Wellesley or, at the most, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

And all the vegetation serves the same purpose as those college lawns. This is the meaning of the verdant delight which surround American cities. Chestnut trees, elms, maples, which turn red in the Fall; trees and shrubs of deep garnet; green or reddish ivy, a climbing calendar which tells the seasons upon brick walls; yellow, blue, purple, and red flowers, cultivated

with care in every open garden, a paradise for everyone. Amidst the greenery and brilliantly colored flowers stand wooden houses, painted white, cream, pink, or better yet, in their time-honored color of aged wood. Where there is no history, or very little, nature is indeed welcome; nature lovingly enriched by culture; I mean by culture in its original form, by agriculture. The entire city is alive; it trembles with the passing of the wind; it keeps us company with its foliage; it smiles with the sun blinking among the leaves; it greets us with its habitual fragrance of freshly cut grass; or it surprises us with the unexpected perfume of snowdrops in bloom. This vegetation corresponds to . . . old stones. It exerts the same tonic effect as a stroll along the Segovian street of La Muerte y la Vida (Death and Life), or under the whimsical arches of San Juan de Duero, and the Romanesque Torre de la Antigua, or the Toledan Cobertizos, where a little lamp burns and where there is always a hint of flirtations or mystery. Beside the Tagus or the Pisuer-ga, the Seine or the Isere, the Hudson or the Charles, by means of granite or green plants, one always seeks to hide his soul from that implacable enemy of this world, loneliness.

I remember my arrival in Salt Lake City on a long shining train which had just crossed the endless plains of Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Wyoming, and now had entered the land of the Mormons. When I got off the train and began to walk down the long avenue, now slick with ice, which stretches from the station to the Mormon Temple, I asked myself what I had lost in Utah, in this place where I didn't even know the name of a single person. Undoubtedly the blame was this time—as in so many other cases—Jules Verne's. Do you remember his "Around the World in Eighty Days?" Phineas Fogg, the phlegmatic gentleman, and his roguish servant Passepartout; in their company I came to know Utah and its Mormons for the first time, in my early youth. But let's

not deceive ourselves: youth somehow remains with us; I had a date with Salt Lake City from the age of ten, and now I was keeping it, walking slowly through the snow along a deserted street, toward the Mormon Temple, which glowed in the distance, and which can only be entered by the faithful.

This enormous temple, brightly lighted, seemed to orient and give meaning to the city. Very close by, the mountains, which surround the city and are visible on all sides, creating in its midst the image of a wild West. Frozen and almost deserted streets. And suddenly, the drugstore! There, in Salt Lake City, I finally understood its meaning. Always open, day and night, in any weather, brilliantly lit up like a beacon in the middle of the night, sheltering and hospitable like a port, full of things . . . like a drugstore, for in no other place are there so many things. Twenty-five-cent books on revolving wire stands; children's records; magazines and newspaper; cigarettes, cameras, candies, luggage, electrical appliances, chairs, pens, toys, glasses, perfumes, stationery fishing tackle . . . anything you can think of. Since it has everything, there are even drugs and prescriptions in the American drugstore. And there is, strangely enough, a large counter, lined with plastic-covered stools, where one can order, at any hour of the day or night, and for a few cents, a couple of eggs, a cup of coffee, a milk shake, a hamburger, or what they call, with wonderful inventiveness, a cheeseburger.

If you want to buy something in the United States, don't give it a second thought. An alarm clock? Don't look for a watchmaker, because you may not find one, or he may not sell alarm clocks. Go to the corner drugstore. Do you need a pipe, a roll of film, a hot plate, a life preserver, some stamps, a bath sponge, a toaster, an atlas, a filet of salmon, an aspirin, chocolate or strawberry ice cream, a coonskin cap? Do you want to call Miami, Chicago, Columbus, the most remote town in Minnesota or in Arizona?

Walk confidently into the drugstore. Do you want to thaw out and warm your ears? Do you want to breathe cool air when outside heat has melted the asphalt? The drugstore makes life livable again.

And, above all, if you need company, if you feel alone, estranged, and detached from everything, if it seems to you that there is no one left in the world, that humanity has disappeared from around you, you will find it again in the drugstore. It is always the same, always identical; it is yours. You will find it in Niagara Falls, near the Canadian border; and in California, on the shores of the Pacific; in the small, intimate cities of Connecticut or Massachusetts, and on the plains of Wisconsin; in the bustle of Chicago, and very near the gardens which surround Pasadena's millionaires. When you cross its threshold, you enter into the same socially shared world, you are "at home". Behind the counter the same smile that you left behind in your own city awaits you. From the stools, a complex sampling of humanity looks at you benevolently: a boy and a girl who are drinking a shake and looking into each other's eyes, while she straightens her blond hair; the nurse who pauses on her way to the hospital for a cup of hot coffee; the solitary night owl who doesn't know where to go; the truck driver who gulps down his bacon and eggs while his gas tank is being filled; the lady who is out shopping and, surrounded by packages, eats a quick bite. Perhaps the counter is circular, or forms three sides of a square: the people face each other and smile; there is a smell of coffee; cigarette smoke curls upwards; a few words are exchanged; an old man cleans his glasses in order to see three generations more clearly.

The drugstore is a refuge, a haven for the weary, a source of diversion for the curious and contemplative, a consolation for the afflicted and lonely. In a big city, its lights beckon and call; in small, quiet towns, when everyone is asleep, it accepts the stranger who feels lost. How



many charitable deeds the American drugstore performs unknowingly! It feeds the hungry, it refreshes the thirsty, at times it clothes the naked, it visits the nostalgic, it consoles the sad, it teaches the uninformed with its books and gives advice for those who need it. How many on their way to commit a crime, perhaps to

murder or to take their own life, may have found a drugstore in their path and have changed their minds? In this country of statistics, one figure is lacking: the would-be suicides who had a change of heart in the drugstore and became reconciled to life. They ought to send a postcard to the census office.

## *Quo Vadis, America?*

MORDECAI ROSHWALD

### 1

A MAN BORN in another land seldom looks upon the present place of his residence as the native-born do. The detachment required for criticism of a nation is more easily found by an alien, especially if he has not resided for a great while in the country concerned.

With this apologetic preamble, I embark on some reflections provoked by the first six months of my visit to the United States. I shall try to put my observations candidly, even at the risk of offending sensibilities. Nor shall I try to describe those facets of American life that seem to be salutary: there is no need to praise health.

What I say here is neither a judge's verdict nor a scientist's finding. I present only hypotheses. These may be confirmed or refuted by longer observation. But I advance them now in the belief that certain issues must be raised before intelligent discussion can proceed. It is easier to evaluate a dead culture than a living. Yet the criticism of a living civilization nurtures that culture; to withhold such criticism is to reduce that society's vitality. In order to endure, a civilization must invite constant criticism. This criticism may be offered by an outsider; but it should be absorbed by the people within. Mine may be the hypotheses; the Americans should do the job of examining their veracity, and thereby examining themselves.

### 2

David Riesman, in his *Faces in the Crowd*, expresses the opinion that in contemporary America appear adumbrations of a society which he ventures to call *other-directed*.<sup>1</sup> Riesman writes,

"In the place of lifelong goals toward which one is steered as by a gyroscope, the other-directed person obeys a fluctuating series of short-run goals picked up (to continue with metaphor) by a radar . . . the parents and other adults encourage the child to tune to the people around him at any given time and share his preoccupation with their reactions to him and his to them."<sup>2</sup>

The meaning of this is that people tend to adjust their behaviour to other people's likings and opinions, and disregard their own opinions, tastes, moral standards—in fact, do not try to elaborate a point of view of their own. If a whole society lives according to such an unprincipled principle, there is bound to develop a laxness in aesthetic, moral, and cultural standards that verges on a spiritual anarchy (which may take the shape of acquiescent uniformity). If Riesman is right in his diagnosis about these tendencies in some parts of American society, his term "other-directed" is a much too mild an adjective for the description of the individual character and of the social phenomenon he has in mind.

The point deserves some elaboration.

Other-directedness prompts people to imitate other people, not only up to a certain point and half-consciously, but unreservedly and with full consciousness. Imitation to such an extent results in manifestations of similarity and uniformity beyond the usual expectation in a western society.

As long as this other-directedness is expressed in the similarity of drugstores throughout the country, in the universality of Howard Johnsons, in the uniformity of innumerable industrial products—the offence may be limited to a few European tourists who expect more variety while traveling through a sub-continent. They may have expected more diversity in the classical land of “free enterprise.” Instead, they may be surprised to find that the relative lack of rules and restrictions does not necessarily encourage diversity in production. Rather, the law of the likings of the majority seems to operate and to guide industry and commerce, almost to the exclusion of the individual dissenting taste. The resulting uniformity is so much greater, if the society is inclined to regard as virtue what the society (or the majority within it) likes, i.e., if the society is consciously other-directed.

When this other-directed tendency to uniformity intrudes into the realm of art and literature, the menace may become greater. The musicals and big “new” hits in American songs may seem one-patterned to me, because of my untrained ear perhaps. When, however, the cinematographic industry is considered, I would suggest with more authority that the tendency to uniformity has a deteriorating influence on this typically American medium of art. In the great majority of pictures, one is able to predict the development and ending of the drama, because there are certain established patterns which are adhered to. If He loves her and She loves him right at the beginning of the picture, there is bound to emerge some illusory conflict, through misunderstanding, which will be cleared up at the end of the performance to pave the way for the happy

ending. A villain hardly ever escapes his just punishment, whether by the verdict of a judge or by the hand of God (or by a non-blind chance). The theme of the pattern of the cinematographic drama in the United States could be described in more detail, and with a few variations—such as the westerner, the love story, the crooked business affair, and the rest. I shall not embark on this. Suffice it to conclude, that the tendency to uniformity, so closely connected with other-directedness, has exercised a stagnating influence on this medium of artistic expression in America.

If the problem of uniformity is studied by investigation of the current writing, this seems to result in another disappointing confirmation of our reflections. Writing, as far as general periodicals are concerned, seems to express a certain pattern of verbiage, construction, approach. It reminds one of creative-writing-courses which, if successful, kill all the creative vitality of a potential writer, or bar such a person from success in publishing by preferring stereotyped mediocrity to sparks of individual genius. Our point can be tested in a simple way: take a Digest, which is a collection of articles and stories from a variety of magazines and periodicals, and try to identify the various pieces by distinguishing the style of one article from that of another. It seems to me that hardly a distinction can be made. Most of the articles are written in a pattern which excludes individuality altogether.

If we examine the problem of other-directed people in morals, we reach the crux of the issue. To be other-directed, to regard as the norm of one's own behavior what other people think and do, is to give up one of the qualities which make us truly human individuals. A human being who does not take the advice of his own conscience in matters of value, but looks for the likings of other human beings, anxious to please them by conforming to their behaviour, is an imitating anthropoid, who cannot claim to partake of what has been

called human dignity: a dignity that comes with the capacity to be a moral judge of behaviour.

Not every human being is a competent moral judge, and innumerable mistakes, some with horrible consequences, have been made in the name of moral judgment. But this does not mean that giving up such a judgment is a solution: that would resemble an attempt to win a game by refusing to play. An internal intent to judge and to have a point of view of one's own is a prerequisite of human dignity as well as of human creative culture. Other-directedness is an ideal—if it is an ideal at all—that, if successful, would produce a collectivisation of human beings; and no coercion would be needed to make them perfectly uniform in behaviour.

One result of other-directedness is imitation and uniformity. Another result is lack of purpose and of persistence in behaviour. There seems to be a bewilderingly frequent change in the activities of many American institutions. There is a blue-print for a certain project, much planning and discussing, and then suddenly the whole project is dropped, forgotten as easily as if nobody ever dreamed of it. American foreign policy suffers thus, it seems to me.

This lack of persistence in keeping with one's line of action, with one's promise, with one's principle, seems to be connected with other-directedness in the sense that the lack of a stability of conduct which goes with the lack of a moral standard is reflected in the mercurial character of conduct and behaviour. If one is always watching for others' opinion, one becomes accustomed to constant changes, and no longer understands or feels the significance of constancy in character and behaviour.

But other-directedness is not the only fashionable mode of behaviour in America. I do not refer to the old-fashioned norms which still may be significant throughout the country, though mainly perhaps with people of older generation. A directly opposed standard, which appeals to many, is the ideal of the smart and tough guy.

He is the man who is purposeful, who is persistent, and who knows how to achieve his purpose through tenacity, cleverness, strength. This might seem a counter-balance to other-directedness, but it is not. For the smart guy is not the man with a moral decision of his own, as opposed to the masses who desire merely to follow. He is the man, rather, with a private purpose and the will to achieve it, at whatever cost to morality. The public admires this type not for his purpose, but for his cleverness in handling situations and people. Their admiration is for the ruthless man whose power of will brooks no obstacles, but into whose conscience nobody inquires. The tough or smart guy (sometimes toughness is required, and sometimes smartness) is the new incarnation of Machiavelli's Prince, or of the ruthless disciples of the Greek sophists, with some allowance for the change in time and place.

Now the combination of other-directedness with the qualities of the smart tough guy is especially dangerous. One result of this is the monopoly of means of communication by commercialism. Most of American broadcasting and television is evidence of this. Through shows competing in degree of stupidity, the other-directed masses are urged to buy superfluities. It is true that art and culture controlled by a totalitarian regime must lose their value; it may be equally true, however, that art and culture controlled by promoters without norms also are bound to lose momentum and become mere means for fooling most of the people most of the time—even if the fooling be less sinister than in totalitarian states.

This combination of other-directedness and smartness on the political level results in the phenomenon of mass-hysteria, which can be started by a "wise guy" who is sufficiently ruthless. There are other forces, of a more conservative character, that may succeed in checking such developments, but the danger remains. The moment the masses are educated to consult the opinion of other people before consulting their own mind—or even *instead* of forming their

own judgment—they are a potential prey for a fanatic, or a ruthless man of ambition.

If we follow the example of some American social scientists, our point may be clarified by referring to a model symbolizing the situation examined. This is supplied by Rudyard Kipling's story about the Bandar-log and Kaa.<sup>3</sup> The Bandar-log are the monkey-folk of the jungle, whose characteristics are not only that they live in a herd and obviously imitate each other (a point not emphasized by Kipling, though necessary for our model), but also show a peculiar lack of persistence in any undertaking:

"They have no remembrance. They boast and chatter and pretend that they are a great people about to do great affairs in the jungle, but the falling of a nut turns their minds to laughter, and all is forgotten."

Kaa, the big python, is the master of the Bandar-log, not only because of his strength, but also because he can hypnotize them. When he is at work, they suddenly lose their other-directed unsteadiness and know to concentrate and follow his commands:

"'Bandar-log', said the voice of Kaa at last, 'can ye stir foot or hand without my order? Speak!'

'Without thy order we cannot stir foot or hand, O Kaa!'

'Good! Come all one pace nearer to me.'

The lines of the monkeys swayed forward helplessly . . .

'Nearer!' hissed Kaa, and they all moved again."

The techniques used by the smart guys may be somewhat different: not hypnosis, in the strict sense, but suggestion combined with persuasion and propaganda. Yet the results may be, in their own way, not less disastrous.

### 3

This social situation, if diagnosed rightly,

has its sources in certain phenomena of American life. To unearth them all may be an intricate task which would require a more extensive study than the present one. But we may try to suggest certain hypotheses.

One of the reasons for this development in America may be sought in the vastness of the country, combined with the ease of moving from one place to another. It is a commonplace in human history that culture is closely connected with sedentary life. Incidentally, even the word *culture* is etymologically linked with cultivation of soil, the farmer's profession. That culture was more easily developed by agricultural rather than nomadic peoples can be easily explained by the fact that sedentary life facilitates leisure and reflection, accumulation of tradition, and establishment of norms of behaviour. Nomadic life accustoms people not to stick to forms and norms, not to be emotionally attached to a place or a home, not to reflect at leisure, but to think in connection with action only, not to stick to a certain way of life but always to be adaptable to new situations and surroundings.

Allowance being made for the general character of modern society, people in America lead a relatively nomadic life as compared with most other countries. This is usually referred to as the great mobility in American life. People living in New York, suddenly being offered a better job, sell their homes and belongings and move to Chicago or Los Angeles. This happens often and in most occupations: business, civil service, education, perhaps even agriculture. It is usually financially unreasonable to take many of one's possessions when moving to a distant place. So most things are sold, and a new start is made in the new place. People who do not actually move, usually expect the possibility of moving to another place some day. So they do not acquire possession to which they would be attached: home remains a sort of a luxurious tent, its function is that of a hotel; it is not an English home which proverbially



ally is one's castle. It is not significant in this respect that American homes may be more convenient and better equipped than many English homes. Perhaps it is typical that so many structures in the United States are of wood.

With the lack of attachment to a certain place and locality goes psychological instability and the flippancy of character. In place of the fixed standards of sedentary people, come the precepts of adjustability to environment and changing conditions of the mobile, "nomadic", people. Always to fit in, to be well-adjusted, seems the easiest way for the traveller, and the conclusion can be easily drawn that, to feel happy, one has to be well-adjusted not only to the material surroundings, but also to the human community. And the easiest way to be adjusted to other people is to accept their standards of behaviour, to be other-directed.

The great mobility in America has its effects in the disruption of the family life. It is almost a commonplace that when a boy, or even a girl, goes to college, he or she is leaving home for another place, and is not expected to return and live with his or her parents after graduation, even if he or she does not marry instantly. Families are dispersed through the country not of necessity, but because of business opportunities and lack of restraint to move through a sub-continent. If, however, families can be so easily dispersed, it is well to prepare for it in advance by reducing emotional family ties to the minimum. Thus the family, which could have been the bulwark of traditional norms and standards<sup>4</sup>, can hardly have its impact on the minds of youngsters, who care more for the opinion of the larger social unit outside the family, and thus become other-directed.

If the basic unit of human society, the family, does not contribute its due share in forming the individual's character, the harm could be undone—to a certain degree at least—if the educational system would take up the task of building the character of the young people. Here, however, certain

modern theories in psychology and education interfere with disastrous effects for the American education.

The psycho-analytic school in psychology may be credited with important discoveries. Its utilization beyond the treatment of certain mental disorders is more dubious, but I concede that it may be beneficial to take it into consideration in the education of children. Relaxation of authoritarianism in education, that comes with psycho-analytically-minded persons, should have been useful in Victorian England. But to base the *whole* of the educational system on psycho-analytical (or pseudo-psychoanalytical) premises may mean abandoning of education altogether.

American education seems to suffer from the fact that it is thoroughly permeated with some notions of the various psycho-analytical schools and their pedagogical modifications. To let the child freely develop, to see his always as the right side, to minimize or even discard the notions of right and wrong, to understand and to forgive, and not to blame and to punish,—all this may be as pernicious as it seems rosy. The child thus brought up (or rather allowed to grow freely with a minimum of education) may become a self-centered man, free from notions of right and wrong, free from moral distinctions. Perhaps some will be spared neurotic complexes, but many will develop psychopathic characteristics by not taking into consideration the moral aspects of behaviour. Many will be closer to a *tabula rasa*, in the emotional and intellectual sense, than to a cultured man who has to absorb much of tradition, as well as to confront conflicts, in order to become a complex human being, as a civilized man is. They may be spared the hardships of decisions—by trying always to be well-adjusted (and therefore other-directed)—but human relations will be the victim of such lack of capacity to arrive at moral decisions (and most real decisions are moral).

If the educational system in America promotes other-directedness on the one

hand, it is not altogether dissociated from the vogue of admiring the tough guy. The emphasis of pragmatic achievement, the stress laid on individual success—coupled with the lack of moral restraint—is a fertile ground for the appreciation of the *smart fellow*.

This appreciation has probably some other sources, too. It may be linked with the history of America, so closely connected with individual pioneering that required a good deal of toughness. (This does not mean, of course, that the tough guy of today is identical with the tough pioneers of a hundred years ago.)

The natural wealth of the country, which has facilitated the sudden acquisition of personal wealth, may be another reason for this appreciation of the smart. If the amount of a country's resources seems limited, and consequently has to be controlled by the society, a system of values tends to develop which stresses the virtues of self-restraint, of humility (including humility in acquiring possessions), of a just division of wealth. If, on the other hand, those resources seem unlimited (as they did till comparatively recent times in America and as they seem to many even now), the tendency is to grab them at full speed, and the more successful one is in amassing wealth, the more admired one is. Thus it is the wealth and prosperity of the country which seem to promote the appreciation of wealth and of the wealthy—sometimes to a degree irrespective of the ways money has been acquired. Hence ruthlessness is not frowned upon as it would be in England, and toughness is admired and envied by a great many other-directed people.

4

All that has been said so far is, as I stressed in advance, hypothetical and one-sided. The situation is not so grim as it may appear from the preceding pages, for the positive aspects of America have not been enumerated and analyzed.

Obviously, America is not divided between other-directed Bandar-log and ruth-

less smart guys only. There are people with a clear distinction between right and wrong and with a strong sense of duty. There are people, among business men and politicians, who do not forget their responsibility to the nation and even to humanity at large. Not everything is make-believe and advertising propaganda; there is also genuine belief and sincere argument.

If, nevertheless, I embarked on criticism and accusation, this was done because of a fear that the condition I tried one-sidedly to depict is gaining strength and may endanger the future of this country and, indirectly, the future of humanity. There are physical dangers to humanity nowadays which surpass the nightmares of the previous generation. But atomic warfare is not the only menace of the atomic era! The loss of individual norms in moral issues, the admiration of unjust power, the lack of tradition, the disruption of family, education without principles—these are dangers which can be called spiritual, though they cannot be disconnected from the material and physical aspects of human civilization. To warn against these and to fight them may be a second front in the fight for human survival, but it may be the first front in the fight for human dignity.

This country, and many others as well, need moral guidance. The potential instructors and leaders may be here, but their voice is not heard with sufficient strength, nor are they sufficiently respected and followed. And yet, unless some high-brows with really broad minds (and not merely excellent narrow specialists) take the lead, this country may degenerate into a herd of other-directed Bandar-log hypnotised by a false élite of Kaas.

<sup>1</sup>David Riesman, *Faces in the Crowd*, Yale University Press, 1952, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>Rudyard Kipling, "Kaa's Hunting," *The Jungle Book*.

<sup>4</sup>This does not imply that all tradition is necessarily commendable and that no change in traditions should be welcome. But the change has usually to be made *within* tradition and not outside it; the tradition should usually be improved upon and not simply discarded.

# History and the God of the Second Chance

STEPHEN TONSOR

*The Dynamics of World History*, by Christopher Dawson, edited by John J. Mulloy. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956.

NONE OF THE disciplines has been more adversely affected by the increasing fragmentation and social dissolution which has afflicted our liberal civilization than has the study of history. The pursuit of the Fact, isolated from tradition and devoid of social meaning, has degraded history from the position which it held in the nineteenth century as the queen of the sciences to the study of "one damned thing after another." The lectures of the historian are increasingly deserted; and the student has turned to those of the anthropologist, the sociologist, and especially those of the psychologist. It has seemed to many that history may be on the brink of slipping into the oblivion which the trivial merits and always suffers.

For the present predicament of history, the historian has no one to blame but himself. Lord Acton wrote, "The process of civilization depends on transcending nationality. Everything is tried by more courts, before a larger audience—comparative method is applied, influences which are accidental yield to those which are rational." Fifty years after this, the vision of most historians is still circumscribed by

what Oswald Spengler described as a "Ptolomaic view" of historical reality. This "pre-Copernican" viewpoint locks us within our particular cultures and leads the historian to the patient and tireless collection of parochial facts which in our expanded world of cultures and civilizations in conflict are largely meaningless.

This conception of the historian as a kind of glorified stamp-collector is a recent idea. The Judeo-Christian historical tradition is entirely opposed to the view that the values of history are at best humanistic or those of contemplative wonder at the variety and chaos of experience. Judaism and Christianity are not only historical religions but both assert that God is revealed through time and that His actions are justified by time. Time and eternity, nature and grace, are aspects of one reality; and prophet and historian interpret the meaning of events in both the natural and the supernatural order. Prophet and historian alike are engaged in the task of reading the "signs of the times." "Watchman, what of the night? The watchman said, 'The morning cometh, and also the night: if ye will enquire, enquire ye' . . ." "Now learn a parable of the fig tree; when his branch is yet tender and putteth forth leaves, ye know that summer is nigh." The prophet and the historian are not nearly so concerned with divining the future as with discovering the implications of the past and present.

The Renaissance, rationalism, and liberalism all tended to ignore the prophetic

mission of the historian; and it was not until the French Revolution swept away the certainties of European experience that men turned once again to reading the signs of the times. Tocqueville wrote: "The whole book. [*Democracy in America*], which is here offered to the public has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced in the author's mind by the contemplation of the irresistible revolution that has advanced for centuries in spite of such amazing obstacles, and which is still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made. It is not necessary that God Himself should speak in order to disclose to us the unquestionable signs of His will; we can discern them in the habitual course of nature and in the invariable tendency of events." Conservative historians and social thinkers, confronted with the dissolution of European society, once again asked what was the pattern and direction of history. It is to this Christian and Conservative tradition that the English historian Christopher Dawson belongs.

Christopher Dawson, in *The Dynamics of World History*, offers us no modern *City of God*. Nor is the book an historical *Summa* in the sense of the work of Spengler and Toynbee. This collection of previously published essays establishes, rather, Mr. Dawson's claim to a position as a great and original historical critic. If the exposition of his own system is tentative and at times uncertain, his criticism of other systems is nothing short of brilliant. His tests of soundness are not philosophical or logical consistency, but the demand that every philosophy of history live up to the facts of historical reality. It is because of this position that he can assert the absolute need of historical system and at the same time criticize with such telling certainty the systems of Marx, of Spengler, and of Toynbee. Mr. Dawson's real service is that of the man who poses the right questions and rejects the wrong conclusions.

For all the insistence upon system, a limited determinism, and a clear cut ma-

terialism, Mr. Dawson does not belong to the ever-growing school of historical pessimists. He does not pretend to read the future. He is the diagnostician of the present. The future is in the hands of men whose free choices in part transcend the determinisms and limitations of the present. Above all the future is in the hands of Providence. His philosophy is pervaded by the Christian virtues, and Faith and Hope rather than Tyche are the handmaidens of the future. He might have said, as Lord Acton did in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor, "But I hope that even this narrow and disedifying section, (the modern period), of history will aid you to see that the action of Christ who is risen on mankind whom he redeemed fails not, but increases; that the wisdom of divine rule appears not in the perfection but in the improvement of the world; and that achieved liberty is the one ethical result that rests on the converging and combined conditions of advancing civilization. Then you will understand what a famous philosopher said, that history is the true demonstration of religion."

Mr. Dawson speaks with assurance when he tells us that history must renew itself and that this renewal can come only through a new conceptualization of the purposes of history. "Hence the essence of history is not to be found in facts but in traditions. The pure fact is not as such historical. It only becomes historical when it can be brought into relation with a social tradition." The time for "operational definitions" in the field of historical study is past. We must look beyond facts to meaning and to purpose.

Meaning and direction, however, are not apt to emerge in the parochial study of one culture, one civilization, or one religious tradition. And the work of the sociologist and the social anthropologist must serve as the springboard for any genuine historical study. They constitute another dimension of social experience. It is only when the historian makes the comparative method the tool of his studies that he can move



beyond the provinciality of national, class, and religious prejudice. The meaning of Western civilization emerges only when it is confronted by another civilization. It is in these dramatic historical confrontations that the meaning of culture, civilization, and religion emerges.

It is in these confrontations, too, that cultures and civilizations are enriched and expanded. It is because of this that every period of crisis is a period of hope, that the periods of cultural dissolution can be, and frequently are, periods of great innovation and harbingers of a new cultural era.

The God who dominates Christian historical thinking is not the God of inexorable fate; he is the God of the second chance. For this reason Christopher Dawson quotes Joseph de Maistre with enthusiasm when de Maistre writes, "Man in his ignorance often deceives himself as to ends and means, as to forces and resistance, as to instruments and obstacles. Sometimes he tries to cut down an oak with a pocket-knife, and sometimes he throws a bomb to break a reed. But Providence never wavers, and it is not in vain that it shakes the world. Everything proclaims that we are moving towards a great unity which, to use a religious expression, we must hail from afar. We have been grievously and justly broken, but if such eyes as mine are worthy to forsee the divine purpose, we have been broken only to be made one."

### ***Ukiyoe: The Floating World***

In the valley, an ancient farmer looks up  
To observe a convoy in the distance.

In the mountains, trucks rush forward  
Bringing young soldiers to plug the gap,  
To hold the line.

Later, the trucks return  
Bringing broken battered bodies.

The farmer again looks up,  
And as the convoy moves slowly out of  
sight,

He turns to plant his shoots of rice.

JOHN REECE DRING

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# Christian Schooling

RANDALL STEWART

***The Christian Idea of Education, A Seminar at Kent School***, edited by Edmund Fuller. *New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, xv, 265 pp., \$4.00.*

THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF EDUCATION consists of formal papers delivered in the course of a seminar at Kent School and portions of the discussions which followed the papers. The authors are a distinguished company representing a variety of Christian positions: William G. Pollard, E. Harris Harbison, Alan Paton, Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., John Courtney Murray, Jacques Maritain, Georges Florovsky, Stephen F. Bayne, Jr., and Reinhold Niebuhr. The whole is edited by Edmund Fuller of the Kent School. The volume is another example — and an informative and stimulating one — of the growing interest in religion in our colleges and schools.

In the first paper, Mr. Pollard declares that "our whole civilization has lost the capacity to respond to its Judaeo-Christian heritage," and goes on to say that "the rediscovery of the hidden treasure of our lost Judaeo-Christian heritage is a renaissance process, just as was the rediscovery of the hidden treasure of our lost Graeco-Roman heritage in the first Western renaissance." We are now engulfed, he believes, in another dark age, and the present business of Christians should be this process of rediscovery, this true renaissance,

which can be "a heady and thrilling thing."

The question raised by Mr. Pollard of the complicated relation between the two sources of western culture recurs throughout the symposium. It is a question which Matthew Arnold dealt with in his *Hebraism and Hellenism*, and indeed one which has plagued Christians from the beginning. Is, then, a dark age a state of imbalance, and does Mr. Pollard propose a restoration of equilibrium? Or would he prefer the dominance of the Hebraic over the Hellenic? Christians, it would seem, have usually managed to come to some sort of terms with the pagan classics. Erasmus and Colet were Christian humanists. So were the founders of Harvard College, who decided that an educated Christian should know Latin and Greek.

Mr. Niebuhr, in the last paper, is concerned with the same thorny question. "Every conception of meaning which depends upon structure, plan, or scheme is Greek in origin," he says, "but all dimensions of meaning which seek to incorporate the freedom of God and man . . . are derived from Hebrew sources." The modern preoccupation with science, the control of nature, and the various determinisms of philosophy and sociology must be regarded, he thinks, as Greek rather than Christian, although, he adds, the Greeks were not predominantly naturalistic. Mr. Niebuhr offers a diagnosis of the "spiritual crisis of our age:" it is owing, he says, to

the collapse, in the face of the tragic events of current history, of both the bourgeois idea of progress and the Marxist creed. Christian faith, he says, has a new relevance in our day. "The Biblical-Hebraic faith must remain the bearer of the religious content of our culture," he believes, "but our generation, like all Christian generations, must confront anew the task of relating freedom to the structures and essences of life and of correlating faith to reason."

An accommodation, then, seems still necessary, a *modus vivendi*, between Hellenism, and Hebraism, science and religion, the world and Christ. The Christian, though not of the world, is definitely in it, and cannot afford the luxury of death in the desert.

This central problem is approached variously in the other papers. Mr. Harbison stresses the insight provided by Christian belief: "A liberal education," he says, "can be, and often has been, illumined by Christian faith." John Courtney Murray cites Origen and the School of Alexandria as an example of "that most precarious of all syntheses, a Christian humanism: 'Origen,' he says, 'affirmed the old humanism to be valid still, but denied its adequacy.'" Jacques Maritain stresses the duality of man ("A Christian philosophy sees man as a natural *and* a supernatural being") and the catholicity of Christianity ("That with which the traditional, classical Graeco-Roman humanities are to be reproached is mainly their narrowness and provincialism"). Georges Florovsky says, "One should be sharply critical of our contemporary civilization, and even inclined to welcome its collapse, but this does not prove that civilization as such should be damned, and that Christians should return to barbarism or primitivism." "The true solution of the perennial problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture," he believes, "lies in the effort to convert the natural mind to the right faith, not in the denial of cultural tasks."

If these discussions seem more concerned with the classical-Christian conflict than with the modern conflict between Christianity and "science" (which has become in our time both a culture and a religion), the explanation may be that the discussants, being for the most part philosophers and theologians, were searching for historical precedents which might be of use in the present situation, the present being derived from the past, and having its analogies there.

Other matters, of course, were presented in this seminal conference. Of particular interest is the question, which came up several times, as to whether the teacher should be neutral, and I was glad to see that the consensus was that he should take a stand. The notion that the teacher must be "objective" in all discussions is apparently part of our scientific inheritance. The attitude may be desirable in science, but it is quite stultifying where moral and religious questions are concerned. I found myself in complete sympathy with Father Murray when he exclaimed in one of the colloquia, "For God's sake, why don't we let each man speak for himself and reveal that he is committed to something?"

To a teacher of English like myself, the symposium is disappointing in one respect, namely, that there are almost no references to literature. This is a little surprising in view of the extraordinary interest today in certain theological as well as literary circles in the inter-relation of literature and religion. A teacher's orientation, of course, is always with reference to his own subject, and he is likely to regard his own subject as "superior" to all others. This is perhaps right and proper, but it creates difficulties for an "interdisciplinary" conference. The teacher of literature may regard philosophy as abstraction, and the teacher of philosophy may regard literature as another embodiment of human error. The attempts in certain quarters to establish a rapport between literature and theology are doubtless significant of something. A common ground may possibly be

found in the question of the nature of man. It is a crucial question, and to compare the various answers found in literature with the Christian answer may be rewarding. Perhaps another seminar might address itself specifically to this topic.

Christianity is primarily an insight, an attitude, a point of view. A Christian is under no obligation to be unlettered, but Christianity embraces all men, unlettered as well as lettered. Milton, that Renaissance man, has Christ in *Paradise Regained* (the specific reference being to

the philosophers of Greece), "He who receives/Light from above, from the Fountain of Light/No other doctrine needs." In the high, transcendent context in which this is true, the question of erudition becomes almost an irrelevance. One of the best of Christian prayers begins, "Lighten our darkness." The darkness referred to is the darkness common to all sorts and conditions of men. This is not to deny the value of Christian education, but to see it in Christian perspective.

### *Lines In Edinburgh*

Pipes on the wind for a moment  
And a teddy boy's cheer,  
Lights and the swirling slide of cars  
Go by below.  
Edinburgh seethes  
Beneath a chequered sky.

Grey Forth  
Shrouds her face in the haar,  
Folds her waves ready  
For night and for death  
Without star.  
But we are the roaring boys,  
The wildly unprepared  
In a pool of mortar noise.

The iron pistons beat  
Above the drone of self-combustion,  
The scuffle in the street,  
The sigh of fustian  
Curtains drawn before the panes:

All the quaking of a city's heart.  
And all these roads are veins  
Filled with the full-tilt blood of life.

Above the stations  
The plumed milk vapour rises  
*Urbis et orbis transcens*  
Like the threads of our delight,  
Even the breath of sorrow,  
Though *vere*  
*Iste locus sanctus est.*

But we are the last men scribbling on the  
shore,  
We are the poets of no more,  
The mind-blown madmen have fashioned  
a pall  
For us all to sleep in,  
All of us, all.

LESLEY SCOTT-MONCRIEFF



## CONDEMNED TO SOME HOPE:

### *R. P. Warren and the Uses of History*

THOMAS H. CARTER

*I read the books, and know that all night long  
History drips in the dark, and if you should fumble  
Your way into that farther room where no  
Light is, the floor would be slick to your foot.*

*Band of Angels*, by Robert Penn Warren. New York: Random House, 1957.

Mr. Warren's latest novel, *Band of Angels*, has all the gaudy, familiar trappings of an extravagant historical romance, including (as narrator-heroine) a mulatto *femme fatale* and a plot so crashingly melodramatic that one should not have been surprised to find it used by Mr. Frank Yerby. (It comes as no shock, therefore, that the movie version features Yvonne de Carlo and Clark Gable). Typically, when the novel appeared, *Time* called it "a magnolia-scented potboiler of the Civil War era"—a verdict which found few dissenters. As usual, Mr. Warren's intention was misunderstood or ignored. Still, the critics have some justice on their side. There is an element of cheapness in *Band of Angels*—a tawdry thread that runs through most of Warren's creative work; but it is, I think, largely incidental, part of the risk that Mr. Warren habitually takes. I trust that it is commonplace to say that Mr. Warren's is a profoundly serious intelligence; and that, in his poems and fictions, he attempts to engage our deepest concerns. Melodrama, the increment of violence, is his means; and for the election of that means he has sufficient reason. The obvious

pitfall is that we may mistake the accidents for the substance.

The fact that Mr. Warren's fiction is susceptible to this particular kind of misreading is evidently not without significance. Mr. Warren shares, one imagines, some of the procedures of the ordinary historical novelist; he does, it would seem, the same research into the same dusty archives. It is, I take it, his motive and his use of what he finds that distinguish him so utterly from the historical romanticist, who is incorrigibly frivolous.

History, in a sense, is what happens; normally, I suppose, it is what has happened a long time ago, and what is of such notoriety that we hear of it in school, or in the newspapers, or elsewhere; I mean those events that have, so to speak, entered the public domain. When the writer elects to deal with such events, as Mr. Warren has sometimes done, he deliberately risks violating a public image—though often enough that image is pretty dim. Such was the fate of Thomas Jefferson in Warren's long poem, *Brother to Dragons*, and it scored a temporary distraction from the point Warren meant to make. When *All the King's Men* was new, that novel, as well, suffered a similar wrenching: many readers, immediately identifying Willie Stark as the late Huey P. Long, chose to appraise

the book as "pure" history (whatever that is), and so relieved themselves of the responsibility of trying to understand it as a serious work of art.

We should mention another kind of History, which is the kind *Band of Angels* draws on, but which differs, in so far as it may be said to differ, not from the author's point of view, but from the reader's: those events about which we know so little, if we know anything, that the author has a free hand with them; in our ignorance, we can't object. Undoubtedly there are graduations, and Mr. Warren, in any case, has ranged widely. These distinctions, despite a certain pragmatic weight, do not visibly affect the discipline that the use of history insists on. "... A poem dealing with history," Mr. Warren has written in his foreword to *Brother to Dragons*, "is no more at liberty to violate what the writer takes to be the spirit of his history than it is at liberty to violate what the writer takes to be the nature of the human heart." History, then, for the writer may be a type of experience, valuable because larger, more inclusive, generally more dramatic, and perhaps more definitive than our limited, private experience; it instructs, and must in any case be accounted for; but the serious artist can no more deliberately set out to betray or deny it, and remain serious in his craft, than he can falsify his own experience. This is not to say, of course, that a writer knows immediately the significance of his subject, or that the subject necessarily has any transcendental value. It can't be pumped in, as by a bellows. The writer discovers his meaning, often (and often doesn't), in the very process of trying to write. As Warren himself, speaking of the historical documents pertaining to *Brother to Dragons*, put it,

*We know that much, but what is any  
knowledge  
Without the intrinsic mediation of  
the heart?*

As Mr. Eric Bentley has perceptively noted, "the alpha and omega" of Mr. War-

ren's teaching has been "the necessity of self-knowledge." This is just, but too narrow: what we want to know is the *nature* of the self, as Mr. Warren would repeatedly have us see it. Poetry, Mr. Warren has said, "is committed to the obligation of trying to say something about the human condition." *The human condition*: this is better, but it is necessary to go a step beyond. An intelligent critic of fiction, Mr. Andrew Lytle, has said that *World Enough and Time* implies nothing less than "the total protestant depravity of man"—an apt but slippery summation that only partially accounts for Warren's later work.

The thematic unity and coherence of Mr. Warren's considerable achievement must result from many factors; we can select for discussion only the one that seems central; I mean, of course, Mr. Warren's working definition of Man—with which he began and which he has scarcely changed. It is upon this definition, I suggest, that his creative work is predicated; he continually subjects it to the discipline of historic fact; and it informs, in fine, his poems and fictions. If we are able to discover how this definition goes, we shall have some protection from mistaking the subject matter for the subject. (Not that this theme, or substance, is always, in fictional terms, clearly or successfully realized: Mr. Bentley was right to complain that *All the King's Men* "suffers a good deal from incomplete fusion of theme and vehicle.")

Here a consideration of *Brother to Dragons* should prove useful: it is relatively recent; Mr. Warren has inserted himself into the poem as a principal character; and it is the obverse of the same coin for which *Band of Angels* forms the other face. As a poem, *Brother to Dragons* is neither entirely successful nor convincing. Despite its dramatic appearance, it is formally a dialectical debate, and R.P.W. (the character) already knows the answers, like Socrates, and merely waits his chance to thrust them in; hence, as far as real argument goes, he contests with straw figures. This is a dangerous flaw, but it doesn't pre-

vent the poem from being in large part genuinely admirable; and for our purposes, it is ideal<sup>1</sup>.

*Brother to Dragons* ("a tale in verse and voices" transpiring *no place and any time*) might very well bear for sub-title, "The Re-Education of Thomas Jefferson"; of that Jefferson whom we were taught to remember as the last of the Renaissance port-manteau-men, the noted rationalist who believed that men were capable of their political salvation, and who, it need hardly be added, is yet cited with equal authority by opposing political polemicists. He is Mr. Warren's hero-villain (Warren is his own protagonist), a type of father-image who stands at the corner of the wrong turn Western, specifically American culture has taken. Mr. Warren has him recall the Philadelphia convention in these terms:

*We knew we were only men  
Caught in our errors and interests.  
But I, a man,  
Suddenly saw in every face, face  
after face,  
The bleared, the puffed, the lank,  
the lean, all,  
On all saw the brightness blaze, and  
I knew my own days,  
Times, hopes, books, horsemanship,  
the praise of peers,  
Delight, desire, and even my love,  
but straw  
Fit for the flame, and in that fierce  
combustion I—  
Why, I was dead, I was nothing,  
nothing but joy,  
And my heart cried out, "Oh, this is  
Man!"*

Such, Mr. Warren's Jefferson admits, was true *then*; it is not true *now*; and he is concerned to find "some justification for the natural." What has altered some pretty firmly held convictions; what makes him say that "love" is but a mask to hide the fact of the "imitigable ferocity of self;" and makes him cry out,

*We are born to joy that joy may*

*become pain.*

*We are born to hope that hope  
may become pain.*

*We are born to love that love  
may become pain.*

*We are born to pain that pain  
may become more*

*Pain, and from that inexhaustible  
superflux*

*We may give others pain as our prime  
definition—*

what has worked this anguished about-face, was the unaccountably brutal crime committed in Kentucky by Jefferson's two nephews, Lilburn and Isham Lewis, who for no special reason (unless "to touch the ironic immensity of afternoon with meaning"), tied a Negro slave to the chopping block, chopped him up, and fed him to the fire. The discovery of the bones gave them away ("I am the Law, I say I want his bones."). Jefferson, so Warren tells us, never saw fit in his lifetime to comment on this occurrence; he is called up to do so now. He must also give satisfaction to his "near son," Meriwether Lewis, commander of the Lewis and Clark expedition and later governor of Louisiana who, dismayed by accusations imputed to his term (and betrayed, as the poem has it, by Jefferson's "absolute dream," "that men are capable/Of the brotherhood of justice"), committed a botched and painful suicide.

Lewis' fate, however, is but corollary and extension of the two nephews' gratuitous butchery—though stupid Isham was merely accessory to his brother Lilburn's peculiar and bloody passion. Jefferson, at first, refuses to accept his nephew:

*I still reject, cast out, repudiate,  
And squeeze from my blood the  
blood of Lilburn.*

It is not, as Jefferson affirms, that when alive he was a fool:

*And if I held Man innocent, I yet  
knew*

*Not all men innocent . . .*

The fact that Jefferson must accept is not

simply that all men are not innocent, but that all men, *because* they are men, are guilty: it is because of the blood kinship that he must take the hand of his nephew; he must admit that the possibility of evil, which is in all men, is in him too. (Conversely, all men are, in a sense, innocent, Lilburn sought merely to define himself, to embrace his deepest, his *real* nature, by cutting away that darker self projected onto the slave George. This smacks of sophistry, but is merely a way of asserting that men are men. That is why "the burden of innocence is heavier than the burden of guilt.") Evil, like good, is part of the ambiguous substance of the human heart.

In Warren's stories, characters frequently move westward to the wilderness in pursuit of self-definition, free from human contact (like the father of Lilburn and Isham, Dr. Charles Lewis); but, predictably, Warren appears to view the Turner thesis and its implications in an ironic light. Many of his characters would not, however, and they often have their creator's sympathy, for once it was possible to regard the West as the fitting landscape for innocence. This, as R.P.W. grossly reminds us, was while there still existed a frontier:

*In that heyday of hope and heart's  
extravagance  
When Grab was watchword and earth  
spread her legs  
Wide as she could, like any jolly  
trollop  
Or bouncing girl back in the bushes  
after  
The preaching or the husking bee,  
and said,  
"Come git it, boy, hit's yourn, but  
git it deep."*

But nature is neutral, not given to comfort or comment, and when Meriwether Lewis returned to civilization, he discovered "the tracklessness of the human heart." As R.P.W., who apparently represents the modern intelligence "enlightened" by such amoral disasters as atomic fission, remarks,

*Men had come West in hope. This is  
the West.*

*Therefore what more is there for man  
to hope for?*

The brightest promises of the Enlightenment, then, are false, and man is thrown back on his own tarnished resources. Health, Lucy Jefferson Lewis tells her brother, is to be had "not by denial,"

*But in confronting the terror of our  
condition.*

The major technical problem posed by *Brother to Dragons* is how to persuade Jefferson to adopt an attitude antithetical to that professed in his lifetime. Mr. Warren's solution, which is fundamentally a trick, points up the non-dramatic structure of his poem; what he has gained in immediacy—which is considerable—he loses in weight and conviction. Jefferson is speaking to his sister, the mother of Lilburn and Isham—

*Now I should hope to find the  
courage to say  
That the dream of the future is not  
Better than the fact of the past, no  
matter how terrible.  
For without the fact of the past we  
cannot dream the future.*

*.....  
It would be terrible to think that  
truth is lost.  
It would be worse to think that  
anguish is lost, ever.*

—when abruptly the murdered and dismembered slave George appears, for the only time in the poem, to speak:

*I was lost in the world, and the  
trees were tall.  
I was lost in the world, and the  
dark swale heaved.  
I was lost in my anguish, and I did  
not know the reason.*

George, one gathers, is the concrete, anguished fact of history that must somehow be explained, or at least accepted.



Jefferson calls him, "My son," saying that "we have been lost in the dark"—of, I repeat, the rationalistic Enlightenment; but men are "condemned to some hope." We must, he goes on,

*Create the possibility  
Of reason, and we can create it only  
From the circumstances of our most  
evil despair.*

*. . . all creation validates itself,  
For whatever you create, you create  
yourself by it,  
And in creating yourself you will  
create  
The whole wide world and gleaming  
West anew.*

If that is heresy, I will leave others to define it.

Mr. Warren's interest in Shakespeare is well known, and no work of his own is more Shakespearian than *Brother to Dragons*: he uses the pathetic fallacy (compare especially *Macbeth*) as often as his protagonist sneers at it. And like a Shakespeare character, he hankers for an absolute belief in the powers of rhetoric; this belief, however, has not been earned: it would have required plot and character, not just "voices"; and its absence undercuts "the justification of the natural" achieved by Jefferson:

*For nothing we had,  
Nothing we were,  
Is lost.  
All is redeemed,  
In knowledge.  
But knowledge is the most powerful  
cost.  
It is the bitter bread.  
I have eaten the bitter bread.  
In joy, I would end.*

It is possible to conjecture why Mr. Warren felt impelled to write *Brother to Dragons*. The historical image of Jefferson and its implications are important; they cannot be side-stepped, for the superficialities of "Jefferson democracy" are still potent ele-

ments in much of our thinking<sup>2</sup>. It seems trite to say it, but it is so, that Jefferson, however worthy of our admiration, was a man of his time; what is external will change; and contemporary intellectuals are properly disturbed because nature no longer wears a benign face. (It didn't in Jefferson's century, either, but there was the possibility that man might sweeten its expression.) Hence Jefferson is something of a political (and philosophical) lion in the path. Wyndham Lewis states the question in terms I imagine Mr. Warren would accept:

When it is said that Jefferson stands for what is best, most idealistic and youthful, in America, we must accept that as substantially true. Had it not been for Jefferson America would have been a far less attractive place. On the other hand it is a *legacy of unreality, like the dream of a golden age.* (My italics.—T.C.)

Mr. Warren's real interest, even in *All the King's Men*, has never been merely in politics, though as a symptom or manifestation I am sure that it interests him very much. The "alpha and omega" of Mr. Warren's teaching is evidently that all men must, as necessary condition of their humanity, eat the same "bitter bread" that his Jefferson speaks of; and that is the knowledge of evil in the world, and in the human heart:

*And that's the instructive fact of  
history,  
That evil's done for good, and in  
good's name—.*

Many critics have commentated on Mr. Warren's concern with the perennial dialectic of good and evil; I want to call attention to two brief passages in *Brother to Dragons* that, from nearly any point of view, are strange. Both are spoken, with some lines between, by R.P.W.

*We must believe in virtue. There is no  
Escape. . . .*

*For virtue is  
Only the irremediable logic of all  
the anguish  
Your cunning could admit or heart  
devise.*

It may properly be objected that these are but partial definitions, later picked up and synthesized by the development of the poem; so they are; but the theology they suggest is odd—the dregs of a recalcitrant Calvinism. It is reinforced by Jefferson's remark to his sister, early in *Brother to Dragons*, in what appears to be its most memorable single cluster of lines:

*There's no forgiveness for our being  
human.  
It is the unexpugnable error. It is,  
Dear Sister, the one thing we have  
overlooked  
In our outrageous dreams and  
cunningest contrivances.*

This statement, too, is but partial; there is forgiveness; but it is we who must give it, forgiving others and by extension ourselves. Just so, there is virtue, but it must come from ourselves.

All of this, I believe, is a version of that old dogma which progressive America, for a time at least, put by, the doctrine of Original Sin. What makes it so curious, however, is that man must work out his own salvation.

*The catfish is in the Mississippi and  
The Mississippi is in the catfish and  
Under the ice both are at one with God.  
Would that we were!*

This God, whatever he owes to some Jonathan Edwards, seems more distant than the vague deistic one. "Your reason," wrote Mr. Jefferson, concerning religion, to Peter Carr, "is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable, not for the rightness, but uprightness of your decision." In contrast, Warren's final line—*Would that we were!*—seems the very embodiment of what we are sometimes pleased to call the tortured "modern" conscious-

ness. What is lacking, then, from Mr. Warren's version of original sin is its corollary of divine grace; what we get is hell, but little heaven—or at least one that is secular and humanistic.

## II.

In discussing any fiction thematically, we are liable to envision the novelist as a man with an abstract thesis that he attempts to body out with a story. (In the case of the poet, the situation will differ but the point is the same.) I do not doubt that many good novels have been written just so; but it has been in spite of that; and the procedure has betrayed many good fictionists. (Cf. Mr. Faulkner's *Fable*.) Fiction is neither a tract nor a series of syllogisms; it may simultaneously be these things and more; but most of all, as Mr. Ezra Pound has observed, it is a story. Still, a story, lacking a substantial theme or congeries of themes, may be thin as a moral abstracted from the human situations which define it, and which at the same time it structures. "... In fiction," Mr. Warren has said, "one should never do a thing merely for a single reason (not if he hopes to achieve that feeling of a mysterious depth which is one of the chief beauties of the art) . . ." On the other hand (as the example of Conrad reminds us), sheer craftsmanship, however scrupulous, cannot altogether prevent a story from ringing false and hollow, at least portentous, if that story has been made to carry more weight than inheres in it. And what a writer has to say, of course, is not entirely up to him: since he needs to render for us, in all its possible contradiction and complexity, what Allen Tate, in a famous phrase, has called "knowledge carried to the heart." Or, in Warren's own words,

*The only knowledge worth the  
knowing is  
The knowledge too deep for knowing.*

For knowing, that is, mechanically, with the mind merely: a work of art (we are speaking specifically but not exclusively of

fiction) must be more than the sum of its parts; it must be alive. M. Jacques Maritain, in his essay on the poetic experience (which I take to be a kind of "knowledge carried to the heart"), provides a valuable description, at the same time reminding us that, as we know, the achieved work of art is an object:

And it is only through and in the object, through and in sensible signs in which the object abounds, that at the terminous of the poetic operation the content of the poetic experience is finally manifested and known in an express and communicable way.

To abstract is inevitably to falsify all but the flattest experience. What M. Maritain describes as the poetic experience, which must likewise be involved in the writing of fiction, cannot be conceptualized; hence it must be communicated "through the symbolic mode." And this, in fiction, amounts to an expert manipulation of the naturalistic surface.

What is implied here, of course, is more that sort of poetics, a technical strategy by itself; a way of looking at life is implied and, which is our present concern, a way of looking at history: or, more exactly, a way of ordering life and therefore, we say, of ordering history. (Its opposite, an emasculation of the creative intelligence, is a way of *not* ordering history and *not* ordering life.) We can take history, as the late A. N. Whitehead did, in terms of the ideas manifested in various cultures: take those we like, that is; or we may, as the serious writer like Mr. Warren must, take it seriously. Mr. Tate is writing of religion; but his description will also be recognized as the essential procedure of the good historical fictionist:

These sad, more concrete minds may be said to look at their history in a definite and now quite unfashionable way. They look at it as a concrete series that has taken place in a very real time—by which I mean, without

too much definition, a time as sensible, as full of sensation, and as replete with accident and uncertainty as the time they themselves are living in, moment by moment.

Needless to say, this isn't limited to the writer who is, as Mr. Warren is not, concerned exclusively with the past; you tend to look at the past and the present, and no doubt the future, from the same point of view.

Those matters, almost inescapably, bring to mind the question of Mr. Warren as a *specifically* Southern writer; but the "Southern" quality of many different writers has lately been overstressed; I prefer now to stress it as little as possible. As I understand it, however, the "Southern Renaissance" may be boiled down somewhat as follows: certain writers, thanks to a mostly coherent, at least partially articulated mode of living manifested by a society in the process of being obliterated even by 1920, were permitted to possess a special knowledge "carried to the heart"—a knowledge which, at this time, did not appear to be available anywhere else; they enjoyed, if nothing more, a feeling of continuity and tradition—though not a "literary" tradition—and the privilege of speaking for a community that really did exist. The imminent disintegration of that community aroused in them a self-consciousness that served to liberate their energies for artistic creation. ("It seems to be a law of intellectual development," wrote A. J. Symonds in the 1880's, to account for the literature of the Italian renaissance, "that the highest works of art can only be achieved when the forces which produced them are already doomed and in the act of disappearance.") And the society that so privileged these writers, without any way intending to, happened to be the Old South<sup>3</sup>.

### III.

Externally, *Band of Angels* is an adventure story, though scarcely one for children; it details, with its author's usual

impressive vitality, the fate of Amantha Starr—"pore little Manty," as everyone, to her growing irritation, insists on calling her. As the book opens, she is, as far as she knows, the well-loved daughter of Aaron Starr, a Kentucky plantation owner before the Civil War, and a mother now dead. Her childhood at Starrwood, spent playing by herself or with the children of the "people," indulged by Aunt Sukie (she of the comforting "warm, spicy smell") and her father, and kept company by a grotesque doll created by the privileged slave Shadrach, proprietor of the workshop, has been lonely but not unhappy. This bittersweet idyll (in no sense, let me add, a "justification" of the Old South) moves to an inevitable end when her father decides that Manty must be educated.

He takes her to Cincinnati where, advised by Miss Idell, wife of his business associate, he outfits Manty in stylish new clothes, and then packs her off to study among the "whey-faces" and "knob heads" (as Miss Idell aptly calls them) of Oberlin, a school whose atmosphere is compounded about equally of sanctity and abolitionism. There the impressionable Manty becomes obsessed with religious fervor, tells her baffled father that she doesn't want to live off "black sweat," and falls, not too piously, in love with an outrageously holy pre-ministerial student, equipped with deep voice, large wrists, and outsize Adam's apple, named Seth Parton. By now, Manty has "ripened" (the verb is unfortunately Mr. Warren's) into such an attractive young lady that she has Seth babbling, undoubtedly with mixed motives, of "the fullness of joy" possible in God, kissing her chastely on the forehead, and dunking himself in a snowbank to cool off. Shortly thereafter, this depressing young man accosts Manty one afternoon following class in order to inform her, on the authority of a friend who cannot lie, that her father has been engaged in carnal sin with Miss Idell (while her husband languished in jail), and further, that her father has passed away in the very act of adultery. Manty, though pre-

viously aware that the relationship between Miss Idell and her father was not exactly above-board, is humanly more concerned with his death. Not so Seth, who seems abnormally interested in the "using in lust" involved. The richly comic interlude at Oberlin, which has a definite structural function, is concluded as Manty tells Seth coldly, "I hate you," and heads home for Starrwood. Arriving at dusk, just as her father is being buried, she learns from the sheriff that her mother was a slave, that she herself has never been legally freed, and is consequently now a chattel. If all this were not shocking enough, Manty is claimed on the spot by her father's chief creditor (the price of adultery is apparently not cheap), rushed off to town and sold to a slave dealer, and eventually purchased by prosperous, middle-aged Hamish Bond, one of New Orleans' wealthiest citizens.

These early events, baldly paraphrased, make *Band of Angels* seem as lurid an affair as another novel that has become an almost legendary archetype of the seriously-meant, modern "thriller," Mr. Faulkner's *Sanctuary*. That much the two books do have in common. *Sanctuary*, however, is a complex and powerful satire; the vehicle into which Mr. Faulkner discharged his moralistic disgust was the well-known stereotype of the decadent South, enlivened by the jitters of the jazz age and a strong dash of ubiquitous if psychopathic gangsterism. In the present novel, Mr. Warren has likewise chosen to exploit a stereotype; but one that is quite different, and, I am inclined to think, equally if not more deceptive: it might be called, with some fairness, the hackneyed South of *Gone with the Wind*.

Despite this similarity, the intentions behind the two novels, as well as their execution, appear to be radically dissimilar. Mr. Faulkner must have meant, for whatever salutary purpose, to shock his readers; Mr. Warren, conversely, is out to shock his protagonist. The book's first two sentences—remember that Manty is the narrator—make it clear that we are confronted again



by Warren's characteristic preoccupation: "Oh, who am I? For so long that was, you might say, the cry of my heart." It continues to be Manty's cry, and Warren's concern, throughout the course of *Band of Angels*; Manty is trying not merely to define herself, but to achieve a positive sense of identity, to be a "self" secured from the knocks of fortune. What, at first glance, seems to be the complement of this theme occurs lower on the same page:

*If I could only be free*, I used to think, free from the lonely nothingness of only being yourself when the world flees away, and free from the closing walls that would crush you to nothingness.

It would be readily apparent, I expect, that the two questions—of the self, and of the nature of freedom—are for Mr. Warren identical, and that their separation is false and arbitrary. If freedom is not to be construed as a lofty abstraction, the hollow vehicle for any meaning we care to assign to it, there must be *someone* to be

free. And freedom, it is sometimes conceded, is not a matter limited exclusively to politics—even though its political aspect has its own undeniable pragmatic urgency.

What I am trying to suggest, in a negative way, is the nature of the freedom that Manty hankers for; and to indicate, less negatively, the close thematic relation *Band of Angels* does bear to Mr. Warren's other work.

*Band of Angels*, like any novel spanning a considerable interval of time, tends to be episodic: it is possible, in fact, to break it down into large, more or less self-sufficient blocks, in which secondary actions are begun and even brought to a temporary conclusion—only to be picked up later and definitely settled. But if *Band of Angels* is not what we commonly call a "well-made" novel, still it is highly unified. Mr. Warren holds rigorously to Manty's point of view, deviating from it in but one instance, and then briefly, to introduce the history of Hamish Bond. Many of the characters have their dramatic existence, inde-

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pendent of the narrator (not all of them, however: Tobias Sears, Manty's eventual husband, generally seems barely to exist at all). Each of these characters, in his way, stands as an analogue to Manty and her quest for identity: each seeks to define escape, remake, or somehow tamper with the self.

As Manty is dragged by the sheriff from her father's grave, with hardly a chance to draw breath, she wonders wildly *who* she has been up to this moment:

I had been defined by the world around me, by the high trees and glowing cookhearth of Starrwood, and the bare classrooms and soaring hymns of Oberlin, by the faces bent on me in their warmth and concern, the faces of Aunt Sukie, Shaddy, Miss Idell, my father, Seth Parton. But now all had fled away from me, in the deserts of distance, and I was, therefore, nothing.

In the novel's structure, Manty's short existence has been building towards this minor climax. Her childhood, though secure enough, has not been without its mystifications. Manty and Aunt Sukie, the boringly-familiar "black mammy," once discovered a doll in the attic which, Aunt Sukie told her, had previously belonged to "Miss Eye-leen," the lady Aaron Starr "long back married and brung home." Miss Eileen, because she "didn't have any juice," had had no children, had died and been buried. When Manty showed her father the doll, and questioned him about Miss Eileen and then about her own mother, he sent her off to bed with unaccustomed sternness; the doll she never saw again.

Another fixture of Manty's infancy was the slave Shadrach, who bounced her on his knee and told her stories about "ole-man Carter-wright," who opened up little girls and "et they liver-and-lights lak you eat apple dumplins—." Until one night, that is, when Aunt Sukie told Shadrach that Manty had grown too big for him "to fool her up that a-way"; and Shadrach be-

coming resentful, glared at the child and exclaimed: "Her! . . . what she? — ain't nuthin, no better'n nuthin — yeah, what she?" Unfortunately for the slave, Manty mentioned the incident to her father; and he, who had never sold any of his "people," immediately sold Shadrach.

It is not till much later, after her marriage, that Manty learns why her father sent her to Oberlin, rather than merely freeing her. It was because, as she finally comes to accept, he loved her; and to give her "papers" would have constituted a sort of rejection: he hoped, by sending her North, to avoid altogether the issue of her parentage.

Mr. Warren's picture of Manty's youth, especially of her father, is done entirely without sentimentality, and certainly without nostalgia. Aaron Starr is presented as a kind and honestly bewildered man, "Southern" by circumstance and tradition, simple by nature. As his daughter, Manty has accepted slavery as one of the *donnees* of life at Starrwood. The episode concerning Shadrach, which occurred before she was old enough to understand it, caused her a certain amount of guilty feeling (for which she made her father, who had sold him, the scapegoat). Afterwards, her sojourn at Oberlin converted her to a rabid (and incidentally comic) abolitionism. This conversion, however, was largely superficial. Despite her religious zeal, she retained, particularly in her loyalty and love for her father, the vestiges of her old attitude. The net result, culminating at the crisis in her father's grave, was to create a natural (and, of course, ironic) ambiguity in her feelings toward the whole of her experience.

What Mr. Warren has done, by subjecting his protagonist to an almost traumatic shock, is to state the question of self-definition in its most extreme form; he has stripped Manty of all the props that normally we live by, to make her ask the questions we feel no need to ask. Her single resource is herself:

For in and of myself, or so it seemed, I had been nothing. I had been nothing except their continuing creation. Therefore, though I remember much of that earlier time, my own feelings, my desires, my own story, I do not know who I was. Or do we ever come to know more? Oh, are we nothing more than the events of our own story, the beads on the string, the little nodes of fear and hope, love and terror, lust and despair, appetite and calculation, and the innermost sensation of blood and dream? No, I put it badly, for by that comparison what would the string be but that self, and that is the very thing it is so hard to know the existence of.

She wonders if she is in her present predicament because of something she has done: maybe because of old Shaddy, or because she hadn't sincerely believed what they had taught her at Oberlin; the comforting assurance, in other words, that we are punished for our sins, and so there is at last justice. Then she has the most frightening thought of all: perhaps she has done nothing: "*It's because I am I. . . . It's because life is coming true: I am I.*"

*Band of Angels*, in its fashion, is somewhat of a transplanted *Bildungsroman*: as we follow Manty from her earliest childhood to middle-age or a bit beyond, our attention is meant to be focussed on her internal struggle to secure her identity. By the limitations of that very situation, unfortunately, that makes this struggle seem so crucial to her, she is confined to a role of nearly complete passivity. (This may be one reason Warren decided to make her physically so ravishing: her looks are just about her only weapon; otherwise she is the toy of consequence. Consequently, she is defined to an unusual degree by the people around her—each of whom, as I have suggested, is similarly preoccupied with his own version of freedom or the self. The most completely realized of these is one Hamish Bond, who easily (and perhaps, as far as Mr. Warren is concerned,

unintentionally) upstages Manty, and everyone else, whenever he appears.

For our inquiry, it is not necessary to go very much into detail concerning the events in *Band of Angels*. The Hamish Bond interlude is important, however, for not only does it occupy a good deal of the book's space, but it recapitulates the theme of the novel. Bond is Manty's first, and as it turns out, sole "owner": he buys her at public auction in New Orleans (after cracking with his cane the wrist of a local dandy intent on fingering the merchandise), transports her to his large house and, in due time and without apparent protest from her, draws Manty into his own bed. But Hamish Bond, as Manty quickly learns, is a man with peculiarities: he has kindness, as someone phrases it, "like a long disease." Bond, obviously a man of action despite his gimp, treats Manty disconcertingly like a human being, allows her not merely the restricted freedom of his estate but of New Orleans itself, and clumsily courts her favor. In return Manty, armed with money he has given her and her own fair skin, attempts to run away. At the dock she encounters his Negro overseer; and, believing mistakenly that Bond has sent the man to spy on her, loses her nerve and returns to the house. It is just about at this point that Bond, with a "hollow groan" and an electric storm for backdrop, crawls for the first time into bed with her.

Before this consummation, Manty has complained bitterly to him of her status; the next day he gives her manumission papers and money; and this time Manty, who is nothing if not unpredictable, voluntarily accompanies him to his up-river plantation. She sticks with him, in fact, until New Orleans, shelled by Farragut, has fallen; and Bond, in despair, has laid hands on her roughly—though not to hurt her. Manty (who seems obsessed on the point) cries out that he is trying to make a "nigger" of her; and Bond, who has not exactly abused her, once more sets her free. From his house she moves into the

besieged city itself, where soon enough she meets and marries Tobias Sears, a captain in the Union army.

The figure of Hamish Bond, despite his melodramatic trappings, seems to me an authentic dramatic creation, although admittedly not of a very high order. As Manty at length discovers, his name is not Hamish Bond at all, but the more commonplace Alec Hinks. In his youth, driven by a mother forever regretting the faded glories of her Southern past, he has made his fortune as master of a slave ship working off the Gold Coast; he has, at the same time, "made" his new identity. Like Manty (or Lilburn Lewis, for that matter), he wants to be free; ". . . you want to know the worst that can happen, then you feel free." Caught up in the general Southern catastrophe, spurred by his own fatalism, he ends in ruin, a kind of suicide. The point about Bond, blackthorn cane and all, is that he is one of the few central figures in *Band of Angels* rendered directly: the pity Manty feels for him, though it is an emotion she frequently mistakes for love, doesn't distort the reader's perspective on him; we see him with our own eyes.

Our view of most of the other characters, unfortunately, is limited to what Manty perceives; and Manty, really, is not very perceptive. In some cases, like that of the basically comic Seth Parton, our awareness exceeds hers, and we have no trouble recognizing Seth for what he is. In regard to Aaron Starr (to take a different kind of instance), the character has been carefully "built-up," so that Manty's temporary rejection of her dead father doesn't result in confusion. Probably the least successful character in the novel is Tobias Sears: he is immediately tabbed by Manty as "beautiful." Here is part of her description of their wedding night:

He turned toward me then and started to move toward me. He had no clothes on, and he looked like a fine statue. He looked like the statue of a Greek athlete, and every muscle swelling strong and

true in the white marble.

I can understand why this passage has a distinct structural purpose, but its air of uncensored *True Confessions* embarrasses me, and I imagine it embarrasses Mr. Warren as well.

The figure of Tobias Sears, in fact, represents a technical crisis—one that Mr. Warren doesn't manage to resolve till the last scene—in regard to the point of view adopted, for Manty's husband is understood neither by himself nor his wife (who frequently presents a distorted image of him). How then, are we to conceive him? "Statue" is indeed the operative word. Manty, too often, looks on him as the hero of a sentimental romance, and ironically the romance Tobias conjures for himself is quite as sentimental: he begins as an Emersonian avid in pursuit of the "Great Soul" alleged to be working its grand design in the lives of men; naturally, he fails to take into account that part of his nature that isn't so pure as a statue, but only wishes it were. (It should be noted here that in like fashion, but to a lesser degree, Emerson is the villain of *Band of Angels*—as was Jefferson in *Brother to Dragons*.) So, in a double sense, "statue" is the operative word for the reader too. Mr. Warren, it may be added, makes his own attitude clear: Tobias begins as an Emersonian, but ends as a human being.

What we are up against, I think, are the inherent limitations of the first-person narrator—especially the one Mr. Warren has selected for *Band of Angels*. Mr. Warren improbably invests Manty with some of the properties of his own characteristic rhetoric. When Manty sounds like Robert Penn Warren, the writing is generally excellent; when she sounds most like Manty, it is not. As narrator, Manty offers another disadvantage: the events of the Civil War must be reported by her from a distance; she sees some of them, dreams of others, and imagines herself present at yet others; but all Mr. Warren's great skill, which is thus largely reduced to a series of dodges,



cannot keep us from feeling that we are being served limp, inert chunks of History on a less than smoking platter. The basic flaw seems finally to rest in the conception of Manty herself. In her determination not to be swamped in a life of sensation, in her very human attempt to preserve her sense of identity, she is almost a miniature hero of the sensibility; but that very sensibility, unfortunately, is often in no way distinguishable from that of a soap-opera heroine.

Hence the novel's penultimate episode — when Manty at last, in middle age, confronts mentally her checkered past and realizes that she alone can truly free herself — is neither convincing nor unconvincing. Despite Mr. Warren's evocative prose, it is mostly flat. One is tempted to remember that Manty was never much good at thinking, anyway.

The concluding scene, in contrast, is extremely effective. Manty and Tobias, worn down by the trials of time, disillusion, and countless betrayals, their own and others, face each other finally as human beings asking no more (and no less) than the other can give. The scene earns its air of conviction because it has the considerable, if uneven, weight of the entire novel behind it; the author, drawing on characters by now established, projects a situation

that is achieved dramatically, rendered fully. Tobias says, "Miss Manty, you don't think it's too late, do you?" and Manty replies, "No, I don't think so."

At least, I suppose I said that. I tried to but maybe it wasn't possible with my face pressed into his chest, and the tears running out of me with the awfulness of joy—all the old shadows of our lives canceled in joy—and his hand patting men on the back while he said darling, darling, darling.

That was what he said.

If we rank works of art in categories, we have to admit that *Band of Angels* belongs to a lower order than does *Brother to Dragons*; but we must also recognize that the novel, on its own terms, is a success, and the poem is not. Concerning *Brother to Dragons*, I have already said that Mr. Warren's theme, secular though it is, deals with original sin (or the inevitable limitations of mankind). His hell is properly static—which in itself argues against dramatic success. My chief complaint against *Brother to Dragons* is that it ends, dramatically, where it should have begun. This complaint cannot be raised against the novel: the characters attempt to work out their own salvation. *Band of Angels*, which is Mr. Warren's purgatory, is ultimately a wry comedy.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>*World Enough and Time* is equally discursive, of course, but less illuminating, owing to the author's canny juggling of philosophical concepts; and I would make merely one point about it here. In a severe criticism of this novel, Mr. Harry Moden Campbell has accused Warren of determinism—of subscribing to the belief that we are made by external factors, such as the "land" or the "scene." If Mr. Campbell were right, I shouldn't blame him for objecting. What he mistakes for determinism, however, is not that at all, but simply a version of Calvinistic predestination, in which the factors that shape us are largely internal.

<sup>2</sup>The question of what Jefferson himself believed, and what he is now generally thought to

have believed, may be two distinct things; Mr. Warren makes no distinction, he confronts them both; inevitably, in so doing, he has created his own Jefferson. The legacy we inherit from Thomas Jefferson has been brilliantly summarized by Mr. Allen Tate in a well-known formula: "The ends of man are sufficiently contained in his political destiny." I will not say that Mr. Warren's and Mr. Tate's interests diverge at this point; but Mr. Warren clearly makes his objection to our Jeffersonian heritage from a different perspective.

<sup>3</sup>See Donald Davidson, "Why the Modern South Has a Great Literature," *Still Rebels, Still Yankees* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press).

## BRIEF OBSERVATIONS

### *Utopia Limited*

HENRY S. KARIEL

PRODDED BY AN ample though frequently undisciplined literature and informed by some current practices of the positive social welfare state, I have been trying to develop what might be called, if it were not a rather pretentious term, a kind of hypothesis. I would have us postulate the possibility of really perfecting a total security mechanism, perfecting it not just in its parts but in its entirety. This type of mechanism would have to be thought of as a prodigious, sprawling apparatus geared to protect us fully, contrived to account for every contingency arising at the nation's core or borders, constituting an almost silent, smoothly-working defense machine, one ever alert, ever at tension, carefully fixed to release the volley of projectiles which deflect those of the attacker, and prepared—at the same time—to retaliate effectively and massively.

In such a faultless machine, in such an ideal security system, the "human factor" will at long last have become redundant. All that is irrational and undependable will have been absorbed, exhausted, or else blocked out. The soldier-technician before the radar screen—all too human, too given to the whim of the practical joker or to the overeager response of the repressed or to the daydream of the infatuated—will have been replaced by an objective eye wholly alert to the fuzzy images before it, wholly related and adjusted to them, instantaneously relaying its perceptions, feeding them into a tabulator receiving hundreds of similar messages. And the

staff officer at the message center—all too human, too unprepared to screen out the irrelevant, the marginal, the incommensurable—will have been replaced by the data co-ordinating automaton. At the system's center, to the extent that a totalitarian whole may be said to have a true center, there will be no opportunity for discretion, no freedom for appraisal. The apparatus, its principles approved by a Congress and a President freely elected, its internal governors duly set by loyal engineers, will calculate and select appropriate alternatives. No sentiment will counteract its decisions; no hope or reminiscence will sidetrack its dictates. All that is devious, variable, or fickle will have been systematically frustrated.

Having postulated this ideal of a public defense system, having kept ourselves from discounting its improbability, let us realistically picture it as maintaining itself over the years, as stretched out over vast and different geographical regions. It should be appreciated, however momentarily, in its stupendous complexity. We should be impressed alone by its inner warning devices which will automatically initiate the exchange of the wayward tube, the petulant calculator, the weak connection, the faulty transmission. It should be envisaged concretely in all its tricky complications, its millions of parts functionally interrelated, delicately meshed and adjusted to one another, posed in fragile equilibrium and yet primed to minister to the slightest novelty, ready to be triggered by the proper emergency.

Accepting this picture, we would have

no reason for believing that the system might misbehave, that it would not, with inconceivable promptness, slide into action, economically performing its assigned task.

Yet to keep ourselves from being disillusioned, I would exclude the wholly improbable and introduce what may appear to be the first serious note. Let us admit the possibility of error—not some fundamental error, not a radical mistake, but rather a barely perceptive derangement, some inappreciable peculiarity. This means conceding that some irregularity, some perverse piece of copper or some over-

heated air pocket, may trouble the system, in fact that at some unspecifiable yet quite specific moment it *must*. It would surely be unrealistic to hold that nothing—and won't the most minute disturbance do?—could emerge to release a meticulously controlled impulse, flashing the lights, scoring the clicks, generating the energy, and liberating the reservoir of hoarded power.

And to complete our vision—or at least that hypothesis of mine — I would postulate the existence of one other defense system outside the nation's borders—a system no less conscientiously constructed, solicitous, sensitive, and rational.

---

### *Some Men A Forward Motion Love*

“Still haven’t finished childhood” was the  
clause  
that closed his letter; then he added. “In  
more ways than one.” By childhood he had  
meant  
those Joycean trips through alleys of the  
mind  
I beg to leave unlanterned. He explains,  
it takes a child to catch a child: and  
swears  
by it. I do not tell him I am more  
the usual coward who transfers a fear.  
This lighting back perturbs me like the  
search  
through darkness for a blacker cat not  
there.  
Let midnight wicks inform a virgin’s fool-  
ish wait, or scholar’s watch. My friend is I,  
and I’m afraid of I, and want no back-  
ward steps. Childhood is over, and we  
shove  
ourselves to manhood, linking arm with  
those  
who feign a forward motion, or we move  
from shadow into shadow, not from love.

RAYMOND ROSELIEP

## CORRESPONDENCE

DUE TO AN unfortunate misprint, the first paragraph of my article "Toward a Christian Approach in Judging Economic Systems" seriously misstates my theological position.

Without repeating the exact words, my position is that "*without* the admission" of a supernatural element, it takes heroic exegesis to make sense of the tradition and scriptures. I did, and do, *not* maintain that heroic exegesis is *always* required.

—DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT  
*Montreal*

[Professor Wright's essay appeared in the Fall 1957 issue of MODERN AGE.]

TO FILL ITS PLACE, MODERN AGE must be, as it is, an intellectual magazine, and it must stand above most of the merely contemporary controversies. Its function seems to me to probe behind the purely political issues and to attempt the discovery of the ideas that inhere in the conservative point of view. Likewise, it is *urbane*; and by this quality it should lure even the cultists of the behavioral sciences into discussions of their premises.

—FRANCIS GRAHAM WILSON  
*University of Illinois*

MODERN AGE recently has received some friendly observations from Dr. Henri Brugsmans, Rector, The College of Europe, Bruges; Mr. T. S. Eliot, London; Mr. Huntington Cairns, The National Gallery of Art; Mr. William A. White, Jr., of the *Emporia Gazette*; Mr. B. E. Hutchinson, Detroit; and many others.

I FIND IT HARD to communicate the interest and pleasure MODERN AGE rouses in me . . . . The nearest thing to it in England is the quarterly issued by the Bow Group, but this is lacking in the cultural range which MODERN AGE so splendidly covers. As a non-party Conservative (or, at least, an anti-Cabinet one), I find it enormously difficult to come across Tory writing in England which is not compounded of political clichés. I must say, too, that MODERN AGE delights me because of its platform of Liberal and non-Conservative writers.

—DEREK STANFORD  
*Hounslow, Middlesex  
England*

IT IS TRUE THAT Spencer, in his innocence, as Professors Wilson and Stanlis point out in their articles, believed that increasing liberty and progress were inevitable. Spencer was not as familiar as we unfortunately have become with the depravity to which human beings sink. But even in this respect, how many thinkers were as farsighted as Spencer in his denunciation of approaching statism in his *Man versus the State*? It is my belief that what America precisely needs today is not a repudiation of the ideals and principles of Herbert Spencer, as Wilson advocates, but a return to the ideals and principles of Herbert Spencer, shorn of his naïve evolutionism. Until we do so, we shall continue wandering in a pragmatic, collectivist quagmire.

—MURRAY N. ROTHBARD  
*New York City*



## NEWS AND NOTES

The last lecture in a series called "The Restoration of Norms" will be delivered by Russell Kirk, editor of *MODERN AGE*, on Monday, April 28, at the New School for Social Research, 66 West 12th Street, New York City. Tickets may be obtained at the building. This concluding lecture is concerned with "Ancient Norms and Modern Historians."

Mr. Kirk's book *Academic Freedom* recently was published in a Korean translation.

At Graz, in Austria, a group of conservatively-minded scholars are publishing—twice a year—an interesting periodical, *Fundamente*. It is concerned principally with cultural community, transcending political nationalism. The editor is Professor Sas-Zaloziesky of the University of Graz. In dollars, the subscription price is \$1.20 annually.

Conservative university students in Norway are publishing a remarkably intelligent review, *Minerva's Kvartalsskrift* (Stortingsgt. 20, Oslo), handsomely printed and containing some serious articles of importance. The first number includes a special contribution by M. Gabriel Marcel, and an article about Marcel by Dr. Per Lønning.

At Park College, Parkville, Missouri, Professor Jerzy Hauptmann, chairman of the department of political science, recently gave a series of faculty lectures on "The Dilemmas of Politics." These have been printed, and copies of the booklet may be obtained for a dollar from the Dean, Park College. The lectures contain some penetrating observations on recent social thought, including conservatism.

*Meinungsforschung und Repraesentative Demokratie* is the title of a remarkable monograph by Dr. William Hennis of the Institute of Political Science, the University of Frankfurt-am-Main, recently published by J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen. Dr. Hennis raises certain important questions concerning the limits of public-opinion "research". Proceeding from first principles in the manner of Burke, he examines the contentions of the pollsters. Here are some of his propositions: "The anonymous sample sheet never will represent *public* opinion. . . . Public opinion research ignores the fundamental difference between choosing and thinking". Dr. Hennis is interested in "the progressive degeneration of American presidential elections toward the popularity poll." "Public opinion research," he continues, "has now become an accepted instrument of the political contest." The West German budget, for instance, provides for a government contract with two "Institutes of Demoscopy", allocating at least a hundred and fifty thousand Deutsche marks *per annum* for this purpose. Yet, though "public opinion may be for or against a government, it cannot, by itself, govern. . . . The researchers attempt to explore public opinion without any clear knowledge of what it is."

A chapter of central importance draws attention to earlier conservative thinkers, and suggests the difference between *öffentliche* and *gemeine Meinung*, a German equivalent of the distinction proposed by Mr. John Lukacs in *Anchor Review* (1957) between "public opinion" and "popular sentiment."

A very interesting new Australian quarterly review, *Quadrant*, edited by Mr. James McAuley and sponsored by the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, publishes both literary and political articles of an importance more than local. The subscription-price is sixteen shillings a year, and the address is Box 4714, Sydney, N.S.W.

Two books, the original editions of which were previously reviewed in these pages, now are available in American editions: M. Raymond Aron's *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (Doubleday, \$4.50), and the Reverend A. L. Drummond's *The Kirk and the Continent* (Allenson, \$6).

Professor William McGovern (an advisor to MODERN AGE) and Dr. David Collier, publisher and associate editor of this magazine, have published recently their book *Radicals and Conservatives* (Regnery). It will be reviewed in an early number of this journal.

In *Die Krone* (Vienna), the newspaper of the Austrian monarchists, has been appearing a remarkable series of articles by Dr. Thomas Chaimowicz, under the title *Kontinuität und Verfassung*. Dr. Chaimowicz, a disciple of Cicero, Virgil, and Burke, discusses the eternal contract which joins the dead, the living, and those yet to be born. A young man who is twice a doctor of philosophy, and has studied in Austria, Colombia, and the United States, Mr. Chaimowicz is also familiar with the work of Friedrich Gentz, the Austrian statesman who translated Burke's *Reflections* into German; and he is helping to restore to European consciousness the importance of Burke, whose writings had been neglected in Austria for many years. Like Gentz, too, Dr. Chaimowicz comes of a Jewish family.

MODERN AGE now is available in more than 1,500 institutional and public libraries. A limited news-stand distribution has been arranged through the firm of Selected Outlets, Bloomfield, N. J., commencing with the Winter 1957-58 issue.

Claremont Men's College, Claremont, California, announces its fifth Institute on Freedom and Competitive Enterprise, to take place June 15 to 28. Thirty all-expense fellowships are offered; information may be obtained from the director of the Institute, Professor Arthur Kemp. The program will consist of a series of lectures and seminars. This year's lecturers will be Professor Milton Friedman, Professor Friedrich A. Hayek (both of the University of Chicago), and Professor Bruno Leoni, of the University of Pavia.

The Union of International Associations, which has existed for fifty years, is at present disturbed by the tendency for governmental bodies to assume the functions of international voluntary groups. Its purpose is the promotion of international non-governmental cooperation, and its headquarters is in the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, Belgium. The Union publishes a monthly magazine. Associate memberships in the Union are welcomed. An annual subscription costs five dollars, payable through the National City Bank, 55 Wall Street, New York.

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

*Harry Elmer Barnes*, leader of the "revisionist" historians of the Second World War, recently published a bibliography of revisionist books. His historical studies and textbooks have exerted a wide influence for a generation.

*Anthony T. Bouscaren*, professor of political science at Marquette University, is spending this year lecturing at the Army War College.

*Thomas H. Carter*, a Virginian, is a frequent contributor to *Kenyon Review* and other quarterlies, and in his Washington and Lee days was editor of *Shenandoah*.

*Curtis Cate* is European representative of the *Atlantic Monthly*. He has lived abroad part of his life, including a year in the Levant, and was educated at Harvard, the *Ecole des Langues Orientales* (Paris), and Magdalen College, Oxford.

*Slobodan M. Draskovich*, a former professor of economics at the University of Belgrade and until 1941 a staff member of the Ministry of War of Yugoslavia, is now editor-in-chief of the Chicago weekly, *Srpska Borba*.

*John Reece Dring*, whose poetry is now finding its way to new anthologies of American verse, fought in Korea—and so this poem.

*Henry S. Kariel*, in the department of political science at Harvard, has an especial interest in the work of Henry Adams.

*Russell Kirk*, editor of *MODERN AGE*, is also research professor of politics, Post College; and member of the faculty of politics, The New School for Social Research. His latest book is *The American Cause* (Regnery).

*Julián Marías*, Spanish philosopher and critic, continues in this number of *MODERN AGE* the observations on America begun in our last number.

*D. P. O'Connell* is professor of international law at the University of Adelaide, Australia. He recently spent some months at Harvard as a visiting scholar.

*Wilhelm Röpke*, professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, the University of Geneva, had a great share in the restoration of a free economy in Germany after the Second World War. This essay was a lecture to the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society, at St. Moritz, in Switzerland.

*Raymond Roseliep*, a priest, teaches at Loras College, in Iowa, and contributes to a score of magazines.

*Mordecai Roshwald*, born in Poland, at present teaches social science at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of several sociological studies.

*Lesley Scott-Moncrieff*, at twenty, is our youngest contributor. A Scot, and a member of the third generation of a well-known writing family, she contributes to several Scottish and English periodicals.

*Gotthold Starke*, a Lutheran, is Counsellor in the German Foreign Office. He was a prisoner of the Russians for more than fifteen years.

*Randall Stewart*, the editor of Hawthorne's *Notebooks*, is professor of English at Vanderbilt University. Louisiana State University Press has just published his book *Christian Doctrine in American Literature*.

*Stephen Tonsor* is a member of the faculty of the department of history, the University of Michigan.

*Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn* recently returned to Austria after lecturing in Japan. He spoke in Japanese, though he never had visited Japan before; has a mastery of all the principal languages of the modern world.